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26 February 1985

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

FRANCO-SYRIAN RELATIONS REMAIN COOL AFTER VISIT

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 252, 8-14 Dec 84 pp 14-15

[Article by Jamal al-Rawi]

[Text] French President Francois Mitterrand's visit to Syria last week was expected to mark the start of fresh international activity to resolve the Middle East crisis. In point of fact, however, it showed how far apart the views of presidents Mitterrand and al-Asad are and it sets limits to Franco-Syrian reconciliation. Our correspondents in Paris who accompanied the French president during his visit to Syria tells here why the visit disappointed both parties.

For the first time since he came to power in 1970, Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad held a joint press conference with another head of state. It took place in the Meridien hotel in Damascus on 28 November at the end of French President Francois Mitterrand's visit to Syria, the first visit by a French president to Syria since its independence. Observers and newsmen believe President al-Asad's decision to join in the press conference means that his talks with President Mitterrand were of exceptional substantive importance, especially since the French had told the newsmen on the eve of the visit that the Syrian president did not agree to the idea of a joint press conference and consequently, President Mitterrand would hold the conference by himself. However, President al-Asad came at the last minute.

The two men sat side by side and for 80 minutes answered questions, but each did so in his own language...and from his world. Those present felt the Franco-Syrian reconciliation effort were more or less a failure because there are no prospects for joint action.

On the one hand, there was a man discussing concord and middle-of-the road solutions and limiting himself to repeating the objectives that must be attained (peace, security, mutual recognition, etc). When asked the conditions for attaining these objectives, he would answer in the same way, that is, the need for dialogue and mutual concessions.

On the other hand, there was a man with a different view, imposing precise conditions and speaking about every issue in detail, his stand seemingly well-rounded and clear.

The longer the press conference continued, the more the gulf between the two men seemed to widen. True, the night before they spent 4 and a half hours alone after it had been decided they would meet for only an hour, but the duration of the meeting, which surprised the French and made those close to President Mitterrand take it as a good omen, did not have much political significance. It consisted of nothing more than the fact that Mitterrand and al-Asad had never met before, with al-Asad insisting, whenever Mitterrand asked him a question, on setting out the entire Syrian stand.

Three Issues

The presidents' talk centered on three main points: Lebanon, the Gulf war, and the Arab-Israeli struggle and the Palestinian issue.

The matter of Lebanon took up most of the time. President Mitterrand was obviously eager to know whether President al-Asad believes Lebanon ultimately has the right to independence or Syria has the right to trusteeship over it. The long talk did not settle this point in President Mitterrand's mind, according to what a member of the French delegation told AL-MAJALLAH. The French president detected in al-Asad an evident eagerness to calm the situation in Lebanon and respect its legal institutions. However, he also emphasized that Lebanon and Syria are one people and one country and that the security and prosperity of each is dependent on the other. Therefore, President Mitterrand emphasized in his press conference that he is still insisting on Lebanon's independence despite the fact that "Syria and Lebanon are one family."

Regarding the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, both parties agreed on the objective, that is, the need for the Zionist army to withdraw swiftly, but President al-Asad did not concede to Israel any right to obtain security guarantees, not even in the region of the boundary zone. This prevented President Mitterrand from acting as a mediator between President al-Asad and Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres who visited Paris this week. Mitterrand wanted to play this role on a small stage, namely, southern Lebanon, as a prelude to playing a comparable role on the regional stage. Al-Asad and Mitterrand apparently agreed that entrusting the UN forces with maintaining the safety of Israel's borders is the ideal solution.

As for the French role in Lebanon in particular and in the region in general, the Syrian party expressed its appreciation of this role as long as it remains independent of the American role. Al-Asad told the newsmen quite plainly: "We favor French role but only a French role."

Concerning the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, it appears that the dialogue was closer to being a monologue. Al-Asad monopolized the conversation for more than an hour, explaining the problem to President from

antiquity to the present. It led President Mitterrand to say at the press conference:

"President al-Asad gave me a complete, fact-filled political and historical account of this struggle and drew my attention to it." Again there was agreement but only on the objectives: the need to halt the fighting and respect the sovereignty of each country. Naturally, however, al-Asad expressed greater understanding of Iranian conditions. He told President Mitterrand that a continuation of the current French and Western attitude toward Iran will not hasten the return of peace.

The Arab-Israeli controversy and Palestine issue came up repeatedly in the long meeting of the two presidents, but here too they were clearly far apart both in manner and in substance. President Mitterrand emphasized the need to start talks as soon as possible, while President al-Asad said that Syria does not want these talks at any price and that it does not accept the Western stand, which regards the Arabs and the Israelis as being on the same level because there is an aggressor and a victim of aggression. However, President Mitterrand said after meeting with the French foreign minister that he was surprised by Syrian flexibility toward Israel because he understood from President al-Asad that his stand is very close to that of Peres and is epitomized by the phrase "land in exchange for peace." But President Mitterrand added: "I'm afraid this Arab and Syrian stand has come too late."

An International Conference

Al-Asad naturally suggested the idea of an international conference to solve the entire problem. President Mitterrand endorsed the idea but went on to say that there is no hope of actually holding it. The Syrian side understood that France would not press Europe, the United States, and Israel to attend such a conference, at least at this time. This too is a case of a clear misunderstanding, for the Syrian side proposed an international conference as an idea to be acted on immediately, letting those stay away who want to stay away. The world would then know who wants peace and who does not. As for the French side, it considered the holding of a conference a good idea as the culmination of successful peace efforts but not to be called for unless Israel and the United States agree to attend.

Presidents Mitterrand and al-Asad held their first meeting on the day that Mitterrand arrived, that is, Monday, 26 November. In it they stressed the need to discuss the international and regional balance, but when the reporters asked President al-Asad if he means a military balance in the region between Israel and the Arabs, he answered: "I mean, of course, a balance between Syria and Israel."

Concerning the PLO, Mitterrand did not go into the issue in detail especially since al-Asad immediately said to him: "I am not against any individual, and whomever the member organizations of the PLO choose,

I consider him to be a representative of the Palestinian people. But Syria is not neutral in this controversy. It has done more than its share for the Palestinian cause. He who sacrifices for it has the right to express an opinion."

Regarding the main issue that has strained relations between Damascus and Paris in the last 3 years, that is, terrorism, the two presidents were asked about it face to face. President Mitterrand acknowledged that he has no proof of Syrian responsibility for any attacks made on the French in Lebanon or for any bomb explosions in Paris. This surprised the French newsmen because the French presidential office had repeatedly given them the opposite impression. And even on the eve of the visit, the official spokesman of the Elysee Palace, Michel Vouzelle, stated that France regards Syria as responsible for these attacks. Strangely enough, the French newsmen did not bring up this point at the press conference.

A high Syrian official told us in Damascus at the end of the visit that it was "only an occasion for the two presidents to get to know each other--and this a good thing in itself." However, he did not conceal his disappointment because Damascus wanted Paris to join it in measures to solve the problem and help Syria diplomatically to improve relations with Europe and the West, especially since President Mitterrand is the highest Western official whom Syria can receive at this time. Syria, of course, warmly welcomed Mitterrand's support for its regional, indeed international, role, but it wanted him to agree to concrete measures right away.

What Does France Want?

The French side wanted a moderate Syrian statement to enable it to pressure Israel on southern Lebanon and the Palestine issue--but it did not get it. It wanted a clearer Syrian stand on the PLO leadership question but was told this was a purely Palestinian and Arab question.

The only future steps on which agreement was reached relate to cultural cooperation between the two countries and on a limited arms deal whereby Syria would get 15 Gazelle helicopters equipped with air-to-ground missiles and a number of Milan antitank missiles.

As for politics, both parties man their positions. No high-level Syrian-French meeting is expected in the foreseeable future. Paris has not extended an invitation to the Syrian president to visit it.

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

DEMARCATIION OF ALGERIAN BORDERS EXAMINED

Paris LE MOIS EN AFRIQUE in French No 225-226, Oct-Nov 84 pp 15-30

[Article by Habib Gherari, holder of diploma in Advanced Studies of the IIIrd Cycle in International Law, University of Paris I, Pantheon-Sorbonne: "Demarcation and Boundary Marking of the Algerian Borders"]

[Text] The interest in a study of the demarcation and boundary marking of the Algerian borders may be based on three kinds of considerations.

1) The first relates to the importance of the problem of determining land borders in general, that is to say:

"... the legal and political operation which is aimed at determining the area of the power of the state."¹

This operation is interesting to the extent that it touches on an important constitutional element of the state, specifically the territory, and thus on the area of the state's sovereignty. Professor D. Bardonnet wrote on this subject that:

"the main function of a border is... to delimitate sovereignties and to separate the areas which constitute the territory of a state, and are subject to its jurisdiction, from the territory of another state."²

This interest is thus linked to the importance of the finality of the institution. On the other hand, as the boundary follows in virtually all cases considerations of a political nature³, only an inductive study or better yet a case by case study, can help to define the problem on the legal level. Finally, still at the level of general considerations, there is the demarcation of the borders, that is to say the:

"... technical operation which transfers the terms of an established delimitation onto the soil."⁴

This maintains relations of complementarity with the notion of delimitation. On the one hand, the first is a good illustration of the principles which require the territorial borders of a state⁶ to be complete, definitive, stable and permanent: practice⁵, jurisprudence⁶ as well as doctrine have always stressed those requirements; but the marking of borders confers this set of characteristics. On the other hand, the demarcation (or boundary marking) is seen as the "test of delimitation," according to the felicitous expression used by the late lamented Charles De Visscher.⁷ The former verifies the

effectiveness and the value of the latter: if the boundary has been well prepared and well studied, the operation in the field will be greatly facilitated. Conversely, if the boundary has been badly conceived, the operation will suffer. This problem is all the more far-reaching when it involves African borders.

2) The characteristics of African borders are well known and easily recalled. Africa, prior to colonization, was not acquainted with the modern concept of border as a line but rather the concept of a frontier zone because its physical (abundance of land), human (nomadism, scattering of population) and political (dispersal of tribal power) characteristics did not push it toward the (European) concept. The movement of colonization imposed its concept of borders in order to separate the influence zones of each European state respectively; in so doing lines were drawn on maps regardless of ethnic, geographic and political realities. This explains why those borders have been labeled approximate, arbitrary and artificial.⁸ During colonization, the African countries did not fail to note the iniquitous and unjust character of this phenomenon and they proposed a revision of those borders as soon as they became independent.⁹ However, when the moment came this was not what happened to them; on the contrary, those states preferred to maintain the status quo with all the problems this implied.

As a matter of fact, differences concerning borders between African states did not fail to materialize¹⁰ and even today some of them have not yet been resolved.¹¹ Furthermore, in virtually all the cases these conflicts have not been referred to the International Court of Justice [ICJ].^{12,13} In the rare cases which have been resolved, diplomacy and specifically direct negotiation between the protagonists was used most often. Hence, the study of any demarcation agreement in the African context is instructive to the extent that sometimes it provides the solution to a disagreement or else it confirms the attitude of the states involved toward their colonial borders when those states have not had any litigation. Finally, the rarity of demarcation conventions in Africa should be stressed because of those problems but also for obvious financial and technical reasons. In fact, the Algerian example is interesting for more than one reason.

3) Algeria, an Arab and African country, has turned the question of the settlement of its border problems into a basic principle of its foreign policy, especially as this country has been confronted with this thorny issue with its Moroccan¹⁴ and Tunisian¹⁵ neighbors ever since its independence. Furthermore, the solution to this problem is seen as an inevitable prerequisite to the policy of cooperation which Algeria plans to conduct with its various neighbors. Finally, Algeria shares borders with several countries: Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Niger, Mali, Mauritania and the Sahrawi Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR], which in itself causes a delicate problem for Algeria at the level of the number of boundaries to set. As a matter of fact, the policy conducted by this country in this area seems exemplary to us in many ways. Indeed, Algeria recently concluded no less than four border marking conventions in addition to those already signed with Tunisia in 1970 and with Morocco in 1972.¹⁶ These conventions fully implement the Algerian position on the matter, while at the same time they demonstrate its consistency. What is there to be said about this? That is what we intend to show in this study in which we

will touch successively on the problems resulting from the drawing of the Tunisian border, the setting of boundaries with the states of Mali, Niger and Mauritania; finally, we will try to draw some information from the analysis of these various agreements.

I. Border with Tunisia

This border must be examined through the study of its two sections, because the problems posed by each of them have produced unequal difficulties.

A- The Bir Romane/Libyan Border Section

1. Controversy Concerning Boundary Marker 233

Even prior to Algeria's independence, Tunisia began to demand a correction of the boundary. Thus, in his speech of 12 April 1957, President H. Bourguiba challenged the course of the border with Algeria, stating that the latter had been favored at the expense of his country as a result of being French territory, and it is a fact that French officers worked out the division.¹⁸ Again, through the words of its president, this state expressed its claims on 5 February 1959. On that occasion, President Bourguiba stated that:

"If the borders established by the French on the Libyan and Algerian sides were in effect, Tunisia would gain an additional 200 kilometers in width, that is to say that it would have double the current width of its territory... This situation cannot continue any longer: either the Sahara will be considered the common heritage of the border countries and exploited as such in association or it must be divided according to the real borders of the country."¹⁹

The president of Tunisia also considered taking the matter to the ICJ and delivered a letter to the French government on 24 January of the same year in which, expressing his reservations, he developed certain arguments concerning, on the one hand, the intersection of Algeria, Libya and Tunisia and, on the other hand, the Bir Romane/Libyan border section strictly speaking.

a) The Tunisian/Libyan border was determined by the Convention of 19 May 1910 concluded between France and the Ottoman Empire.²⁰ According to this convention the border common to both countries starts at Ras Adjii on the coast and ends at Garet el Hamel in the south, at 14 kilometers south-west of Ghadames. This outline was confirmed by a proces verbal on delimitation drawn up in 1911 by both parties²¹ and by the exchange of letters of 26 December 1956 which took place between France and Libya.²² But, noted the president of Tunisia, the current border as conceived by France stops at Fort-Saint, 30 kilometers further to the north than Garet el Hamel. Hence, he concluded, this error²³ should be corrected by recovering the Fort-Saint/Garet el Hamel section.

b) This time speaking about the Algerian/Tunisian border, the president noted that the Bir Romane/Garet el Hamel section was never drawn in a clear and final manner, that the "temporary border" as referred to on maps and represented by dotted lines did not end at Garet el Hamel or boundary marker 233, but at Fort-Saint, at boundary marker 220. Consequently, he concluded, that temporary status should be ended and a new border should be drawn vertically

from Bir Romane to the parallel of Garet el Hamel. Thus Tunisia would be able to satisfy its desire to own its "Saharan extension."²⁴

c) Hence, the region claimed is a vast area between Bir Romane and Garet el Hamel.²⁵ It is a region of considerable extent and is also rich in oil as it includes the El Borma field on the Algerian side and probably also the Edjelleh field. In short, it involves a region which is highly coveted for its riches, and there is no doubt at all about the intentions of the Tunisians as they propose as an alternative solution that the Sahara become a heritage common to the border countries and exploited as such.²⁶

d) On the French side they responded that the letter from the president of Tunisia used names which were to say the least unknown. Moreover, the letter including the Tunisian reservations was in fact nothing but an annex to the national convention signed on 24 January 1959 in which an agreement on Fort-Saint emerged on the Tunisian side. Furthermore, in February 1959 France argued that Tunisia had agreed to the existing boundary because it had initialed the map annexed to the convention on domestic autonomy dated 3 June 1955.²⁷

e) In 1961, Tunisia reiterated its position in a letter addressed to the French government. However, 10 days after having sent this message, President Bourguiba told the National Assembly of Tunisia:
"... We have decided, whatever the consequences may be, to send a Tunisian military unit to plant a flag on boundary marker 233 which the French military is keeping us from reaching."

"France must return to us what it usurped from us. But as far as the drawing of our western borders with Algeria are concerned, I commit myself to do it only with an independent Algerian government."²⁸

On the very evening of this speech, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic [GPRA] in turn took a position in a communique: "no correction of borders could take place with the colonial power which has no right to conclude agreements in the name of Algeria."²⁹

Shortly afterwards, events started to move fast as on 19 July 1961 at 21:30 hours a commando group made up of Tunisians attacked Fort Thiriet, located in Algeria some 700 kilometers from Fort-Saint. This attack was repelled but there were several deaths, specifically on the Tunisian side.³⁰ It was under those circumstances that Algeria became independent on 5 July 1962.

f) Barely a year after having recovered its independence, Algeria concluded two border conventions with Tunisia dated respectively 26 July and 1 September 1963.³¹ However, this agreement did not bring an end to the Tunisians' claims; and even though the episode of the Algerian-Moroccan "war of the sands" pushed this problem to the background, as of 1966 Tunisia started up the debate again about the famous boundary marker 233 located, as we saw earlier, some 14 kilometers southwest of Ghadames in the extreme south of Tunisia, a marker which France had always considered as belonging to the territory of Algeria. On 11 April 1966, the Algerian minister of finance made a speech at Souk Ahras,

a city located very near the Algerian-Tunisian border, in which he referred to the boundary marker in question. The Tunisians who had put their argument forward again the preceding 15 March thought they detected an implicit recognition of their claims in this statement.

However, their hopes were short lived because on 13 April 1966, a communique from the Algerian embassy in Tunis reset the clock:

"The embassy of the Republic of Algeria in Tunis strongly denies any erroneous interpretation of the statement (by the Algerian minister in question), and specifies if necessary that Algeria is one and indivisible and that its borders are those which it inherited from the colonial power at the time of the proclamation of its independence."³²

The official circles in Tunisia in turn once again stood their ground, specifically their claim to access to boundary marker 233 with all that this implies in terms of appropriation of a vast region with promising economic resources. However the problem was solved shortly afterwards, that is to say the next year.

2. The Solution

a) A first meeting took place on 19 and 20 January 1967 at Nefzaoua between an Algerian military commission and its Tunisian counterpart. At the time of this meeting an agreement in principle was reached on the location of the border from Bir Romane to Fort-Saint over a 200 to 250 kilometer section, but without however resolving the core of the problem concerning the status of the boundary marker 233.³³ This was resolved on 16 April in Tunis at the time of the signing of the agreement between the two parties about the demarcation of the border.³⁴ The final solution to the problem was established with the agreement of 6 January 1970. As a matter of fact, following the 1968 agreement negotiations resumed as early as in January 1969, and continued throughout that year; it was on the occasion of the visit of the Algerian minister of foreign affairs to Tunis that the agreement of 6 January 1970 was signed, which put an end to any controversy.³⁵

b) This agreement confirms the Algerian argument of respect for the boundaries as they were inherited from France, in this case the border as it was established in 1929. In this respect the preamble to the agreement entitled:

"Agreement on the Location of the Tunisian-Algerian Border Between Bir Romane and the Libyan Border"³⁶ does not leave any doubt:

"Having recorded the consent of the Tunisian state to renounce its claims relative to the portion of territory from Fort-Saint to boundary marker 233..."

Article 1 of this agreement refers to the boundary as it appears in the process verbal on delimitation signed in Tunis on 16 April 1968. Article 2 of this document stresses the final nature of the settlement of the border issue as agreed on by both parties. That is an echo of the concern for stability and permanence which characterizes all settlements relative to the boundaries. Finally, article 1b with the protocol as an annex settles the problem of the transfer of national property. This is how the controversy regarding boundary marker 233 ended.

B- The Mediterranean/Bir Romane Section

1) Very early on Tunisia recognized the location of the border in this sector, going from Tabarka on the Mediterranean coast to Bir Romane, much further to the south. It is thus that in 1959, while it challenged the course of the border in the south, Tunisia agreed to the one further to the north given that, it stated, this border was determined by common agreement by the French authorities in Algeria and those of the protectorate, and given that moreover the location was approved by a decree from the Bey in 1901.³⁷

2) However, paradoxically, the demarcation of this sector was implemented only in March 1983. As a matter of fact, it was on the occasion of the visit of Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid to Tunisia that the Convention on Boundary Marking relative to the border in this sector was concluded on 19 March 1983,³⁸ at the same time in fact as the treaty of brotherhood and concord dated the same day.³⁹

As it presents itself today, the Algerian-Tunisian border has been definitively demarcated; it runs from the Mediterranean coast southward to Bir Romane more or less vertically, then after having reached that point, it makes a loop toward the east (toward the dry well point), then drops down again in a straight line until Fort-Saint.⁴⁰

If the Algerian border with Tunisia has caused some problems, the same is not true for the "Saharan" states, further to the south, that is to say Mali, Niger and Mauritania.

II. Southern Borders

We will successively examine the demarcation of the Algerian borders with Mali, Niger and Mauritania.

A- Border with Mali⁴¹

Prior to being demarcated, the location of this border caused a few differences of interpretation among the parties involved.

1) The basic text here is the Convention of Niamey of 20 June 1909,⁴² which defines the location of some 1,368 kilometers of borders. This border is limited on the east by the intersection with Niger and on the west by the intersection with Mauritania. The convention in question was concluded between two French officers, Colonel Laperinne for Algeria and Colonel Venel for French West Africa [AOF]. However, as this text experienced several successive changes,⁴³ it could not avoid being the source of texts which were not always similar.

As a matter of fact, at the time of the discussions between the two parties, each one produced a draft which was of course favorable to itself. Thus, Algeria relied on the following text:

"Article 1, paragraph 1: toward the east, starting at the source of the wadi of Tin-Zaouten, the border follows this wadi for 100 kilometers downstream

from the confluence of the wadi of Tin-Zaoua. After leaving the wadi of Tin-Zaouten, the border heads in a straight line for the headland of Tassili in the Ahaggar, which is located 15 kilometers south of the In Guezzam wells; next, it follows the slopes of the Tassili in the Ahaggar until it reaches the point of Izileg, which remains in Algeria; from there a straight line links this point to that of In Azoua, which remains in French West Africa."⁴⁴

Mali, on the other hand, based itself on a modified text of the Convention of Niamey which was approved by the colonial authorities on 6 August 1911. Therefore, as far as this country is concerned the eastern part of the border must take this change into account.

The "Malian" text was worded as follows:

"Article 1, paragraph 1: toward the east, starting at the source of Tin-Zaouten the border follows this wadi for 100 kilometers downstream from the confluence of the wadi of Tin-Zaoua, then heads in a straight line for the oasis of Tin-Azoua, the latter remaining in French West Africa."

"Paragraph 2: the border will start at the wadi of Tin-Zaouten, it will follow, going toward the wadi, the watershed of the Tilemsi basin until it reaches the source of the wadi of Gouden and the wadi of In-Keouen, until the point where this water parting is intersected by the colonial road of Ifalek, at Bankor, Tin-Tagan, Sounfat (1906 Laperrine itinerary)."⁴⁵

This controversy was not theoretical at all because it implied a certain number of practical effects, among which the determination of the 100 kilometers and the ownership of the well of In-Tellit."⁴⁶

a) Concerning the first problem, while Mali maintains that:

"The 100 kilometers must be measured following the course of the wadi of Tin-Zaouten, as it is described by the text in its possession and not following a straight line."

"Algeria, on the other hand, maintains that the 100 kilometers are measured to the south as indicated by the existing maps. It states that the outline which appears on the maps it has in its possession are indeed in conformity with the Convention of Niamey; this is, it concludes, the interpretation inherited from the colonial authorities at the same time as the official texts, all of this forming an indivisible unit."⁴⁷

b) The controversy relative to the location of the well of In-Tellit was due to the gaps in the above mentioned Convention of Niamey given that its article 1, paragraph 2 specifies laconically that:

"The border follows the dividing line of the waters between the wadi of N'Gouden and the wadi of In Keouen..."

Leaving the well in question between the two wadis, in this controversy Algeria felt that the well belonged to it as was shown by the map appended to the Convention of Niamey, whereas Mali argued the reverse, basing itself on facts on site, on an alleged contradiction between the map and the text of the convention, and finally on certain recent maps showing that the well in question belongs to it."⁴⁸

c) Furthermore, the demarcation also presented serious technical and financial problems (boundary marking, development of maps...) which, given their importance, threatened to get in the way of the desire of both states to mark their boundaries. As a matter of fact, this desire revealed itself at the time of the meeting between the two heads of state of Mali and of Algeria at Ouargla (Algeria) on 30 January 1970, and on that occasion the mixed joint technical commission for the definition and establishment of the border was⁴⁹ set up, through multiple diplomatic exchanges devoted to that problem... It is thanks to those efforts and that spirit that on 8 May 1983 a convention was concluded in Algiers between the two countries, relative to the marking of the border which seems to confirm the Algerian positions.^{50,51} With the other two states, the demarcation did not require any preliminaries.

B- Border with Niger⁵²

1) This border is about 950 kilometers long; starting at the intersection with Mali it stretches northward in three sections of 174 kilometers, 227 kilometers and 549 kilometers until the intersection with Libya.⁵³

Legally, it is once again the above mentioned Convention of Niamey which defined its outline. Thus, it:

"Leaves the wadi of Tin-Zaouten, 100 kilometers downstream from the confluence of the wadi of Tin-Zaoua. After leaving the wadi of Tin-Zaouten, the border runs in a straight line toward a point located halfway between the well of In Guezzam and the well of Asmanka, then runs along the southern edge of the Tassili in the Ahaggar until it meets the wadi of Iferrer, follows the ridge of the cliffs which border the western bank of this wadi until a point located halfway between the well of Tedjeit and the well of Izelek. From this point on, the border runs in a straight line toward the Libyan border, going past the peak of Ahoh located between In-Ezzan and Djado at 22 kilometers from the well of In Ezzam."⁵⁴

The Bilma conference in 1932 did not substantially affect this arrangement so that it has remained in force as proven by the boundary adopted by the convention of 5 January 1983 between Algeria and Niger.

2) Indeed, it was in Algiers on⁵⁵ 5 January 1983 that the two states signed a convention of boundary marking which retains the determination of the common border in three sections:

Going from the point whose geographical coordinates are 4 degrees 16'00" east longitude and 19 degrees 08'44"00 north latitude (extreme western point of the border between the two countries), it runs in a straight line toward the point south of In Guezzam, the point whose geographical coordinates are 5 degrees 48'46"88 east longitude and 19 degrees 26'35"66 north latitude. From that point on, it once again takes on the form of a straight line until it reaches the point located 3 kilometers north of the center of the well of In Azaoua which is located at 7 degrees 27'33"74 east longitude and 20 degrees 50'36"29 north latitude. Once again starting from this point the border follows a straight line to end up at elevation point 1010 (Gharet Dhirouet el Djmel), the extreme eastern point of the border between the two parties, which is located⁵⁶ at 11 degrees 59'54"60 east longitude and 23 degrees 30'54"00 north latitude.

This border is indicated by a certain number of markers. Finally, the last border is that with Mauritania.

C- Border with Mauritania⁵⁷

1) The definition of this border touches on two aspects: on the one hand, the intersection of Algeria-Mali-Mauritania, and on the other hand, the description of the boundary itself.

a-- With regard to the first point, the French decree of 5 July 1944 established the point where the border of Mauritania meets with the borders of Mali and Algeria in its point number 5. However, article 2 of this decree indicates that the detailed specification of the border was supposed to be added later on by way of an order from the governor general of French West Africa, but in reality this text never saw the light so that as soon as they became independent Mali and Mauritania hastened to resolve this problem, which was settled in fact by the Treaty of Kayes of 16 February 1963. However, as far as the Algerian section is concerned,⁵⁸ this convention did not alter any of the provisions of the decree of 1944.

b-- As the definition of the Algerian border was made by the Convention of Niamey, it did not present any problems of specification.

2) This explains why the two countries (Algeria and Mauritania) managed to conclude a convention on the marking of their common border with relatively no problems (except for those of a technical and financial nature).⁵⁹ In this case it involves the convention signed in Algiers on 13 December 1983. In accordance with article 1, the course of the border is defined:

"... by a straight section beginning at an extreme eastern point with the following geographical coordinates:

- longitude: 4 degrees 50'00"00 west of the international meridian
- latitude: 25 degrees 00'00"00 north

and which goes by the well known as 'Hassi 75,' jointly recognized by both parties, to arrive at the extreme western point on the 8 degrees 40'00"00 meridian. Each one of those three points is indicated by a marker."

However, the location of the Hassi 75 well is not specified in the convention and it is up to a mixed group of experts to specify its geographical coordinates as well as the latitude of the extreme western point.⁶⁰ Thus Algeria has demarcated no less than four borders with its neighbors; this action already makes it possible to draw certain conclusions.

III. Conclusions

In most of the cases, the five delimitation and boundary marking conventions analyzed include a certain number of technical provisions related more specifically to the marking of the border.⁶¹ Thus, these conventions make provisions for the location of the markers,⁶¹ the establishment of mixed technical groups or committees in charge of supervising the work,⁶² the development of maps with an indication of their scale,⁶³ and the inspection, protection and repair of the markers.⁶⁴ However, the most interesting observations come from the analysis of the Algerian position on border questions throughout the study of those conventions. At first sight, Algeria may be characterized by its

constancy and loyalty to the principle of uti possidetis. On the other hand, the settlement of the border issue fits within the framework of a broader doctrine in matters of foreign policy: "good neighbor policy."

A- Reference to Uti Possidetis

1) While they were colonized, the African states wanted to carry out a real "revision" of the borders they would inherit from colonization because of their many deficiencies and their arbitrariness.⁶⁵ However, after independence those same states, faced with the risks implied in this policy, reversed themselves and opted for a territorial status quo. This shift was well conveyed by Mr Keba M'Baye when he wrote:

"The separations among territories during the colonial era were criticized by the Africans themselves who considered them arbitrary and based on no solid foundation at all. Since every territory has become independent, it became clear that what was considered artificial and short-lived has suddenly become untouchable because it corresponds to a deep national feeling."⁶⁶

Similarly, Mr J. Buchmann noted that:

"It would be wrong to underestimate the solidity of the borders inherited from the colonial era and to imagine that they must disappear for the sole reason that they are absurd. The fact that in the final analysis independence was acquired within the framework of the territorial states, weighs very heavily here."⁶⁷

In fact, keeping the colonial borders as they were has made it possible for the new African states on the one hand to appropriate the whole continent and thus not to leave any 'terra nullius,' and consequently no foreign power can claim any parcel of land on the continent. Along the same lines, and this fact is much more important than the previous one, the status quo has created a barrier against the territorial appetites of some African states which would be tempted to expand their sovereignty to territories belonging to weaker neighbor states. On the other hand, and primarily, this policy has contributed to the emergence of a national feeling given that in Africa the state preceded the nation. Some countries consist of a mosaic of tribes and clans which very naturally exercise centrifugal forces; to maintain the status quo makes it possible to gather these people together within a specific spacial framework,⁶⁸ which is already a first common feature and thus a reason for solidarity."

The recognized advantages of this view are by far more important than its inconveniences and this explains why, faced with this problem, the OAU also chose this solution.

As a matter of fact, in view of the imminent multiplication of disputes concerning boundaries, and more specifically the Algerian-Moroccan conflict and the events it led to,⁶⁹ the African leaders were duty bound to define an official position for the continental organization concerning this thorny problem. The rules of territorial integrity appear repeatedly in the convention setting up the OAU; thus the preamble, article 1, paragraph 1, and paragraph 3 of article 3 mention it, but those provisions do not deal specifically with the problem in question; this is why the first conference of heads of state and

of government, held in Cairo in 1964, adopted a resolution (A H G 16/1) entitled: "Litigation Among African States Concerning Borders" and worded as follows:

"The conference of heads of state and of government:

... solemnly declares that all member states commit themselves to respect the borders in existence at the time when they acceded to independence."⁷⁰

Somalia and Morocco alone disassociated themselves from that position by rejecting the doctrine of uti possidetis.⁷¹ Thus conceived the principle may then be defined: "... as the principle according to which the colonial borders inherited at the time of their independence by the new states, must be respected and maintained by them."⁷²

This principle is not, in reality, specifically African given that it appeared first in Latin America around the year 1810 when, after their independence, the new South American states decided of a common accord to keep the borders inherited from the colonial powers, that is to say Spain and Portugal.

Without going into the debate relative to its legal or political nature, let us simply note that the International Court of Justice has mentioned this principle in connection with the Libyan-Tunisian land border in its decree relative to the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries.⁷³ Moreover and especially, in his individual opinion Judge R. Ago has expanded this principle to maritime borders agreed upon among colonial powers.⁷⁴

2) It is this principle that Algeria is firmly attached to and which it put to use for the settlement of all the border problems we have mentioned; but also it did not depart from it at the time of the conflict which opposed it to Morocco, and one may expect that the same was and will be true with regard to Libya.

As soon as Algeria became independent in 1962, the Algerian government declared: "The borders of new states must be established according to the borders of the former colonial powers which these states succeed."⁷⁵

A year later, on 10 December 1963, the head of state repeated the official Algerian position, that is to say that: "Algeria has the borders which were left by colonization."⁷⁶

Along the same lines, the Algerian minister of foreign affairs let it be known in 1966 that:

"Algeria is one and indivisible, from north to south, from east to west, and its borders are those which it inherited from the colonial power at the time of the proclamation of its independence."⁷⁷

With regard to the agreement of 6 January 1970, which settled the problem of boundary marker 233,⁷⁸ the commentators have commented that the final solution was in complete harmony with the Algerian position and consequently with the principle of uti possidetis.⁷⁹

In his message on the state of the nation of 20 December 1981, President Chadli Bendjedid repeated this doctrine: "Algeria... proclaims its total commitment to the decisions of the OAU relative to respect for the land borders at the time of decolonization."⁸⁰

The preamble of the four boundary marking conventions concluded in 1983 refers explicitly to the principle of the inviolability of the borders acquired at the time of independence and to the above mentioned OAU resolution AHG/16 1.

B- Insertion of the Question of Settlement of the Border Problems in the "Positive Good Neighbor" Policy

1) The Algerian doctrine of neighborly relations is completely positive given that the states in this situation not only must not either attack or interfere in the internal affairs of the neighbor, but also more positively must work in favor of the broadest possible cooperation.⁸¹ In fact, this means that one goes from the concept of border as limitation and line of separation to one of border as "meeting place,"⁸² location of cooperation and rapprochement.

This view of the relations among states of the same region was put into practice by this country at the time of the marking of its borders.

2) With Tunisia, at the same time as the conclusion of the first convention of demarcation on 6 January 1970, a treaty⁸³ of fraternity, neighborliness and cooperation was signed on the same day.

More recently, with the same country on the occasion of the boundary marking convention relative to the second border section,⁸⁴ the two states adopted on the same day a treaty of fraternity and concord. In addition and especially, the two neighbors wanted to promote their cooperation of which one element will be:

"The development of industrial units, and specifically those established in the border areas of the two countries."⁸⁵

Generally speaking, economic collaboration between the two countries receives priority.

The same is true with Mauritania given that on 13 December 1983⁸⁶ it joined the treaty of fraternity and concord which binds Algeria and Tunisia, and which is a treaty open to all states in the region.

Similarly, since August 1982, the heads of state of Algeria, Mauritania and Mali have been meeting every⁸⁷ year in the capital of one of the three countries to discuss common problems.

Conversely, Algeria set a precondition to Libya's joining the treaty of fraternity and concord of 19 March 1983, specifically the conclusion of a convention⁸⁸ on the delimitation and boundary marking of their common border. This means that the settlement of the border problems takes on a considerable importance in the eyes of this country and that it is a necessary step for establishing stable political relationships and broad economic cooperation which, as a matter

of fact, is in keeping with another challenge, that of promoting cooperation among developing countries or south-south cooperation in general,⁸⁹ and more specifically with the desire to develop the Maghreb.⁹⁰ Algeria still has definitively to delimitate its borders with Libya, Morocco and the SDAR, but we know that in the two latter cases preconditions must be brought up which go far beyond the simple problem of the drawing of the borders.

The setting of African borders is a difficult operation and a long term enterprise, but its benefits are so important at the level of peace and economic cooperation that it must be attempted there where any chance of success exists.

FOOTNOTES

1. C. De Visscher, "Problèmes de confins en droit international public" [Border Problems in Public International Law], Paris, Pédone, 1969, p 28.
2. "Land Borders and the Relativity of Their Location (Selected Legal Problems)," RCADI [Recueil des cours de l'Académie de droit international], 1976, V, table 153, p 21.
3. Ibid., p 22.
4. C. De Visscher, loc. cit.
5. See the agreements mentioned by Professor D. Bardonnet, op. cit., pp 28 ff.
6. Ibid., pp 25 ff. In 1962, the ICJ declared in the Temple of Preah Vihear case:
"Generally speaking, when two countries determine a border between them, one of their principal objectives is to decide on a stable and definitive solution." (ICJ, volume 1962, p 34).
See also along the same lines, J. Dutheil de La Rochère, "Procedures To Settle Border Disputes" in SFDI [Société française de droit international], Colloquium of Poitiers, "La Frontière" [The Border], Paris, Pédone, 1980, pp 115-116.
7. Op. cit., p 30. Mrs Dutheil de La Rochère wrote on this subject:
"... experience shows that demarcation often reveals the inadequacies of delimitation." (Op. cit., p 120).
8. See the general study by R. Yakemtchouk, "African Borders," RGDIP [Revue générale de droit international public], 1970, pp 27-68.
9. Ibid., pp 49 ff.
10. B. Boutros-Ghali, "Les conflits de frontières en Afrique" [Border Conflicts in Africa], Paris, Editions techniques et économiques, 1972, 158 pages.
J.P. Queneudec, "Remarks on the Settlement of Border Conflicts in Africa," RGDIP, 1970, pp 69-77.

F. Gnandi, "Contribution à l'étude du problème des conflits frontaliers en Afrique" [Contribution to the Study of the Problem of Border Conflicts in Africa], specialization thesis, Law, Clermont, 1983, 287 pages.

B. Sandaogo, "Les conflits de frontières en Afrique" [The Border Conflicts in Africa], specialization thesis, Law, Poitiers, 1982, 327 pages.

For specific studies, see for example:

O.W. Yagla, "The Border Conflict Between Ghana and Togo," in SFDI, Colloquium of Poitiers, "La frontière," op. cit., pp 151 ff;

A. Shire, "L'intangibilité des frontières et les Etats de la corne de l'Afrique: conflit somalo-éthiopien" [The Intangibility of Borders and the States of the Horn of Africa: Somali-Ethiopian Conflict], specialization thesis, Law, Paris, 1983, 270 pages;

J.F. Guilhaudis, "Remarks Concerning Recent Territorial Conflicts Among African States (Aouzou Strip, Ogaden, Kyaka Salient)," AFDI [Annuaire français de droit international], 1979, pp 223-243;

P. Kebe, "Les problèmes de frontières en Afrique: le cas de la frontière nigéro-camerounaise" [Border Problems in Africa: The Case of the Nigerian-Cameroun Border], specialization thesis, Law, Paris, 1981, 455 pages.

Chronicle of Professor Rousseau at the RGDIP.

11. One recalls specifically the conflict which opposed Libya and Chad concerning the Aouzou strip (see the study by B. Lanne, "Tchad-Libye: la querelle des frontières" [Chad-Libya: The Border Quarrel], Paris, Karthala, 1982, 255 pages) and the Mali/Burkina Faso litigation (see EL MOUDJAHID [Algiers] of 15-17 March 1984), but there are many others.
12. J.P. Queneudec, op. cit., and "The African States and the Conference of the ICJ," ANNALES AFRICAINES, 1967, pp 27-50;
M. Bedjaoui, "The Peaceful Settlement of African Disputes." AFDI, 1972, pp 85-99;
R. Yakemtchouk, op. cit., pp 63 ff and "Africa in International Law," Paris, LGDJ [expansion unknown], 1971, pp 26 ff;
J.M. Bipoun-Woum, "African International Law: General Problems, Settlement of Conflicts," Paris, LGDJ, 1970, pp 177 ff;
O.F. Natchaba, "Les états africains et la Cour Internationale de Justice" [The African States and the International Court of Justice], higher doctoral dissertation, Law, Poitiers, 1978, 2 volumes, 206 and 240 pages and J. Dutheil de La Rochère, op. cit., pp 132-133.
13. With the exception of the Mali/Burkina conflict which is currently being examined by an ad hoc chamber of the ICJ (see Ch. Rousseau, "Chronicle of International Events," RGDIP, 1984, pp 266-267 and "Mali-Upper Volta: Special Agreement for the Submission of a Frontier Dispute to a Chamber of the International Court of Justice" in ILM [International Legal Materials], volume 22, 1983, pp 1252-1254). With regard to maritime borders the African states are more willing to go before the International Court of Justice: Libya and Tunisia have called on the ICJ for the delimitation of their respective continental shelf, and Guinea-Bissau and Guinea are before an arbitration court with the same problem (see our article: "A Current Problem: Delimitation of the Tunisian-Libyan Continental Shelf," LE MOIS EN AFRIQUE, No. 215-216, December and January 1984, pp 39-58; and PGA [expansion unknown], volume 16, of 1 April 1984, pp 32-33.

14. N. Bouaita, "Problèmes frontaliers et territoriaux au Maghreb: contribution à l'étude de l'uti possidetis" [Border and Territorial Problems in the Maghreb: Contribution to the Study of Uti Possidetis], higher doctoral dissertation, Law, Paris, 1981, pp 33 ff; B. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., pp 32-45; and M. Lamauri, "Le contentieux relatif aux frontières terrestres au Maroc" [Litigation Relative to the Land Borders of Morocco], specialization thesis, Nancy, 1977, 247 pages.
15. See below.
16. However, unlike Algeria, this country did not ratify these agreements; this is why we will not study this case.
17. For general, documentary and bibliographical data, see I. Browlie, "African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopedia," Hurst E. Company, London, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1979, pp 89-97 (map p 90). [No reference to this footnote in the text]
18. N. Bouaita, op. cit., pp 23 ff and Ch. Rousseau, "Chronicle of International Events," RGDIP, 1962, pp 172 ff; finally LE MONDE of 14 April 1957.
19. LE MONDE of 7 and 12 February 1959.
20. Text in B. Bouguettaia, "The Southern Borders of Algeria," Algiers, SNED [National Publishing and Distribution Association], 1981, pp 239-242.
21. Text, ibid., pp 251-255.
22. Text, RGDIP, 1958, pp 581-582.
23. Ch. Rousseau, "Chronicle of International Events," RGDIP, 1962, p 174 and B. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., pp 17 ff.
24. Ch. Rousseau, "Chronicle of International Events," RGDIP, 1962, p 175.
25. See map of Tunisian claims in ibid., p 173 and N. Bouaita, op. cit., pp 394-395.
26. R. Yakemtchouk, "The African Borders," op. cit., p 63.
J. Dutheil de La Rochère, op. cit., p 132.
27. LE MONDE of 14 February 1959.
28. Speech of 17 July 1961, ibid., 18 July 1961.
29. Quoted by Ch. Rousseau, "Chronicle of International Events," RGDIP, 1962, p 176 and LE MONDE of 19 June 1961.
30. Chronicle of Professor Rousseau mentioned above.

31. Text of these conventions: JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE [JORA], No. 87. of 22 November 1963, pp 1212-1213 and No. 89 of 29 November 1963, p 1256.
32. LE MONDE of 14 April 1966 and Rousseau, "Chronicle of International Events," RGDIP, 1966, pp 998-1000.
33. Ibid., 1967, pp 727-726 and LE MONDE of 21, 22 and 24 January 1967.
34. Ibid., 24 and 25 April 1968 and Ch. Rousseau, "Chronicle of International Events," RGDIP, 1969, pp 148-149.
35. Ibid., 1970, p 1017.
36. Text in JORA, No. 19, 21 February 1970, p 214.
37. Ch. Rousseau, "Chronicle of International Events," RGDIP, 1962, p 175.
38. Text in JORA, No. 23, 4 June 1983, p 1041; see LE MONDE of 22 March 1983; JEUNE AFRIQUE, No. 1162 of 13 April 1983, pp 28-29; REVOLUTION AFRICAINE, Algiers, No. 96, 25 to 31 March 1983; and Ch. Rousseau, op. cit., 1983, p 822.
39. See below.
40. See various maps reproduced in Professor Rousseau's above mentioned chronicles.
41. For general, documentary and bibliographical aspects, see I. Brownlie, op. cit., pp 44-50 (map p 44).
42. Text in B. Bouguettaia, op. cit., pp 243-245.
43. See ibid., pp 156 ff.
44. Quoted by ibid., p 196.
45. Idem, pp 196-197.
46. Ibid., pp 198-200 and Y. Doumbia, "Le règlement pacifique des conflits de frontière entre le Mali et les Etats limitrophes dans le cadre des principes fixés par l'organisation de l'Unité Africaine" [The Peaceful Settlement of the Border Conflicts Between Mali and the Neighboring States Within the Framework of the Principles Set by the Organization of African Unity], specialization thesis, Law, Paris, 1975, pp 90-92.
47. Y. Doumbia, op. cit., p 90.
48. Ibid., pp 90-91. B. Bouguettaia, op. cit., pp 198-200. D. Bardonnnet, op. cit., p 86.

49. Y. Doumbia, *op. cit.*, pp 92-93.
50. Ch. Rousseau, *op. cit.*, 1983, pp 820-821; text of the convention in JORA, No. 23, of 4 June 1983, p 1043.
51. We cannot affirm this with certainty because of a lack of adequate documentary data.
52. For documentary aspects see I. Brownlie, *op. cit.*, pp 84-88 (map p 84).
53. B. Bouguettaia, *op. cit.*, p 202.
54. *Ibid.*
55. REVOLUTION AFRICAINE, Algiers, of 14 to 20 January 1983, pp 6-9; EL MOUDJAHID, Algiers, of 6 January 1983; LE MONDE of 11 January 1983; text of the convention in JORA, No. 54, 27 December 1983, p 3125.
56. Article 1 of the above mentioned convention of 5 January 1983.
57. For the general, documentary and bibliographical aspects, see I. Brownlie, *op. cit.*, pp 50-54 (map p 50).
58. B. Bouguettaia, *op. cit.*, pp 194-195.
59. Text in JORA, No. 8, 21 February 1984, p 164.
60. Article 2 of the above mentioned convention.
61. Article 2 of the convention with Niger (above).
62. Article 2 of the convention with Tunisia of 19 March 1983, of the convention with Mali and Article 2 of the convention with Mauritania (above).
63. Articles 5 and 6 of the convention of 1983 with Tunisia, Articles 4 and 7 of the convention with Mali, Articles 3 and 5 of the agreement with Niger, and Articles 3 and 5 of the convention with Mauritania (above).
64. Articles 8 and 9 of the convention of 1983 with Tunisia, 9 and 11 of the convention with Mali, 7 and 9 of that with Niger, and 8 and 9 of that with Mauritania (above).
65. R. Yakemtchouk, "The African Borders," *op. cit.*
66. "Law and Development in French Speaking West Africa," REVUE SENEGALAISE DE DROIT, August 1967, p 46.
67. "L'Afrique noire independante" [Independent Black Africa], Paris, 1962, p 166.

68. See the above mentioned article by Yakemtchouk, the above mentioned theses of B. Bouguettaia, N. Bouaita, and J. de Pinho Campinos, "The Topicality of 'Uti Possidetis'," in SFDI, Colloquium of Poitiers, "La frontière," op. cit., pp 101 ff.
69. See footnote 13 above.
70. Complete text in B. Boutros-Ghali, "L'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine" [The Organization of African Unity], Paris, A. Colin, 1968, p 182; and AFDI, 1964, p 625.
71. For more details, see B. Boutros-Ghali, above mentioned work, pp 47-52.
72. J. de Pinho Campinos, op. cit., p 95.
73. ICJ, Collection, 1982, pp 65-66 paragraph 84.
74. Ibid., pp 95 ff; see also H. Gherari, op. cit., p 54.
75. "The Algerian-Moroccan Border Conflict," MAGHREB, January-February 1964, p 15.
76. Ibid.
77. LE MONDE of 15 April 1966.
78. See above.
79. LE MONDE of 27 April 1968; and Ch. Rousseau, op. cit., 1969, p 149.
80. LE MONDE of 22 December 1981.
81. Ibid. REVOLUTION AFRICAINE of 14-20 January 1985, pp 4-5. EL MOUDJAHID of 6 January 1983 and of 30 October 1984.
82. EL MOUDJAHID OF 9 January 1983.
83. Text in JORA, No. 5, 15 January 1970, p 38.
84. Text ibid., No. 23, 4 June 1983, p 1040.
85. Article 1 of the framework agreement on industrial cooperation concluded between the two countries on 24 April 1983; ibid., No. 37, 5 September 1984, p 935.
86. Text of the adhesion protocol, ibid., No. 8, 21 February 1984, p 163.
87. The last meeting took place at Nouakchott, EL MOUDJAHID of 15-18 September 1984.

88. LE MONDE of 29/30 January 1984 and 22/23 April 1984. JEUNE AFRIQUE, No. 1118 of 3 August 1983, p 31 and No. 1205 of 7 March 1984, pp 52-53.
89. A. Moatassine, "South/South in the Maghreb?," REVUE DU TIERS-MONDE, No. 96, 1983, pp 909-918.
90. M. Toumi, "Le maghreb" [The Maghreb], Paris, PUF [Presses Universitaires de France], 1982, 126 pages.

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CSO: 4519/74

ALGERIA

OBJECTIVES OF FIVE-YEAR PLAN REVIEWED

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French 4-10 Jan 85 pp 16-18

[Article by K. Chehrit: "The Second Five-Year Plan: Production To Ensure Economic Independence"]

[Text] The figures put forward in this second 5-year plan cannot be the only indicators of its various objectives. The growth in the volume of investments, from 400.6 billion Algerian dinars in the first 5-year plan to 550 billion, is certainly an indicator of the effort that was decided, but it is insufficient, for the true effort to be made will be qualitative rather than quantitative.

From now on, growth must be ensured by the existing production potential rather than by new investments. In its introduction, outlining the major orientations of the 1985-1989 5-year plan, the Plan and Finance Commission stressed the need for prudence in making new investments and for truly taking outside constraints into account. "If the plan goals are to be achieved, the internal and external constraints that burden our economy must be taken into account." The introduction, which summarizes the plan, lists such outside constraints as persistent inflation, shrinking trade, the eroded purchasing power of raw materials, attacks against the prices of oil and gas (our country's main sources of foreign currency), prohibitive interest rates, technological competition, debts, etc. These constraints, therefore, are an incentive to greater vigilance and a courageous choice when it comes to new investments. This will of necessity involve financial sacrifices in some sectors and moderation of the demand.

What is meant by internal constraints is mainly demographic pressure, which generates a strong growth of social needs, and the expenditures entailed in achieving the needed national and regional development and in controlling the rapid urbanization process. Actually, the demand for social services will increase inexorably and at a high rate, as the Algerian population will have increased by 20 percent by 1989. The other constraint mentioned by the Plan and Finance Commission of the People's National Assembly in its introduction deals with the major efforts that must be made to cover the expenditures resulting from the new orientation adopted to change the course of national and regional development. The current belief is that urbanization should be

brought under control and that rural populations should stay and be rooted where they are. To achieve this, the Algerian countryside will obviously have to be made more livable, and living areas will have to be created in the most deprived regions; also, investments will have to be reoriented toward inland areas. "If we are to control the urbanization phenomenon, we shall have to promote the rural world."

"In support of this effort, material bases and living conditions comparable to those of the towns must be established in the country."

Despite these constraints, the 1985-1989 plan includes some ambitious goals that are as many challenges to be met in order to achieve greater economic and social efficiency. It is no longer enough to reorganize the country's finances to say that the economy will be sound. True performance will emerge when agriculture and food production (which, together with water supply, account for 14 percent of all plan credits, totalling 550 billion) will make Algeria immune to "food power." And why should we not export agricultural surpluses in the long range? Therefore, we can state that success of the major orientations of this plan will depend on the effort made and the results achieved in the agricultural sector, the latter being somehow integrated to the water-supply sector. "In the agricultural sector, the projected production growth set at 4.5 percent per year represents a minimum goal considering the size of the consumer demand for foodstuffs. The demand is such that, even for such a production increase, food imports will continue to grow. It is therefore imperative that agriculture should appreciably increase its performance."

In the sector of processing industries, projected growth and production [as published], estimated at 9 percent per year, appear adequate to ensure better coverage of domestic demand and initiate exports of some products. As the post-oil era is inexorably approaching, the development of our national production will make it possible to restore a "normal" extraversion coefficient of our national economy. This coefficient will be 20 percent in 1985 (compared to 38 percent in 1978). To retain a sound foreign trade--the objective is still to achieve surpluses--import restrictions will be imposed on certain foodstuffs, industrial consumer goods, services, semi-finished products and raw materials as well as on certain durable goods. Food imports will from now on involve only products that cannot be supplied by the country's agriculture (cereals, tea, coffee, sugar, spices, oil-producing grains). As far as industrial consumer goods are concerned, only certain products will be imported, products that are not produced locally, in particular drugs and spare parts. Services will be a target in this effort to reduce imports.

Generally speaking, the volume of expenditures included in the second plan will make it possible to increase production by 7.8 percent per year, exclusive of oil and gas. Consumption will increase by 5.8 percent per year. Staple products will still receive price subsidies from the State. This plan should make it possible to create 946,000 jobs over 5 years, during which the active population will increase by about 900,000 people. In conclusion, according to the introductory report of the Plan and Finance Commission of the People's National Assembly, "the primary stakes will require that external and internal financial balances be brought under control as well as the overall proportions of the plan, the latter being marked by greater fluidity and enhanced regulation of the overall operation of the economy."

Table 1. Comparison of Investments for 1980-1984 and 1985-1989

<u>Sectors</u>	<u>1980-1984</u>	<u>1985-1985</u>	<u>Percent Increase</u>
Productive Sectors:			
- agriculture, water-supply	47.1	79	14.4
- industries	154.5	174.2	31.6
- implementation means	20	19	3.5
- transports	13	15	2.7
- stocking, distribution	13	15.85	2.9
- telecommunications	6	8	1.4
Basic Infrastructures and Social Sectors:			
- economic infrastructures	23.2	45.5	8.3
- railroad infrastructures	(5)	(17.8)	(3.2)
- housing	60	86	15.7
- education and training	42.2	45	8.2
- health	7	8	1.4
- community facilities	9.6	44	8
Total	400.6	550	100%

Table 2. Growth of the Gross Domestic Production in Each Sector for 1984-1989

<u>Sectors</u>	<u>1984</u>		<u>1989</u>		Average Annual Growth 1985-1989
	<u>Billions</u>	<u>Structure</u>	<u>Billions</u>	<u>Structure</u>	
	<u>of Dinars</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>of Dinars</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Agriculture.	19.2	8.4	23.9	7.6	4.5
Water and energy	2.1	0.9	3.4	1.0	10.0
Oil and gas.	62.7	27.6	76.3	24.3	4.0
Oil-and-gas related services and public works.	2.6	1.1	3.3	1.1	5.0
Mines and quarries	0.7	0.3	1.0	0.3	6.6
Processing industries.	26.3	11.6	40.5	12.9	9.0
Building and public works	33.6	14.8	51.6	16.5	9.0
Services	59.2	26.0	83.9	26.8	7.2
Total added values	206.4	90.7	283.9	90.5	6.6
Single global industrial tax and customs duties	21.2	9.3	29.7	9.5	6.9
Gross domestic production.	227.6	100.0	313.6	100.0	6.6
Gross domestic production, exclusive of oil and gas and related services and public works.	162.3	71.3	234.0	74.6	7.6

Objectives of the 1985-1989 Five-Year Plan

- Mobilization of resources and production growth so as to decrease costs, and increased participation of the country's capacities as far as studies and project completions are concerned.
- Greater rigor in program planning and management and greater efficiency in the use made of economic agents, through improved intra and intersectorial coordination. Rational utilization of the means available to supervise and organize the economy.
- Strict and permanent control of internal and external financial balances.
- Distribution of resources so as to encourage accumulation in priority sectors (agriculture, water supply, processing industries).
- Progressive and organized implementation of investments in correlation with internal resources.

1985 Annual Plan

The major orientations of the 1985 annual instalment of the 1985-1989 Five-Year Plan reflect the overall orientation of the latter. The investment budget will amount to 94 billion dinars, i.e. a 13-percent increase over 1984.

Estimates and projections for 1985 aim essentially at increasing the gross domestic production by 6.5 percent (6.6 percent exclusive of oil and gas); increasing consumption by 4.5 percent or so; stabilizing the volume of imports at the 1984 level; and finally increasing exports by about 10 percent. The growth objective for the gross domestic production is based on a minimum increase of 4.5 percent in agriculture, 6.5 percent in water supply, 8 percent in industries other than oil and gas, 8.5 percent in building and public works, and 5.6 percent in services.

The growth objectives for the industries other than oil and gas are as follows:

- Electricity and gas-supply: 10 percent; building materials: 17 percent; chemicals, petrochemicals, hides and leather industries: 8 percent; wood and cellulose: 9 percent; textiles: 15 percent; building and public works: 10 percent.

Compared with those of 1984, 1985 investments will show a marked increase especially in priority sectors such as agriculture and water supply.

Agriculture

1985 investments in the agricultural sector will increase by 33.7 percent compared with 1984. For the productive industry sector, the increase will exceed 17 percent, with a similar trend in economic infrastructures where investments will increase by 20 percent compared with 1984; finally, investments for ad-

ministrative infrastructures will increase by 29.3 percent. Changes could be introduced during the year, if increased resources warrant it.

Finally, we should note that, of the 94.3 billion dinars representing the 1985 credit instalment, 46 billion are given in the form of final credits. The investment program for 1985, the first year of the second 5-year plan, takes into account the volume of credits required to finance large current projects, the investment priorities of the 5-year plan (agriculture, water supply, processing industries, railroads), the national capacities to implement these programs, the foreseeable increase in internal resources and, finally, the hostile international environment, which restricts the extent to which we can have recourse to foreign countries. The 1985 annual plan, therefore, is particularly important as it must provide for the resorption of projects that remain to be completed and take up the responsibility for programs under the second 5-year plan, in keeping with national capacities.

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EGYPT

RAMIFICATIONS OF EMIGRANT LABOR DISCUSSED

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[5-11 Jan 85 pp 35-37]

[Text] One or more member of each Egyptian family is living abroad.

The rate of exchange for the Egyptian pound is set daily in Kuwait, not in Cairo.

Remittances from abroad make up the state's second largest source of foreign currency.

One of the most important issues currently being debated among scientists and economists is that of Egyptian workers emigrating from Egypt to work abroad. Many observers think that this phenomenon, which is social in nature, has generated numerous economic phenomena that have cast shadows on the economy and on all aspects of life in Egypt. Today it is rare to find one Egyptian family that does not have one or more of its members working abroad on either a permanent or temporary basis.

The growing rate of emigration from Egypt--growth in the numbers and kinds of people who are emigrating--has led to the creation of active and effective forces of Egyptians outside the borders. These emigrants do have an impact on the decision-making process in the state, and particularly economic decisions. This is especially because recently and for several years the question of the economy has been on the top of the state's list of priorities. A report on Egyptian labor abroad follows: it is being published by AL-MAJALLAH in two installments, and this is the first one.

Despite the obvious economic benefits to the local economy which resulted from the fact that hundreds of thousands of Egyptians are working abroad--the most important of these is that growth in these Egyptians' remittances from abroad which makes them now constitute the state's second largest source of foreign currency--many people are now looking askance at some of the negative phenomena that befell the Egyptian economy as a result of the fact that so many Egyptians are working abroad. These people are particularly worried about the economic consequences of these remittances, more specifically, the accompanying harmful

effects on currency which remittances from Egyptians abroad will have on the local money market and consequently on the Egyptian economy as a whole. One finds this kind of concern prevalent in specialized national councils, in universities, at economic clubs and among monetary authorities, most importantly, the Central Bank of Egypt. That bank alone has to worry about the use of Egyptians' savings abroad in speculation which is carried out at the expense of the Egyptian pound and causes it to decline further.

The Monetary Effects of Emigration

The emigration of Egyptian workers in the modern sense of the term began in the mid fifties, and it continued to grow after that, especially after the 1967 war. Then there was another emigration wave after the 1973 October War; that wave is still continuing, and people are emigrating in large numbers. However, the economic effects of that emigration did not become clear until a few years after the economic liberalization policy was put into practice in 1973, when Egyptian laws were able to grasp the notion of private foreign currency holdings within the country's borders. That was followed by measures which allowed the expansion of private projects. Then individuals were allowed to use private foreign currency resources to import goods. That was when the effect of Egyptians' savings abroad began to be felt. It was also then that the problems began.

The figures show that the volume of remittances from Egyptians abroad changed. It has been agreed that these remittances are to be computed on the basis of direct remittances to banks operating in Egypt. In addition, the volume of funds used to finance imports without transferring currency was also to be computed. It is known that this is done through the foreign currency which is sold by Egyptians abroad on the free money market that operates outside the banking system.

According to the figures of the Central Bank of Egypt the total figure in 1977 for these remittances was about 649.4 million pounds. That figure includes 205.6 million pounds of remittances in material goods, or goods imported without converting currency. In 1978 the total figure for these remittances was 1,241,200,000 pounds. That figure included 587.2 million pounds of remittances in material goods. In 1979 that figure rose to 1,549,500,000 pounds, and that included 980 million pounds of remittances in material goods. In 1980 total remittances were 1,888,300,000 pounds, and remittances in material goods rose to 1.17 billion pounds. In 1981 total remittances fell to 1,526,500,000 pounds, and that included 1.3 billion pounds of remittances in material goods. In 1981-1982 after the death of President al-Sadat these remittances fell once again to 1.4 billion pounds, and that included 1.1 billion pounds of remittances in material goods. In 1982-1983 remittances rose once again to 2,327,500,000 pounds, and that included 1.85 billion pounds of remittances in material goods. In 1983-1984 total remittances were 2.6 billion pounds, and that included 2.15 billion pounds of remittances in material goods.

These remittances thus rose noticeably in recent years; they have now become the state's second foreign currency resource after oil exports. According to 1983-1984 figures returns from oil exports amounted to 2.654 billion pounds. According to the 1983-1984 budget, returns from the Suez Canal amounted to 970 million pounds, and returns from tourism and non-petroleum exports amounted to 1.8 billion pounds.

The Culprit: Importing Goods without Converting Currency

All these phenomena could have been considered positive; however, the problem becomes clear when we learn that all of Egypt's foreign currency resources are subject to the direct supervision and direction of the Central Bank of Egypt. Egypt's foreign currency holdings are computed according to official rates of exchange which are in effect locally. This applies to oil sales, to the sale of other exports, to tourism, to returns from the Suez Canal and to direct remittances through banks. It does not, however, apply to remittances of material goods.

The course of affairs in the Egyptian market led to a situation wherein foreign currency, which is necessary to finance import operations that do not involve currency conversion, is purchased from Egyptians abroad through a group of currency merchants who established their own market for buying these funds. This market was later turned into a pseudo-exchange for foreign currency where these merchants speculated and purchased the savings of Egyptians abroad at the expense of new reductions in the price of the pound every time demand from importers for the dollars of Egyptians working abroad rose. Thus, the rate of exchange for the dollar would rise and that for the pound would fall again. All this is caused by that system by means of which goods are imported without converting currency. Of course, local currency authorities (the Central Bank of Egypt) are not involved in this process, and these rates do not represent the real strength of the pound.

Kuwait Sets the Rate of Exchange for the Pound

That situation led a prominent bank expert to comment sarcastically that the rate of exchange for the Egyptian pound was being set daily in Kuwait and not in Cairo. This is because the Kuwait market is the principal center for buying and selling currency. It is that market which draws the savings of Egyptians working in the Gulf states and in Kuwait as well.

Although Egyptian economic authorities have tried repeatedly to confront this phenomenon with a series of administrative and police measures so as to put an end to this trade in currency whose illegality is ambiguous, none of these attempts achieved any success to speak of. In fact, the price of the dollar in Cairo markets rose to 148 piasters last month. That was a 30 percent increase over the official rate of exchange for the dollar in banks. This instability in the money exchange market also led to the appearance of a new attitude among those who have foreign currency holdings. They refrained from converting their foreign currency holdings into pounds as they waited for the price of the dollar to rise again in the market, now that the dollar was being treated in Egyptian markets as another commodity.

Also the presence of a black market for foreign currency that until now has relied on the savings of Egyptians abroad has led to the appearance of new aspects in the supply and demand for foreign currency. Some returns from tourism found their way into the black market where they were sold at high prices. In addition to the demand in the black market, investment companies came into the picture to buy dollars to finance their imports from abroad. Citizens who were going on pilgrimages or who were traveling abroad for medical treatment or

tourism were also purchasing foreign currency. Some observers speak about foreign currency being purchased to import narcotics. It is estimated by some that this market amounts to 500 million dollars annually. Trafficking in narcotics is of course prohibited, but from an economic standpoint this activity is treated as though it were an import activity whereby goods are imported without converting currency.

Although such imports constitute only 20 percent of total Egyptian imports, which amount to 8.5 billion pounds annually, economic authorities have to face a real problem when they try to think about abolishing that system of importing goods without converting currency. If this system is abolished, it will do away almost completely with the black market for foreign currency. Abolishing that system would mean that the state would have to come up with 2 billion dollars annually to finance imports that are brought into the country under the terms of that system. The state would have to come up with those 2 billion dollars, and that amount will be above and beyond what it can come up with at the present time.

Three Pillars

Dr Ahmad Jami', professor of economics at 'Ayn Shams University refuses even to consider abolishing that system which he considers one of three principal pillars on which the economic liberalization policy was founded. In addition to the Arab and Foreign Capital Investment Act and the currency law, which was issued in 1976, these laws are regarded as the legal framework for the economic liberalization policy which Egypt has been pursuing since 1974. Dr Jami' said, "The currency problem that resulted from using the savings of Egyptians abroad in the process of importing goods without converting currency demonstrates the failure of the economic policy to attract those savings in a proper way to develop the Egyptian economy. Economic management should have provided appropriate investment channels through which Egyptians abroad who have foreign currency holdings could convert their funds and realize a profit that would be suitable and satisfactory. At the same time these savings would be making an effective contribution to the liberalization policy, imparting to it the productive character which the state has been calling for instead of the import character which has characterized this policy ever since it was established.

In this regard the state is currently making satisfactory efforts in an attempt to attract those savings to industrial projects and to the housing sector where there is a severe housing shortage. So far, two conferences have been held for Egyptians working abroad. Those Egyptians met with state officials to discuss the means by which those Egyptians could contribute to projects that are needed by the state. The state has adopted the idea of establishing a firm for Egyptians working abroad with a capital of 15 million dollars. A number of government banks are taking part in that firm whose immediate goal will be to set up projects that respond to the needs of Egyptians living abroad. The most prominent of these are housing projects for them. At the present time this firm intends to set up a bank for Egyptians living abroad. That bank would serve as a source of funding for projects the firm intends to set up in its capacity as a holding company. Engineer Mashhur Ahmad Mashhur has been appointed president of this company. He is a man who proved to be very successful when he was chairman of the board of the Suez Canal Authority. Engineer Mashhur served in that position for many years.

Remittances Are Small

On the other hand, economic circles are talking about the small remittances from Egyptians abroad, both direct remittances and remittances in material goods. They say these remittances are less than they ought to be. Some experts estimate the annual savings of Egyptians working abroad to be not less than 9 billion dollars a year. But this is an exaggerated estimate. A more acceptable estimate was set forth by Dr 'Atif 'Ibayd, minister of cabinet affairs, in a valuable study he made on the savings of Egyptians abroad. Dr 'Ibayd estimated those savings to be 6.4 billion pounds a year; his estimate was based on a field study that was conducted by a team of researchers that he supervised. Dr 'Ibayd attributed the fact that annual remittances were lower than that figure to an imbalance in the local foreign currency market and to the presence of two markets for currency exchange. One of these markets is official, and currency is exchanged through banks; the other is the free or black market where rates are higher than official rates. Dr 'Ibayd said, "The first step to be taken to achieve satisfactory figures for remittances from Egyptians abroad is to achieve a comprehensive solution to the question of exchange rates."

Suggested Solutions to the Crisis

In this regard the Association of Egyptian Banks proposed some time ago that a commercial currency market be established in banks. This market would be subject to the supervision of the Central Bank, and the rate of exchange for the pound vis a vis foreign currencies would be set daily in that market with rates going up or down depending on supply and demand. However, the economic administration is apprehensive about that measure because it fears the rate of exchange for the pound will fall further if supply and demand are allowed to determine the rates on a broad scale. However, the sharp changes that took place in exchange rates on the black market have caused officials to reconsider that solution. The economic administration has recently allowed national banks to buy and sell dollars at rates that are higher than the set rates so as to solve the problem of a short supply of dollars in the market recently. A comprehensive study is also underway to expand in this direction on the basis of setting up certain controls to restrict demand for foreign currency in the market. Consideration is being given to switching a number of principal imports from the system of importing goods without converting currency and restricting the importation of these goods to public sector foreign trade companies. Concurrently, communications would be conducted with the IBRD to obtain loans to secure funding for these imports. If this measure is applied, it will be considered a real blow to the foreign currency black market. Demand for the dollar will decline noticeably. This means that the possibility for speculation in buying foreign currency will decline and the rate of exchange for the Egyptian pound will improve.

Which measures will be the ones chosen for implementation? That is what the next few days will reveal.

[Text] Egyptians working abroad cost the Egyptian economy 1.5 billion dollars.

Remittances from abroad helped bring about the decline in the value of the Egyptian pound.

AL-MAJALLAH published in its last issue the first installment of a report on Egyptian workers abroad. It became evident that each Egyptian family has one or more of its members abroad. The second and final installment of this report follows.

The impact that the phenomenon of Egyptians working abroad has had on currency played a major role--it was almost the only role--in evaluating the economic success of this phenomenon from an economic standpoint and determining its positive and negative effects on Egypt's local economy in recent years.

Economic circles in Cairo--both government and academic--have known that two basic approaches were being used in analyzing the consequences of the migration of Egyptian workers. The first approach is a positive one: it shows total remittances in currency and material goods that benefited the Egyptian economy as a result of the fact that those Egyptians have been working abroad and as a result of the changes in their employment situation year after year. The second approach shows the harmful effects that the phenomenon of Egyptians working abroad has had on the currency: these effects occurred coincidentally with the process of bringing the savings of those Egyptians into the country to work in the Egyptian economy. The most important of these effects was the fact that these remittances played a strong part in causing the value of the Egyptian pound to decline. Furthermore, it has been established that these savings failed to work through proper mechanisms that would have ultimately made them contribute effectively to the development of the national economy. Throughout the past years of economic liberalization the economic use of these savings was restricted to meeting the needs of private and marginal imports. They were not aggressively introduced into the creation of investment opportunities in production that would have contributed to development and would have raised the value of of the GNP.

The phenomenon of Egyptians working abroad was dealt with economically according to this view which many experts now consider to be flawed. It would be rather easy, also according to this method, to get all the figures that define changes in the flow of remittances in currency and material goods from Egyptians working abroad. It would also be easy to get the figures that define the decline that the Egyptian pound has undergone as a result of these remittances.

But it is extremely difficult, however, to find answers to other questions that are no less important in evaluating the phenomenon of Egyptians working abroad than currency figures. For example, there is no one in the Egyptian government who can answer a simple question accurately about the number of Egyptians working abroad. One can get nothing more than approximate estimates. Albert Barsum Salamah, the minister for emigration and Egyptians abroad affairs, for example, insists that as of early 1984 the number of Egyptians who emigrated

either permanently or temporarily is not less than 3 million. But in the Immigration Department of the Ministry of Manpower one can find no more than 250,000 cards for Egyptians who followed the letter of the law when they left the country to work abroad and registered their status with the Ministry of Labor. Most of these Egyptians are teachers on loan by the Egyptian government to Arab countries.

One Million Workers

What is curious is that the present report on the number of Egyptians working abroad was prepared by the International Labor Organization which had charged an Egyptian university professor, Dr Samir Radwan, and a foreign expert whose name is Hans with the task of conducting a study on Egyptian workers abroad. These estimates are mentioned in that report.

In 1974 the number of Egyptian workers abroad was about 500,000; in 1976 that number was 600,000, and in 1980 it was 875,000. That is an annual rate of increase of 19.9 percent. By the end of 1984, according to Hans and Samir Radwan, the number of Egyptians working abroad was 1.194 billion.

In the past few years interest in the question of Egyptian workers abroad began to take on a new dimension after a number of negative economic indicators appeared and it was discovered that these indicators had a strong bearing on the phenomenon of workers emigrating.

In addition to official interest in the matter from the state, numerous studies dealing with this question from new angles came out. The most prominent of these studies were those that were conducted by national councils specializing in investigating the economics of Egyptians working abroad. Dr 'Amr Muhyi-al-Din, professor of economics at Cairo University also led a research team that studied the phenomenon of emigration; this was one of the studies conducted by the university's Center for Technological Research. Dr 'Atif 'Ibayd, minister of cabinet affairs, also presented an extensive study on this phenomenon before assuming his position as minister.

Although these studies focused primarily on the financial aspects of this phenomenon, they underscored numerous important effects that the phenomenon of Egyptians working abroad has had on the Egyptian economy.

A Continuous Drain

There is, for example, the phenomenon of highly specialized technicians and skilled workers who emigrate because they are attracted by high wages abroad. As the years went by and the drain among these groups continued, the local production establishment began to suffer from a severe shortage in these specialized skills, and that had an actual effect on the average growth of the national product. In a study by the specialized national councils Fu'ad Husayn, former minister of finance, said that training skilled workers requires the necessary scientific knowledge, repeated training and years of experience. All that would ultimately make those skilled workers able to offer superior performance in production. In a country that has an imbalance in its labor market as a result of the presence of a large number of unskilled workers, the absence of skilled

workers has a profound effect on production. The study shows that in 1975 the ratio of unskilled workers to the total number of workers who had emigrated was 54.3 percent. In 1981 that ratio declined, and by 1982 it reached 14.3 percent. In other words, more than half the workers who leave Egypt are experienced workers and workers with highly specialized skills whose loss does have an effect on local production.

In an attempt to calculate the financial effect that the absence of those skilled workers from the local market has had, the financial product of those expatriates' work was computed on the basis of the financial product of their colleagues who are employed locally in accordance with the GNP. It turned out that in 1975 the Egyptian economy lost 145 million pounds due to the absence of those workers. In 1982 that loss rose to 683 million pounds.

The problem, however, is that workers considered by the studies to be unskilled workers whose absence would not result in any loss to the national economy are in fact farm workers who emigrated to improve their conditions. They left behind thousands of feddans in poor condition. This is because workers in that sector are scarce and wages are high.

The shortage in skilled technical workers has also led to the rise in the cost of services and goods that are offered by Egyptian workers who preferred to stay in Egypt and not emigrate. This is particularly true among craftsmen whose wages have soared to levels that until a few years ago were unheard of in the Egyptian market. In addition, wage overestimates have also had an effect on the rise in production costs and accordingly, the rise in the general level of prices locally. Technical workers have also left public sector companies and gone to work in the private sector where wages are better because the private sector can be flexible in setting prices for its products.

That effect has been most pronounced in the construction sector. At the time when the state is laying ambitious plans for housing projects, utilities and other industrial projects, most workers with different levels of skill in that sector have left Egypt to work on construction projects that are going on at full speed in the Gulf countries and in other Arab countries. This problem emerged when reconstruction in the cities along the Suez Canal began in 1974, and it is still continuing.

Speculation

The studies called attention to another phenomenon that may be attributed in a principal way to Egyptians working abroad. This is the phenomenon of high prices for land and real estate in Cairo and the governorates. A lack of investment opportunities in production projects, which could have drawn the savings of Egyptians working abroad, caused these savings to be used in speculation in the market for land. In fact, these savings created that market which unexpectedly became widespread in a few years. Ultimately, this caused land prices as well as real estate prices to soar, and a system of owning residential apartments was introduced. [Translator's note: This system is somewhat different from condominium ownership in the United States.]

In rural areas speculation in land exacerbated the problem of diminishing farm land. People from these rural areas returning from abroad purchased farm land and built homes for themselves and their families on this land at the expense of the agricultural terrain which is being encroached upon by residential construction.

Agricultural studies made it clear that 60,000 feddans of the best farm land are being taken away every year and used for construction expansion. To make up for this loss of farm land 180,000 feddans have to be reclaimed from the desert every year because one traditional feddan of farm land yields three times the crop that one feddan of reclaimed land yields.

One can thus say that financial calculations and consideration of the fact that Egyptians working abroad constitute one third of the reasons for residential expansion at the expense of farm land have caused the Egyptian economy to lose 20 million pounds in 1975 because Egyptians working abroad took farm land out of farming. In 1980 the Egyptian economy's losses rose to 50 million pounds, and in 1982 they rose once again to 59 million pounds. Linked with these two phenomena is the fact that when skilled technical workers--especially craftsmen and farm workers--return to Egypt from abroad, they refrain from manual labor. It has become evident that upon their return to Egypt, instead of going back to their original professions, many of those people prefer to use their savings which they accumulated while working abroad to speculate. Thus, they take themselves out of the free labor market and become involved in speculative activities that could have harmful implications on the local economy.

Inflation

However, the most salient damage to the Egyptian economy as a result of the fact that Egyptians were working abroad is that which has to do with the inflationary effects that accompanied the work of those Egyptians abroad. If inflation, simply defined, means an increase in the amount of money in circulation that is not met by an equal increase in production, then the problem regarding the savings of Egyptians working abroad becomes even more grave since those savings were accumulated abroad but were being spent in Egypt. Those Egyptians who earned those funds abroad did not make any contributions to increasing Egypt's national product. These funds were brought into the country to be spent without there being a comparable increase in production. That is the reason behind the inflation we are having. Inflation grew in the seventies; in 1981 the rate of inflation was over 40 percent a year, but it declined after that.

Inflation might be somewhat acceptable if it had been one of the effects of an increase in production projects. But for Egyptians working abroad, it is principally the result of their speculation over land and real estate. Egyptians working abroad also tend to adopt new and alarming modes of consumption that became widespread quickly in the seventies, increasing inflationary pressures on the Egyptian market.

The savings of Egyptians working abroad also helped create a habit of acquiring dollars and opening bank accounts in foreign currency. In fact, the dollar was being treated in the market as though it were a commodity, and it became the principal tool for accumulating savings. That situation caused foreign currency deposits in banks to grow, and that affected the Egyptian economy in two ways.

First, foreign currency was not being fully utilized because it was in the form of deposits that could be withdrawn by depositors. The foreign currency in banks was not in the form of remittances that had been turned over to the banks and could be used to meet the deficit in the balance of payments.

Second, the growth in the money supply was noticeable with foreign currency deposits representing a large percentage of liquid funds locally. In June 1980 it was estimated that about 20 percent of local liquid funds were in foreign currency; in April 1982 that estimate was at 26 percent; and in April 1984 it was 35 percent. This growth in the money supply was aided by the fact that monetary authorities managing the money supply did not place appropriately tight restraints on the money supply to contain inflationary pressures.

Positive Effects

Specialized national councils attempted to compute an estimate of the total costs--those that can be computed of course--borne by the Egyptian economy as a result of the fact that Egyptians are working abroad, and they tried to compare that with the volume of savings. These councils said that in 1981 total costs amounted to 1.53 billion pounds compared with 192 million pounds in 1975. This is an annual increase of 41 percent. These figures represent 48 percent of total remittances in 1981. They represent 25 percent of total remittances in 1975. In other words, the economic cost of Egyptians working abroad in recent years is now canceling out [the benefit] to the national economy from half the remittances which are the product of this phenomenon.

However, different studies did mention a number of other benefits to the local economy that resulted from the phenomenon of Egyptians working abroad. The problem of hidden unemployment in some professions and specializations has been alleviated. The phenomenon of Egyptians working abroad has helped improve the rate of savings among those Egyptians working abroad. Despite the problems they caused, remittances from Egyptians working abroad helped reduce the pressures on the balance of payments. In addition, these remittances alleviated the subsidy burden borne by the state in relation to numerous commodities. This is a result of the fact that those people are living abroad.

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EGYPT

FOREIGN EXCHANGE PROBLEM DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM: AL-TAB'AH AL-DUWALIYAH in Arabic 30 Nov 84 p 3

/Editorial by Ibrahim Nafi': "Living with Reality and Expected Movement"/

/Text/ We have demanded repeatedly and we still demand the adoption of clear, decisive and daring policies to confront the fundamental problems facing our building and development efforts. We have said that these policies must be selected according to the needs dictated by these problems after a careful study and a comprehensive examination of the alternatives and of the pros and cons of these policies.

If we decide to select certain policies and begin implementing them, we must give them the opportunity to achieve their objectives and must secure for them the necessary degree of stability and continuity. We must refrain from foiling these policies after a short time with conflicting decrees and policies and we must not announce measures and decrees and then change them before the ink with which they are written and the ink with which their explanatory notes--notes which stress the essential and desirable nature of these policies--dries up.

All are aware of the economic and financial problems encountered by our country as a developing country with limited resources. The chronic deficit in the balance of payments and the big deficit in the state's general budget from which we suffer--these deficits are a secret to nobody. These deficits include both those we cover with loans and treasury notes and those we cover by relying on the banking apparatus. Both are forms of a deficit, which totals 5.4 billion pounds in the current budget.

We also know that we have not yet succeeded in adopting effective policies which enable us to rely on exports as a main source of foreign currency. We are also aware that consumption, both governmental and private, is growing cancerously, regardless of whether it is essential or luxury consumption. We are also aware for certain that there is an imbalance between wages and prices.

We are also aware that one of the main obstacles hindering the development processes and impeding solutions to the main problems and the implementation of the major projects intended to eliminate the transportation, housing and utility problems and to carry out the major development projects is the scarcity of our foreign currency resources.

These are the problems we call problems that pertain to the national economy's basic structure. They are all problems that need to be tackled courageously with decisive policies that attack the causes and that are not content with treating the consequences. To tackle and uproot these problems in the long run and to surmount the difficulties they pose in the short run, short-term policies and long-term policies are required.

We are facing, for example, the fundamental and urgent issue of the scarcity of foreign currencies and the subsequent obstruction of the development processes and of the implementation of the essential projects this problem causes.

To confront this urgent problem, need and the supreme national interest dictate that we overcome all the difficulties facing the production sector so as to enhance its activity. We must also secure all the requirements needed by this sector in order that it may perform its important and vital role in the Egyptian economy's structure. It is unreasonable, for example, to subject the production sector to the complexities and difficulties of importation streamlining when importing this sector's needs. It is also unreasonable to have this sector face the difficulties of acquiring the foreign currency needed to import these needs or to treat it the way the consumption sector is treated when it comes to the importation of its needs.

The importance and vitality of this sector require us to modify our current regulations so that the needs of the production sector, be they public or private, may not have to be submitted to the import-streamlining committees. This sector's requirements are well known and do not need to be defined. These requirements are confined to raw materials, spare parts, machinery, equipment, production requirements and construction materials. These requirements must be presented to the banks clearly and the banks must exert efforts to meet the public and the private sectors' requirements immediately and to secure the foreign currency and credit needed to import these requirements from abroad without any delay.

All this leads us by necessity to an important question: where can the banks secure all these foreign currency needs, keeping in mind that we are all aware of the short supply of such currency in the local market and of the numerous perils involved in dealing in foreign currency?

Therefore, the banks must be permitted to deal in the foreign currency market at flexible prices compatible with the real value of these currencies at the time of purchase and sale.

Though we complained at one time of the moneychangers' control of the foreign currency market to the extent that made the banks often chase the moneychangers earnestly to meet their needs and to submit to the changers' demands and conditions--which are what we are not subjected to at present because of the circumstances involving a case before the courts--this should not prevent us from trying to help these banks.

To release their capacity and capability to secure the foreign currency needed for production and development, the least we can do is to give the banks the possibility of being on an equal footing with the moneychangers. It is unreasonable to have the moneychanger offering a purchase price that exceeds by far the prices at which the banks are required to purchase this currency and then expect the foreign currency to flow to the banks instead of the moneychangers.

As long as the difference between the two prices is high, foreign currency will, regardless of whether we like it or not, flow to the moneychanger. But if this difference is small or reasonable, then the currency will, by necessity, flow to the banks because they are safer and because dealing with them does not entail any possible risk. A difference of a few piasters in the price of any foreign currency will not at all induce those with big or small savings to take risks and deal with the moneychangers.

Therefore, giving the banks the opportunity to purchase foreign currency at realistic and flexible prices will insure the liquidity needed to secure the requirements of our country's production sector. This will necessarily be reflected in a positive manner on this sector's conditions. Securing this sector's foreign currency needs at the time and the moment when the sector needs them will protect this sector from the haphazard fluctuations that are fabricated at times in the foreign currency market. It will also protect this sector from the consequences of having to wait for long periods to purchase its requirements--periods during which the prices of the requirements and commodities it needs may change at the international level.

Moreover, this system will, by necessity, reflect positively on the conditions of the banking apparatus which will be able in this case to focus on its main objectives of development, building and investment instead of wasting a large part of its efforts in chasing moneychangers to buy their friendship secretly behind the back of the Central Bank of Egypt.

It is true that the proposed system also has its pitfalls. But these pitfalls should not cause us concern in the first phase of the implementation of the system because it will be possible to contain and control them after a reasonable period. Besides, any economic system in the world has its positive and its negative points. What is important is that the positive points be greater than the negative ones and that it be the most convenient system for our conditions and circumstances at present.

Despite all this, there are precautions that we must take to insure the success of this system and to achieve its objectives:

If, for example, a committee is formed to set foreign currency prices each day so that the banks may deal on the basis of these prices, then this committee must not be a bureaucratic committee that clings to rigid rules and regulations. It should be a technical committee with access to all internal and external data and should have direct contacts with currency sources at home and abroad.

The banking apparatus' ability to act and move must also be released. This apparatus has enormous resources and vast assets estimated to amount at times to \$7 billion in foreign currency deposits. This apparatus also has vast capabilities in its contacts with the international banks and its international reputation is good. This proposed system will release the banking apparatus' capabilities in a manner compatible with the apparatus' strength and dignity and with our country's national objectives. In this respect, it is also beneficial to permit the Egyptian banks to deal with the money-changing agencies and firms and other banks in the Arab world in accordance with rules established by the Central Bank of Egypt, provided that this bank is notified each day of the purchase and sale activity.

It is certain that the Islamic banks can perform an important role in supporting this system and it is beneficial to invite them to participate in the development plan's activities and projects on the basis of partnership and profit sharing, especially in the two spheres in which these banks have expressed a readiness to participate, namely, the housing and industry spheres.

The demand for foreign currency must be streamlined. To achieve this, real priorities for public and private imports must be set. Streamlining public waste must be discussed. Several measures to streamline the demand for the foreign currency that is used for the purpose of repeated and unjustifiable travel abroad, such as a minor pilgrimage to Mecca several times a year, must also be discussed. We are not demanding this in order that restraints be imposed on freedom of movement. Rather, we reject all restraints. In-house affairs may need to be rearranged at times and this imposes, by necessity, a rearrangement of the priorities. It has so happened that Saudi Arabia

itself, where the K'bah exists, has banned any Saudi and any foreigner residing in the country from performing the pilgrimage during the pilgrimage season as long as he has already performed it so that he may give the opportunity to another Muslim who has not performed a major or minor pilgrimage.

On the other hand, adopting the policy of taking into consideration the percentage of the Egyptian component in any bid for the implementation of Egyptian projects as a fundamental factor in giving preference to bids by international firms will contribute to streamlining the demand for the foreign currency needed to implement these projects.

Effective measures must also be adopted to attract more foreign currency to the Egyptian banking apparatus. In this regard, several advanced and sophisticated system to attract the savings of Egyptians abroad and at home must be discussed. Moreover, it is necessary to adopt effective measures to increase Egyptian exports to the outside world and to enhance our country's revenues from exports. Treasury notes with special benefits can be issued in foreign currency. The banks can be, rather must be, encouraged to perform the task of investment trustees for the Egyptians abroad. There is no doubt that many of these Egyptians wish to invest their savings in small and medium-size projects in Egypt but lack the expertise and the ability to implement such projects. The task of the banks in this case is to implement the investment projects with their savings and on their behalf, with the investors ultimately reaping the yields and profits of these projects and with the banks earning reasonable profit rates.

It is certainly beneficial to encourage the establishment in Egypt of new investment banks whose activity is confined solely to investment and to attracting the savings of Egyptians abroad. It is also beneficial to encourage the Arab banks which have displayed a readiness to set up a financial investment conglomerate in Egypt in order to invest in certain projects or activities to which they have agreed.

All these measures and others are urgently required so that we may achieve for the proposed system all the possibilities of success and to secure for production the currency it needs. None of these measures undermines the broad base of small or big savers, nor do they undermine under any circumstances the rules and regulations governing the possession of foreign currency. Moreover, the measures do not undermine the bank deposits in foreign currencies or the freedom to dispose of any deposits in any form whatsoever.

On the contrary, these measures seek to encourage savers and deposit owners to develop their savings and deposits and to attract more such deposits to Egypt and to its banks so that they may contribute to securing the production requirements and to eliminating the obstacles facing production, to implementing the development projects and to solving our country's main problems.

I do not think there is anybody who does not wish to contribute to solving these problems and to enhancing building and development activity in Egypt.

8494

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EGYPT

SUPPORT FOR RETURN OF GOLAN TO SYRIA PROCLAIMED

Cairo AL-AHRAM: AL-TAB'AH AL-DUWALIYAH in Arabic 10 Dec 84 p 7

/Editorial: "Withdrawal Without Discrimination"/

/Text/ Egypt has announced through its chief delegate to the United Nations that it has chosen the path of peace founded on justice because it is the only path that achieves the interests of all the disputing Middle East parties. Egypt has also urged Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories without discrimination, regardless of whether these territories are the West Bank, Gaza Strip, the city of Jerusalem or the Golan Heights.

Egypt has also reaffirmed that the PLC is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and that, therefore, it must take part in any negotiations seeking to achieve peace in the Middle East.

When we in Egypt demand withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied territories, we make no distinction between one occupied Arab territory and another. To us, the Gaza Strip is the same as the Golan Heights.

Even though Syria takes part with Iran in performing a prominent role in the acts of terrorism that have increased in a serious manner in the past 2 years, as announced in yesterday's report by the U.S. Department of State on the victims of terrorism in the world, this does not dissuade us from demanding evacuation of the Golan Heights and their return to the Syrian motherland.

Even though the Syrian regime never stops attacking Egypt, Jordan and the PLO and calling for a war of daggers and microphones now that it has proven its inability to wage the real war and that it has eschewed the path of peace, this will not make us abandon our main cause--a cause which the Syrian regime may have forgotten in the war of daggers--namely, the cause of the unity of this regime's national soil.

EGYPT

MUBARAK'S VISITS TO INDUSTRIAL SITES EXTOLLED

Cairo AL-AHRAM: AL-TAB'AH AL-DUWALIYAH in Arabic 15 Dec 84 p 7

/Editorial by Mursi 'Atallah: "Real Meaning of President's Visits"/

/Text/ The numerous visits which President Mubarak has made to the production sites in Egypt have come to represent a main feature of the present regime's philosophy, which is founded on eliminating all the fabricated barriers between the leadership and the people.

When President Mubarak proceeds personally to the production bases, he seeks to give every official the example which says that a practical and effective administration engages in its action amidst the masses of workers by relying on the system of dialogue and understanding.

These tours and visits give the head of the state the opportunity to be in the total picture of what the plan's priorities should be, whether in the production sector or in the service sector, because he finds out on the spot which projects deserve priority in implementation, as he finds out on the spot the extent of their actual needs.

Many are the problems that have been surmounted in a number of the sites visited by the president, without the president using a magic wand, without touching the 5-year Plan and without allocating additional appropriations and budgets. All he has done is to issue logical instructions which have been implemented without any delay because the officials have been convinced of the soundness and rationality of the instructions.

President Mubarak has added a new tradition through his eagerness to honor and award those who elevate Egypt's name in any sphere of international representation, especially in the sphere of athletics. His visit to al-Zamalik Club less than 24 hours after the club's soccer team returned with the African Clubs Championship Cup has come to reaffirm this course of encouraging sports and honoring athletes.

EGYPT

POOR PLANNING IN CONFECTIONARY INDUSTRY CRITICIZED

Cairo AL-AHRAM: AL-TAB'AH AL-DUWALIYAH in Arabic 5 Dec 84 p 6

/Editorial by Ahmad Muntasir: "Prophet's Birthday Confectionary"/

/Text/ A happy new year because today is the birthday of the noblest of men and the master and last messenger of God.

The traditions of this holiday's sweetmeats date back, according to all accounts, to the Fatimid era, i.e., to more than 1,000 years ago. The Fatimid rulers transformed numerous occasions into food and confectionary festivals and into displays of pomp and joy. These occasions include, according to the books, the Prophet's birthday, the birthday of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, the birthday of Fatimah and of her two sons, al-Hasan and al-Husayn, the holiday of the caliph, the night of the mid-month of Rajab, the first night of the month of Sha'ban, the first day of the month of Ramadan, the repast of Ramadan, the night of recitation of the Koran, al-Fitr holiday, (al-Adha) holiday, (al-Ghadir) holiday, the holiday of covering the walls of al-Ka'bah, the holiday of the winter covering of al-Ka'bah walls, the Gulf Conquest holiday, the Coptic New Year's day, the Epiphany, Christmas day and processional days.

The list is, evidently, long. It is as if all days of the year were holidays, festivities and celebrations. It must be that the social mood or condition permitted such festivities in the past. The changes are numerous nowadays but the traditions of the Prophet's birthday confectionaries are still the same.

All nations have their celebrations in which they emphasize the eating and drinking aspects. Consequently, our celebration of the Prophet's birthday, and of the confectionaries and sweetmeats that go with it, is nothing unique. But what I actually find to be strange is that we are complaining at the state level of the growing sugar consumption and of the millions we pay to import large quantities of sugar from abroad and, instead of trying to reduce this consumption, we engage in acts and practices that flow strongly into the channel of increased, rather redoubled, consumption.

I am not saying this in protest against those who buy the Prophet's birthday confectionary because everybody is entitled to this. However, I am saying it in protest against a phenomenon that has spread recently, namely the purchase by some public sector companies and organizations and by some government agencies and authorities of confectionary boxes to be distributed to their workers and employees, both those who deserve them and those who do not.

Thus, the circle of the confectioners' trade has expanded. Naturally, their sugar consumption rate has also increased, keeping in mind that we listed sugar at one time as a tourist commodity in an attempt to rationalize its consumption.

However, it seems that rationalizing means to us something that needs a superhuman mind to understand it.

8494

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LIBYA

RESPONSE OF UNIVERSITY TO SOCIAL NEEDS DISCUSSED

Tripoli AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in Arabic 14, 21 Jan 85

[Article by Musa al-Shaybani: "The University in the Dock: The University Is Living in Alienation from the Society and the Connecting Link Is Absent"]

[14 Jan 85 pp 12, 13]

[Text] Basically, talk about the university, with all it contains, does not amount to hateful enmity toward it, or a negation of its positive features. We are fighting against some people's aberrant conduct, the irresponsibility of others, and many people's exceeding of the bounds of the noble mission of the university.

While we are fighting these odious phenomena in the university, we are well aware that everyone who is not concerned with the matter will stand alongside us in confronting this aberrant behavior which is taking place in the university of science and knowledge. In spite of that, when we are fighting against people who commit excesses against morality and people who lack conscience, we also realize that these characteristics in no way apply to the whole which makes up university society.

Talk about the university directly touches on everyone who stands within the field of the charge -- people who wanted the university to be a fashion show and a shelter for moral deviates, and wanted it also to be a fertile pasture for the pursuit of their impulses and their vile descent into the evil swamp of people who wanted the university to be turned from a place for science, knowledge and morality to a pasture which they would dominate with their deficient mentalities and a place for their terrible seances and private meetings.

Yes, there are good people who bear every upright morality in their spirits. These people without a doubt are on our side and they are with us. They condemn the university of moral deviation, the university of seances, the university of Paris clothing, and the university of the bourgeois among whom there is no subject of conversation as they sit in the cafes, rest areas, roads, passages and study halls except the latest fashions in the world of the West, the madness of Paris, the grandeur of Rome and the lights of

Copenhagen. Lest we be unjustly reproachful of the university, let us let the university speak.

At the beginning, we had this meeting with Dr Salim al-Hudayri, secretary of the people's committee of the University of the First:

The editor: Dr Salim, in your view, how is the university, from the following standpoints?

1. Curriculum.
2. Departments.
3. Morals and behavior.

Answer: This issue was addressed in the journal AL-JAMI'AH, but the treatment was not correct in its manner. The university was portrayed as a swamp of evil, and that involved exaggeration and generalization.

The editor: You want to reply to the journal AL-JAMI'AH, but it would be better if the reply were in the same journal which published these articles. The situation concerns the journal AL-JAMI'AH, not us as the journal AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR.

Dr Salim: I am intending to prepare and write a reply to the journal AL-JAMI'AH but I would like to underline some points before getting into your question. These are:

The university is a complete society. The students and members of the faculty represent all the towns and villages in the Jamahiriyyah. To give this sector a verdict of moral decadence is to give a verdict on the society as a whole.

I would like to stress that the phenomena that exist in the educational institutions are phenomena which extend beyond the scope of the educational institutions and are social ones which have arisen as a result of development. Of course there are many positive and negative features to this development, and these phenomena must be dealt with on the basis of their analysis in the pedagogical and social sense. Without a doubt, if there are some aberrant acts, which is normal in societies, there are many people who exhibit the conduct and morality of this Islamic society.

For our part, we in the university observe from close at hand all the activities which take place inside it, be they scholarly, cultural or social activities, and these without a doubt are accompanied by some distinctive activities and modes of conduct which we would rather did not exist. From our standpoint, the building up of man is not accompanied by laws, restrictions or rules, because conduct basically depends on the education and culture, in general, which a child receives from the beginning of his awareness and entry into and interaction with society, from compulsory education on up to university education. The fact is that upbringing stops when people reach the age of maturity and puberty, and that is the stage in which the student

enters the university. This does not mean that when the student enters the university he is far removed from guidance and oversight, but that cannot exist in general in institutes of higher education; the role of guidance and oversight is assigned to the family primarily, and it is covers the conduct and notions of the society in general.

The editor: What is your opinion concerning the curricula that exist at present in the university?

Dr Salim al-Hudayri: In the case of applied curricula, they do not differ from one place to another, because they are connected to fixed, clear scientific facts. However, what does differ from place to place is the method of education, along with the training and applied programs that accompany it. In the case of humane sciences, we believe that we need revolutionization and development, so that these humane sciences can keep up with the movement of the new society.

Since the curricula studied currently are imported ones, it is necessary to change and develop them, but the difficulty facing departments which lie within the framework of this type of learning is the diversification of the faculty members within them, in terms of their cultures, which generally are cultures that have been affected by the cultures of the West, and the diversity in their schools from which they graduated, which belong to different cultures, ranging between Eastern and Western ones, traditional cultures in general, most of which do not have a conviction in development and revolutionization. At the University of the First, we do not consider that the matter is as bad as is feared, although we have not reached the state we would like. Perhaps this desired form has been attained by the graduation of new classes of faculty members who have lived through the movement and the philosophy of the revolution and have not been greatly affected by the cultures of other societies.

The editor: Therefore the solution assumes concrete form in the preparation and composition of local curricula and support for local higher studies.

Dr Salim: Yes, the solution is to support local higher studies so that we will be able to respond to or realize the needs of our faculties for faculty members who have performed their higher studies locally; with the passage of time and the turnover of new faces among faculty members, we believe that this problem will disappear for good.

The editor: Dr Salim, some people feel, and perhaps it has become clear, that the moral situation has started to backslide toward undesirable modes of conduct as regards a number of moral phenomena. What is your assessment of that?

Dr Salim: Some people might imagine that morality and exemplary moral conduct among male and female students consist of a commitment to specific clothing or a specific appearance, but we believe that morals in our new society go far beyond that. They concern the proper conduct of man, in his dealings with his colleagues or professors, or in his respect for the statutes and laws in effect within or outside the university and his commitment to

the performance of his domestic, national and religious duties. These forms of conduct are the morality of the new mass society.

The editor: These are criteria which we appreciate. Where do we stand with regard to them in the University of the First?

Dr Salim: One phenomenon which we would like to disappear is the alien manifestations which have appeared as a reflection of phenomena by which our male and female students have been affected, through their contact with other societies outside the Jamahiriyah or with families which do not belong to this society in terms of their conduct and morality, whether these families are Libyan or not, since there are many families which have been greatly affected by Western conduct and morality which is totally remote from the conduct and morals of our society. The strange thing in this is that these families which claim to be developed and civilized boast and brag about their affiliation with these forms of behavior which are alien to our society. These phenomena have without a doubt had a great effect on the society, especially the universities, where members of these families meet with other male and female students, who, without a doubt, will be directly or indirectly influenced as a result of their contact with them. Of course, the negative factors in this sort of situation will have more of an element of attraction and influence than the positive ones.

The editor: Could light be shed on this type of family, exactly, and could it be defined?

Dr Salim: Yes, and more precisely, by these families we mean families which were left over from the era prior to the revolution who studied with Italian families, were affected by Western societies, had money and were middlemen and opportunists. Even after the revolution occurred we find them rushing after their masters and the lords of their bounties, to the point where some of them perhaps could not bear the movement of the new society and ran away in flight to live on the crumbs of their masters. Nonetheless, these families have left their marks on some Libyan families, in their conduct or in their bourgeois ambitions, through their children's presence in the universities, be they students or faculty members.

The editor: What is the solution, in the face of this situation?

Dr Salim: Some people might wonder why these types of students and faculty members are accepted in the university. To answer, we say that the revolution does not want to lose any of its elements, and therefore it has opened the door to everyone, in the hope that these classes will try to understand the new process of building a new society that is going on around them and will assimilate this process and coexist and interact with it, in order ultimately to be assimilated with this society and become one of its foundation stones. Therefore, we do not differentiate between one or the other in giving everyone an opportunity to enter the universities and education or accepting faculty members to contribute to the process of education in this university. If it happens, and it is apparent to us, that there are people from these classes who cannot coexist with our movement, or have tried to obstruct our course, the forces of the revolution are able to stop these

people where they are through the constant liquidation of these elements after they are discovered, especially those which have bared their teeth and declared their disloyalty to this society frankly, starting with what happened in April 1976 and ending with what happened in April 1984. This is not the end, since the force of the revolution is vigilant in discovering these sorts of elements in order to liquidate them. The revolution is ongoing; as the saying has it, every night is the night of the first and every day is the seventh of April.

Self-Management

The editor: In your view, why does what we could call administrative chaos and the inability to apply the principle of self-management in the optimum way enter into the university?

Dr Salim al-Hudayri: In reality, self-management is a pioneering ideal which is in keeping with the ideological premises of the new mass society. However, everything that is new faces difficulties and challenges, and self-management is among the new premises where, although we have covered a substantial distance in the area of applying them, our ambitions have caused us to be dissatisfied with what has been realized in this field. Self-management has been applied in all the faculties of the University of the First in full, in spite of the negative features which have stood in the way of application, especially as regards the laxity which has accompanied the process of self-management and the lack of attention to cleanliness and public facilities, because some elements have not committed themselves to application or have failed to perform their duty in the most thorough manner in applying self-management.

The people's educational conferences have ratified penalties and rules for people committing violations or refraining from carrying out this program, but I believe that these rules do not guarantee that this principle will be carried out as thoroughly as possible, on the one hand, and, on the other, the new law on the universities, which is in keeping with the new philosophy of the structure of the universities and higher institutes, which are made up of various people's committees, self-management and the programs of formation of masses and armies, has not been set out and formulated in final form yet. As a result of this, the faculties in the universities vacillate and are confused and beset by difficulty in the face of the application of the new philosophy and the old law, and this could obstruct the principle of self-management from the outset.

Nonetheless, we have not withdrawn and contented ourselves with the actual state of affairs. We have started applying self-management throughout the university this year following the formation of the specific people's committees in the homes of students and cafeterias, which the students who organize themselves through a people's committee supervising them are now running. All the people working in the university cafeterias will be dispensed with except for those who are technicians and whose jobs the students cannot perform. In addition, a program has been set out for male and female students to lead celebrations, for a fee, and close to 70 students have been tallied who can lead the celebrations after being trained for a short

period. A start has been made in allocating them to celebrations in order to learn about parade routes and train them in leading these cavalcades, and perhaps they will assume charge of all the celebrations for good at the end of this year.

The editor: Out of a feeling for all these problems, what do you intend to do so that they can be overcome?

Dr Salim al-Hudayri: Following the formation of the specific people's committees for various activities in the universities, these committees were assigned to set out their conceptions of the future so that the university would be a revolutionary citadel of scholarship in service of the society, working with it, on behalf of its progress and advancement. These committees, in my view, are a serious, positive step, since they will contribute greatly to solving the problem of existing contradictions through the distribution of tasks among these specialized committees. The task of the Committee on Higher Studies and Scientific Research, for instance, will be limited and restricted to advancing local higher studies, by setting out programs which will guarantee that Libyanization and self-sufficiency in qualified personnel is achieved in all sectors. The task of this committee will not be restricted to setting out programs but [will extend] to monitoring and supervising them. In addition, the Production Committee will set out programs which will guarantee that this educational institution is intensively involved in helping attain the needs of society and increasing production as far as the productive programs inside and outside the university both are concerned. In addition, each of these committees will play a great part in advancing the various activities in the university.

The editor: We hope so.

Since the humane sciences are more concerned than others with revolutionization and change, we went to meet with their professors in the Faculty of Education. This meeting took place with a number of them, first with Dr al-Tuhami al-Tarhuni, the secretary of the people's committee in the faculty.

The editor: Dr Tuhami al-Salim, we had expected that the university would lead the movement of revolutionary transformation in the society, on grounds that it is the progressive scientific center which is most able to understand the data and requirements of change, but perhaps we have found the opposite -- the society is leading the university, and the university is an instrument of reverse attraction, if we are not being excessive in this evaluation of ours.

Dr Tuhami: There are two issues in the university which are basic, the issue of curriculum and the issue of morality.

The humane sciences indeed need a revolution in curricula, since the humane sciences must keep abreast with the concepts which have been presented. The issue of revolutionization is not a simple one, because it includes or comprises three elements:

The student, the faculty member and the textbook. As far as the textbook is concerned, one cannot change that overnight; that requires authorship and

here is where the task of the faculty member in the university enters in. The faculty members are primarily responsible for changing these curricula and they can only change the curricula if they understand and grasp the concepts that have been presented within the Jamahiriyah. The fact is that there have been positive initiatives, since there are people who have done writing on history, people who have done writing on geography and the Arabic language and people who have done writing on mass sports. Initiatives are being taken to do writing on the English language, in terms of textbooks.

From the standpoint of educational sciences within the classroom, they are more developed than the textbooks. Most faculty members do not rely primarily on textbooks, in view of the data that existed previously, but are always trying to adapt textbooks in a manner which will be in keeping with theory, especially in humane sciences such as history, Islamic studies, sociology and educational and psychological studies.

In addition, as far as the student, the third element in the change of curricula, is concerned, he is always trying within the classroom to lead the classroom in a manner which is in keeping with the era of the masses. Indeed, most of the discussions which take place within the classroom are part of the gist of third world theory, and there are many innovations in the area of literature and society which students present in the form of reports or research in this regard. This I can state as far as the curricula are concerned. As for the moral aspect in the university, most of the problems which arise are due to people or students from outside the university. Many of the students who have graduated into society come to visit the university most times of the day, along with some members of the society who have no relationship to the university from the standpoint of education or administration, and most moral violations are recorded by this group. Guardians do not cooperate with the university, since the issue of morality starts with the family, and the university, before it is an educational institution, is an institution in which people are educated in the morals and sciences which will qualify them to perform their role in the society. The process of upbringing precedes the process of education. This means that the university expects that the student will be prepared in terms of upbringing and morals before he enters the university, because the university provides him with scholarship, not upbringing.

As regards the bills governing these cases, these are the formation of disciplinary councils for everyone covered by them, in the event they violate morality. However, the problem is that we cannot apply these councils to people who are not in the university, and consequently the cases which are committed in the university by people who have no relationship to the university are handed over to the people's security post in the university.

The editor: Is it possible to refer to or give a picture of these moral violations?

Dr Tuhami: Most of these problems are due to the clothing which is present and is the result of worn-out cultural modes. Few of them are related to young people's issues. In spite of the educational conferences' decrees on the application of chaste clothing within the university, the executive committees have not been able to apply most of these decrees.

The editor: What do you recommend as far as solving this issue goes?

Dr Tuhami: Our hopes are very great that the formation of an army will take place in the university so that there will be a unified university dress and we will thereby be able to draw a distinction between people who are students and people who are not.

The editor: Are steps being taken?

Dr Tuhami: Specific committees bearing on the formation of an army have emerged and embarked on their activities, and our hopes are very great that these committees will succeed in applying the clothing which will end most moral problems. Our hopes are that they will succeed in underlining and supporting the program of forming the masses.

The editor: On the basis of what you have mentioned, and what you are going through every day in the university, how is the situation in the university?

Dr Tuhami: The university.

The editor: Be specific!

Dr Tuhami: Being specific, without being polite to anyone, the current situation in the university is wretched, although eliminating it, that is, applying the bills within the university in the optimum manner, and having every one of us understand his obligations and rights, would be the easiest of things.

The editor: What do you mean by the word "wretched," and why?

Dr Tuhami: By that I mean the failure to respect the laws within the university, the university laws and bills regarding studies, morals and administration, and also the failure of people working in the university to understand the morality of the mass society. I believe that the law which has currently been presented to the people's conferences must be enacted in place of the university's disciplinary bills, and at that point the moral problems will end. Add to that the application of the formation of the army at the soonest possible opportunity.

The editor: Perhaps you in the university have gone beyond the era of the masses and have surged toward the era of chaos.

Dr Tuhami: In the university there is an absence of understanding and a failure to differentiate between free democracy and freedom, because freedom is where people live free and do not do what they want, as in free democracy, because people who do what they want might harm others. Rather, the requisite freedom is the freedom which has been set down as law and does not harm others.

The editor: God has helped you. Goodbye.

The editor: Greetings, Dr Bashir al-Qubbi.

Dr Bashir: Greetings to you.

The editor: How does the picture of the university appear in the view of Dr Bashir al-Qubbi? Has it kept abreast of the revolution?

Dr Bashir: The university is of great importance in any society. The Libyan universities have advanced with the emergence of the revolution of the first of September. However, the University of the First has not been able to keep abreast of the steps of the revolution of the first, for numerous reasons, among them that the steps of the revolution have been great, giant and on-going and the university has failed to keep up with them for the reason that it has not yet been able to adapt, and adapt its situation, to the achievements the revolution has made or is calling for.

The statute and bills of the University of the First have vacillated between the capitalist and Marxist systems, but the university has not yet succeeded in creating a new university statute which would encompass the statute, laws, bills, curricula and so forth in a manner which would be in keeping with the theory of the masses.

There is another point, which is that we in the university have not yet grasped the material bearing on education in the Green Book, since the Green Book differentiates between education, the curriculum, the teacher, knowledge and culture, stating that knowledge is a natural right, but not stating science or learning. That means that knowledge does not require going to university. Our lack of awareness and our lack of understanding have made us falter and accept things without conditions and rules and without evaluations. If we understand this statement, we will distinguish between science and knowledge. In addition, we have not grasped the curriculum as the Green Book describes it. We are still studying Marxist and capitalist curricula which are by the nature of the case the product of these schools, in accordance with their formulation and classification, and we offer them as rich sustenance.

The Green Book considers that a curriculum means actual participation and actual life, and participation means that we are participants, even in the educational process, in the sense that administration must be a partnership among people; that we call self-management in the university. If we understand that participation is self-management, we will not falter. In every one of these faculties there are thousands of students, whose ages range from 18 to 24, the age of physical production in all areas, and there we have all areas of specialization, in addition to the expertise the members of the faculty possess, but we have not benefited from these capabilities and resources because of our failure to understand and grasp what the curriculum and participation must constitute.

Another issue on which I would like to make a statement is that evaluation is restricted to the evaluation of paper and the information the student repeats, without attention to his entire personality, to the point where we evaluate the paper and not the student.

As regards morals, since there are no rules, it has been inevitable that weak-spirited people who have no morals have worked their way in. The

solution lies in the presence of rules and control. For example, there are students in the Military School for Girls who are present during the entire 24 hours, and because there is order and control we do not find moral backsliding as in the university, where female students do not remain more than 7 or 8 hours, because there are no rules, as I have pointed out.

In addition, the Western habits which have become widespread in the university, such as get-acquainted parties, for example, and the dress of male and female students at these parties, which are not held for the sake of getting acquainted, all these things reflect badly on the university and detract from its reputation.

Goodbye. I now have a disciplinary council.

The editor: We would like to meet with you on the pages of the newspaper AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR to discuss the subject of the university.

Dr Ruhiyah Karah: I would like it if this matter were to be deferred. I cannot talk about the university because I feel that what has been written in the journal AL-JAMI'AH has affected me greatly, to the point where I cannot rid myself of the effects of what has been written. Its wounds are still fresh.

The editor: We are talking with you as people from the journal AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR and not editors in the journal AL-JAMI'AH. Has the journal AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR affronted you?

Dr Ruhiyah: No, the article was published in the journal AL-JAMI'AH. The important thing is that we cannot talk without being affected by what has been written in the journal AL-JAMI'AH.

The editor: Talk to me as you like.

Dr Ruhiyah: In every social context there are moral problems and the moral problems in the university are limited. The issues and problems have been presented in the form of generalizations, which are harmful to us all, without exception. Generalizing and exaggerating are the fault of the articles that were presented in the journal AL-JAMI'AH, and I would like to state that the relationship that exists between the student and faculty member ends just with the acquisition of scholarship and learning and that the mistake of one or two people does not apply generally to everyone and everyone does not bear the responsibility for it. I am not defending people who have committed mistakes.

I would like to say also that this experiment, that is, self-management, is a new one and is still in its beginnings and will pass through numerous stages. It is faced with many obstacles, and will appear in its suitable form only after a while. Change cannot occur overnight. Nonetheless, I am not content with the form of the Faculty of Education and the absence of order and cleanliness in it, but we have hopes that awareness will increase and we will arrive at a good level.

The editor: Do you have anything else?

Dr Ruhiyah: No, but publish my opinion without distortion or changes.

The editor: That you will have without having suggested it. Goodbye.

A speaker: These people are waiting for you, doctor. As you know, they are from the journal AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR and have come with the purpose of making reports.

Dr (a revolutionary): I am busy now. After a little I have a get-together meeting.

(Silence.)

The editor: Greetings, Dr Abu Bakr Shalabi.

Dr Shalabi: The fact is that the university is still experiencing alienation and the university has not reached the people through its programs, or vice versa. The important thing is that there is a missing link in the middle between the university and the society. This link can be dealt with and understood only through studies. The notion of the open university has been propounded, but I do not know if programs exist for realizing this goal. In past years, there were programs in this regard.

The university now is trying as far as possible to graduate generations which understand the spirit of the revolution in terms of scholarship, morality and ideology.

The editor: What else?

Dr Shalabi: I hope that this scholarly citadel will be a true manifestation of the progress of this society and will help raise and uplift it, alongside the other achievements the people have realized in this blessed process.

We will have an encounter with other people's opinions in the next issue.

[21 Jan 85 pp 10, 11]

[Text] In the last issue, we opened up the discussion with the university, leaving talk about the university to the university, so that it could remedy its problems through scholarly serious discussion striving toward construction and progress, without triviality and without slipping into the abysses of rhetorical vituperation from which we will derive no benefit.

Out of the journal AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR's concern for the reputation of the university and its concern that this institution should be at the desired level from various standpoints in terms of scholarship, morality and conduct, this issue is continuing to explore this file, in order to broach the subjects with the people of the university, to underline them and give them their share of discussion, publicity, and study, so that our universities may eliminate all stumbling blocks and attain their goals without falling prey to backsliding.

In this issue, we had a meeting with a number of faculty members, although we were not able to meet with others; that can be attributed to the start of the midyear holiday.

At the beginning, we had this meeting with Dr Khayri al-Saghir, professor in the Department of Crops at the Faculty of Agriculture.

The editor: How is the program of revolutionizing and developing the curricula in the Faculty of Agriculture progressing?

Dr Khayri: I have plunged into the issue of revolutionizing the curricula and I am now rapporteur of a committee which was formed for this purpose, that is, developing and revolutionizing the curricula of the Faculty of Agriculture. Of course the courses and curricula in the Faculty of Agriculture are supposed to be reviewed, in keeping with the developments which are taking place, while the scientific content is retained and the need for actual conditions to advance beyond their present status is affirmed.

The curricula are not something that is frozen; rather, there must be dynamism in them, since the goal is to graduate engineers whose scientific background will be firm and strong, in addition to the moral, patriotic and nationalistic qualities which they must possess, guaranteeing that well educated, learned engineers are graduated who will combine scientific ability with the ability to give concrete form to their scholarly abilities for the sake of uplifting their nation.

The editor: Where has this committee got in its mission?

Dr Khayri: The committee was formed 3 months ago. As is well known, there are 10 departments in the Faculty of Agriculture. In addition to other tasks, the committee's program requires that the joint curricula in the Faculty of Agriculture and the other faculties which are studying these same sciences be reconciled.

We have finished setting out a final conception as far as the basic curricula, specialized curricula and associated curricula, "supplementary to the field of specialization," are concerned, and this file will be submitted to the competent bodies in the Faculty of Agriculture.

The editor: Could one learn about the benefits of the new curricula compared with the flaws in the previous ones?

Dr Khayri al-Saghir: The benefits which this conception could produce can be summarized as follows:

1. The effort to provide curricula which are in keeping with the faculty's needs and the country's needs as it proceeds toward development and agricultural transformation.
2. The elimination of some curricula which are almost covered to some extent in certain other curricula, along with the modernization of some new curricula which the students in the Faculty of Agriculture must study in order to complete the picture of agricultural coursework.

3. The review of the contents of some curricula on basic sciences, such as the Arabic and English languages, so that they may be in keeping with the curricula of the faculty and benefit the students in it.

The editor: In your opinion, will the new conception succeed in creating model agricultural engineers?

Dr Khayri: It might not be possible to attain that higher model. That is also a very great aspiration which we are working to approach or attain, and everything we are doing is aimed at shortening the road to reach the desired goal. Creating the model agricultural engineer is a lofty goal and the realization of that is connected to various factors, including curricula, equipment and the seriousness of the students.

The editor: In your conception of the new curriculum, have you set out a scientific curriculum program as one feature for applying and giving concrete form to the formation of the masses?

Dr Khayri: We have not produced a conception of this aspect up to this point. In the past, a plan of action for the students and for assigning them to various agricultural projects was set out.

The conclusions this committee reached are part of the whole, with its various elements, as far as development and revolutionization are concerned, and these elements are the curricula, employment of the students, formation of the army and formation of the masses.

Dr Fawzi Tahir was left to converse spontaneously.

Dr Fawzi: As regards self-management, we have covered a great distance in that in the Faculty of Agriculture -- a substantial distance.

When we bring about self-management, that is not restricted to sanitation. The areas of self-management are diverse, for instance the registration of students, preparation of their files, performance of office and administrative work and other matters.

I believe that the program is very successful, but nonetheless it requires participation from everyone, be they students or faculty members. Self-management requires only commitment in which the university will cover great ground in managing its affairs by itself.

I would like to say that self-management is a new experiment, and its fruit will not emerge in a short period.

As regards the issue of the formation of the army and production, that is a new theoretical concept in the university, and I personally do not know what has been done about it, but there are committees which have specialized in this aspect in order to set out a special program on it.

The editor: I note that many professors tell me, in their general statements, that they personally do not know how far given programs have gone.

Why is that, in your opinion? You must be informed of things in the event you follow up on them.

Dr Fawzi: As regards the issue of the formation of the army and production, we approved the two sections in the educational conference and they are in the process of being put into effect. The issue should be considered a new one, and has been presented only for a period of half a year.

Dr Fawzi: As far as university dress goes, many brothers with whom you have held meetings have addressed themselves to clothing and have said that that is one of the steps which must be carried out, and this should be considered a solution. In my opinion, the issue is not one of university dress, and you cannot pass judgment on a female student through her dress.

The editor: In my opinion, to some extent the external form says what is inside.

Dr Fawzi: I disagree with you on that.

The editor: What do you recommend, in particular?

Dr Fawzi: There must be chaste clothing, which will not highlight the girl's alluring charms and do away with her dignity.

Dr Muhammad al-Muqri, professor in the Faculty of Agriculture: Are these people from the AL-ZAHF who are coming down to us?

The editor (to himself): No, the ones who are ascending with you!

Dr Muhammad al-Muqri: This is a picture of Dr Abu Bakr Shalabi; he is my nephew. The picture was in the file which I am carrying with me.

The editor: We held a conversation with your nephew in the last issue, and he told us that the university is living in alienation from the society. What do you say regarding your nephew's statement?

Dr Muhammad al-Muqri: Ah! This is philosophy! We are in agriculture.

The editor: From the standpoint of agriculture.

Dr al-Muqri: In my opinion, unless there is interaction between the society and any institution, this institution will be an alien one. It is a duty that the university carry out all activities connected to the society and that it know itself and perform the pioneering role in the society. To rule that the university is alienated is something else, a philosophical point. Dr Muhammad al-Muqri went on to say:

"In addition, the university produces scientific capabilities for us; in addition to that the university must produce other things for us, that is, it must perform productive activities and be more closely connected to field work.

"We in the Faculty of Agriculture perform a number of tasks, foremost among them the Arabization of the curricula, where the rate of Arabization now comes to about 90 percent. I should not miss the chance, either, to indicate that most professors in this faculty are Libyan Arabs and the highest proportion of local professors is in the Faculty of Agriculture.

"The Faculty of Agriculture performs a number of works of research including research into the production of salinity-resistant crops, with the participation of the National Scientific Research Authority."

Our sister Karimah Bashiwah, reader in the Department of Koranic Interpretation in the Faculty of Education, said:

"I do not blame male or female students who waste time in university common areas; rather, I blame the university, which has presented them with erroneous guidance. The moral aspect of the university is connected to its academic aspects.

"Students who are directed to study an academic subject in which they have no interest will fail in their studies because of this orientation, this orientation which is based on dividing students up in accordance with their evaluations in examinations and the results of examination grades, which do not constitute a scientific criterion for learning about students' intelligence. Many are the students who obtained excellent grades, were directed to faculties such as medicine and failed in their studies, while students with acceptable evaluations were successful in them. The grade total is a secondary thing in university studies, and that is how it should be taken. Guidance is a cause of students' failure; their success will be realized when they are given scope to choose what is suitable for them.

"This bad aspect of the life of university students is a result of the academic policy which exists in universities that rely on guidance.

"In another area, Libyan students are brought up in families where relations between men and women are founded on instinctive aspects, not on humane and intellectual ones. This is the source of all the wrongful phenomena we find in the university. However, many apparent problems, such as dress and so forth, are organizational matters, and it is among the easiest of matters to solve them, since the educational people's conference could be held in an emergency session and resolve these issues even in just a single session.

"Another aspect I would like to talk about concerns conduct. Relations between students and doctors and professors, and between their colleagues and male and female students, are all relations which are not in keeping with the university level. Scholarship alone is not enough to build man."

The editor: How is it that relations are not in keeping with the level?

Our sister Karimah: There are the struggles among professors, struggles that are not scientific and not aimed at scientific purposes, as they ought to be, but are indeed for personal reasons; we find such struggles and you will

find some colleagues fighting with a successful person or professor. This conduct has been reflected on the educational level in the university.

The editor: What else?

Our sister Karimah: It is a strange thing to find a student who is most moral and refined in this university, and it is a very normal phenomenon to find a student who is not refined. I personally assert that it would be better for this university to be closed than to have it at this level.

The editor: What about the administration?

Our sister Karimah: Administrative red tape plays a big part in obstructing higher studies. For example, students experience a delay of 4 months in having them agree over the subject of theses.

I can assert that the scholarly future of the university lies only in reliance on domestic personnel. On the one hand domestic personnel are not available, and on the other, increasing the number of university students will require a greater increase in the number of professors and an increase in the total number in a given single area of specialization.

I would like to point out that the higher studies that exist at present do not in any way represent higher studies which might be a scientific basis for the academic future of the university.

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LEBANON

JA'FARI SHI'ITE MUFTI COMMENTS ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY MOVES

London. AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1468, 21 Dec 84 pp 15-16

[Interview with Mufti 'Abd-al-Amir Qabalan by Shirbil Zughayb: "Mufti Tells AL-HAWADITH Extremism Must Be Put To Use in Building State": date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] When political storms gain strength, when military battles break out, and when solutions and settlements come up against intransigence and unyielding positions, an appeal to hold a summit meeting for spiritual leaders is heard. Such a meeting would be necessary since spiritual leaders could take the initiative and rescue the Lebanese people.

Recently, however, the positions assumed by some clergymen--both Muslim and Christian--have not been less unyielding than those of some politicians.

Why do matters go in that direction?

It was on the basis of that question that AL-HAWADITH interviewed His Eminence, the distinguished Ja'fari mufti, al-Shaykh 'Abd-al-Amir Qabalan who answered the first question by saying this: "The situation in Lebanon differs from the situation in Lebanon's neighboring countries. The intransigent positions that we see all parties assuming stem from the fact that there are wide discrepancies among Lebanese groups. The proper way to go would be to build a Lebanese homeland for all the citizens of the country. However, the inflexibility that has surfaced recently, or what some people consider extremism on the part of some groups, is due to the presence of an unrealistic tendency, and it is that tendency which has created this discrepancy among the Lebanese.

"Matters will not be right in Lebanon if it continues to move in this direction. We want to have a homeland, not a country for sects. We want a country that is a homeland for all its citizens. We want a country with open districts: a country where no privileges are afforded to one district or one group of people unless those privileges are earned because of what that district or group of people did in the interests of Lebanon. Therefore, this situation which is thwarting the course of the state or impeding the establishment of a new homeland is the product of this disparity in emphasis, in direction, and in dealing with reality.

"Fanaticism is not new; it is not new with Muslims or with Christians. We have

not been living with angels or with prophets. We have been living with people among whom fanaticism within the same sect and on the same team can be found. Therefore, we have to put that fanaticism to work, not to build new colonies or mini-states in this small country, but rather to build a state. This extremism must make us more objective and more realistic so we can move forward to a civilized Lebanon that is founded on freedom, justice, skills, abilities and energies. Lebanon, this country that houses various religions, ought not to have an imperial approach to its existence; instead, its approach should be democratic."

[Question] No two people in Lebanon would disagree over those principles that have been mentioned. There are disagreements, however, over application, methods of application and those authorities that must apply those principles. One group of Lebanese citizens thinks that a summit meeting for spiritual leaders has to be held, and those spiritual leaders must be given the power to find solutions for Lebanon. At the same time another group says that clergymen do not have the tanks and guns that would enable them to impose a solution. What do you think about these two proposals?

[Answer] There are many men of reason in our country, and one can find people who are sincere in all sects. One is not to make light of those ideas that were used to enact laws that were to protect Lebanon from what happened to it. Although clergymen do not have tanks or guns, they do have access to the masses and to the means by which they can inform and mobilize those masses. If clergymen were to get together, either in a spiritual summit or as thinkers and scholars, they could make an effective contribution to the effort to build this country. This does not deny a politician's or a jurist's prerogative to do the same in that respect. We can all back up within our ranks those sincere patriots who can all work together to get Lebanon out of this vicious cycle it has been experiencing. When we think seriously and sincerely about Lebanon being rescued by people of good sense and knowledge who are on opposite sides, Lebanon then will be home safe. I firmly believe that evil people whose interests are hurt by the existence of Lebanon are the ones who do not want the country to be restored to its people, nor do they want the people to return to their country. But we all have to work closely together and consider the dangers that surround us, and we have to come up with wholesome solutions to save Lebanon and the Lebanese people. If the Lebanese people were to have an appropriate environment, they could conquer the world with their intelligence and their contributions, not with the terrorists' image that Lebanon's enemies are promoting about them abroad. The deliverance of Lebanon depends exclusively upon the cooperation of its loyal citizens. Deliverance for Lebanon cannot come from abroad; it cannot be accomplished by friends, brothers or foes. The Lebanese people are the ones who know best what needs to be done.

[Question] It seems that politicians and clergymen are competing for the support of the public, and it is obvious that this competition has recently become blatant. What are the reasons for that?

[Answer] Politicians had been neglecting their duties for some time. At the same time the demeanor of clergymen was useful. When that group of clergymen found themselves among people who were being led into tendencies that had nothing to do with the heritage or origins of those people, they rose to defend

the people's heritage and origins and to put an end to those tendencies that were alien to their land, their language and their people. Clergymen took that action to prevent fragmentation among the masses and to show the people that religion served the interests of worshipers and people. They wanted to show that religion was not confined to the mosque or temple, but that it was part of all the requirements of life. Clergymen took action to show people the tolerance and virtues of religion; they wanted to show people that there were those who wanted them to have a sense of the spirit, the principles and the truth of religion.

[Question] It has been noticed that since the absence of His Eminence Imam Musa al-Sadr, opinions within the same rank of the Shi'ite sect have been varied. Can elections be held in the Supreme Shi'ite Islamic Council even though His Eminence Imam al-Sadr remains president of that council?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the absence of Imam Musa al-Sadr has created a big vacuum. The presence of clergymen on the scene, with each one holding on to his position or premise, has created these different methods and ways among people seeking the same goal and the same objective. We all seek the Kingdom of God and His pleasure. But these differences provide evidence of vigor and not of division or fragmentation. Accordingly, they serve the interests of citizens and protect them. We had decided to hold elections for the Supreme Shi'ite Council in the absence of Imam al-Sadr, but the security situation precluded those elections because not everybody was able to get to the council's main office from all the districts in Lebanon because of the conditions surrounding each district. It is known that His Eminence Imam al-Sadr will continue to serve as president of the council until he reaches the age of 64 which he has not yet reached.

[Question] As far as the security situation is concerned, the state has devised a security plan for the greater Beirut area that all parties have consented to. But it seems that matters have not become quite settled. Are you in favor of the army taking action with everyone's consent, or do you favor giving the army total freedom to carry out its security functions?

[Answer] The army is made up of people, and they influence the army. The military needs to be reorganized, and it needs new blood as well. There are people in some ranks of the armed forces who are not enthusiastic about imposing security or having it done at their expense. The smallest incident makes those people fail to carry out their duties, and they make no effort to do so. Normal security will be restored when state authorities prevail over all Lebanese territory. As long as there are pockets remaining outside the authority of the state, problems in those areas where the authority of the state is missing will linger.

The army ruled before the so-called February uprising, and government had a presence in West Beirut. Laws were being enforced among the people of West Beirut, but in some other areas where the army was present, the army was not even able to arrest those who were being sought by the legal system or by the state. In this regard let me say that the state must have a presence everywhere, and it must enforce the laws on al-Shaykh 'Abd-al-Amir Qabalan and on Patriarch Kharish as well. When the state does that, we shall be at its service and our people will abide by the laws. But when the state enforces the laws in one

district and looks the other way in another, that state forfeits my support. I cannot support or work with a state that discriminates between one citizen and another. Such a state cannot impose security on people without their consent. This is because a political accord would give the army the momentum it needs to deal with matters, especially after each faction within the army fell back to its own unit. Therefore, the change that has to be made must be a change from the bottom up. We have to have new blood for the new army we must have for a new country.

[Question] It is being said in this regard that His Eminence Mufti Qabalan is being held in special regard by the state. Minister Joseph al-Hashim quoted you when he attacked those who were impeding the coastal plan. How do you assess your relationship with the state and with the Phalangist Party?

[Answer] I've said that those who prevented the application of the coastal plan were the devils of the human race. I am from the south, from the coastal strip, and I refuse to put up obstacles in the face of our people. I know that there is only one road to the south, and that is the coastal highway. I refuse all detours to that road. I support the coastal plan, and I support all those who are helping support it. I support the state if the state is serving all citizens. I support all parties if these parties are turning matters over to the state. I reject mini-states and shadow governments, and I reject all those who really control the state. I support every group that works for the interests of the country and takes action to rid the country of the Israeli occupation. Israel is the cause of everything that ails Lebanon. It applies pressure on Christians, on the Druze, on Sunnis and on Shi'ites in the south. Therefore, Israel wants to stay with the help of those who work with it. When Israel is left alone and no one works with it, it will not be able to survive on Lebanese territory. Therefore, I support all those who are serving Lebanon and are not establishing relations with Israel. As His Eminence Imam al-Sadr said, "Israel is absolute evil."

[Question] To get rid of this absolute evil the state has turned to military negotiations with Israel, which are being conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. Attitudes on accepting or rejecting the principle of negotiations differ. While those who reject negotiations regard them as recognition of Israel, you personally did accept the principle of negotiations. Will you support the outcome of these negotiations no matter what that outcome will be?

[Answer] Our support for negotiations is not absolute. We said we supported negotiations conducted by the truce committee which took into account the resolutions of the UN Security Council. We want the coastal strip to remain under the control of the Lebanese government, and we refuse to have Israel's clients stay behind because we believe in the sovereignty and integrity of Lebanon. We support the negotiations provided that we do not recognize Israel because Lebanon is part of the Arab world that surrounds it. When the Arabs reach a consensus on that matter, then we can look into it. Israel humiliated the dignity of Lebanese citizens. It seized large areas of land from Lebanon, and it is engaged in seditious operations among the people of Lebanon. Those who rejected negotiations rejected them, as they said, because they feared that national resistance in the south may become soft. Some people said they rejected

negotiations to strengthen the position of Lebanese negotiators, and some said they rejected them because they wanted military and political solutions. I don't know who rejects the negotiations and who supports them, but I do know that I reject Israel's presence in Lebanon and I want Israel out of Lebanon provided that Lebanon retain its sovereignty and the power to have the final say so on every inch of its territory.

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LEBANON

LEBANESE FRONT OFFICIAL REJECTS DISSOLUTION OF PARTY

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1468, 21 Dec 84 p 18

[Interview with Edouard Hanin, secretary general of the Lebanese Front: "Edouard Hanin Tells AL-HAWADITH, 'It Is Not Unusual for the Government To Adopt Arab Positions'"; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] At a meeting held recently by the Lebanese Front a question was asked about what could happen if the front were to disband. Another question was also asked about whether or not the front ought to be expanded and if it ought to be expanded, how.

No explanations were given later for the reasons that might have caused these two questions to be asked. The two questions were mentioned by an official statement from the Lebanese Front. AL-HAWADITH interviewed the secretary general of the front, Mr Edouard Hanin who wondered, "Why should the front disband?" "The front," as he said, "has been active, and people have been involved in it since it was founded over 10 years ago."

At first Deputy Hanin spoke about the birth of the front and the political stages it went through.

Mr Hanin said, "The Lebanese Front was founded in al-Kafur after President Franjiyyah moved there in 1976. It had become necessary to establish the front because the government, which was then headed by Prime Minister Rashid Karami, had failed to meet to consider current affairs and decide upon the treatment that was required for them.

"Cooperation between President Franjiyyah and a body of men who had refused to flee from the battle and leave the scene was inevitable. In forming that committee President Franjiyyah immediately chose [former] President Sham'un, al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, Abbot Shirbil Qassis and Edouard Hanin. They were among the few who stopped daily at the government house in al-Kafur. They were later joined by Jawwad Bulus, Charles Malik and Fu'ad Ifram al-Bustani.

"The effect of that committee on the Lebanese people was good; they were delighted with it. At first that committee was called al-Kafur Front. Then it was called the Lebanese Front, and that is the name that stuck with it till today.

[Question] The Lebanese Front has gone through periods of alienation and estrangement with the Arabs and Arabism. What is your assessment of the government's attitudes toward adopting a clear-cut and an unequivocal Arab course?

[Answer] The Lebanese Front believes that Lebanon should not turn its back on the Arab world which is within its geographic range. Lebanon joined the Arab world in forming the Arab League. Therefore, the front supports Lebanon's cooperation with the Arabs in all affairs in which Lebanon chooses to cooperate with the Arabs. Lebanon tries to conduct such cooperation within the bounds of dignity, sovereignty and national interests. The front does not find it unusual for the government to adopt an Arab course in some of its positions because the front has confidence that government--I am saying government not the government--has not departed from the boundaries which Lebanon did set for itself since its independence and to which it remains faithful.

[Question] The Lebanese Front is a misnomer. It is in fact a Christian front. Was it founded to be a Christian front or did Muslims refuse to join it?

[Answer] How can this "misnomer" [as you say] be everywhere and have people involved in it everywhere for 10 years if it were not a current fact and a dynamic, vital organization? If the Lebanese Front were in fact a Christian front, does that make its name a misnomer? If Muslims refuse to join the front, does its name become a misnomer? Making such an argument is irrational and unrealistic; it is also shortsighted and shows weakness that comes close to being cowardice in facing facts.

[Question] Whereas principal members of the Lebanese Front say the front represents Christians, at least half of the Christians [in Lebanon] deny that it represents them. Who specifically are those Christians that are represented by the front?

[Answer] The Lebanese Front has never claimed it represented Christians. Ever since it was founded, the front has claimed, and it is still claiming, that it represents the proper Christian opinion. That Christian opinion does not have to be the product of a Christian coalition. It is enough for that opinion to be that which was stated and expressed by Christians throughout history. That opinion, which is being held by the front, is enough as long as a majority of the Lebanese--and I am not saying Christians--subscribe to it.

[Question] Do you believe that the Lebanese Front has succeeded in accomplishing what it was founded to accomplish?

[Answer] Yes it has. Had it not been for the Lebanese Front many businesses which are still functioning would have collapsed a long time ago.

[Question] Some people are saying that as an institution the Lebanese Front is about to come to an end. They are saying that the parties which are represented in it will act as they see fit. Others, meanwhile, are talking about the possibility of expanding the front by having deputies and other figures who are not in it now join it. They are saying those people would give the front new momentum. What is the truth of the matter?

[Answer] I think it is very unlikely that the Lebanese Front will come to an end. Does a cause come to an end? Expanding the front, however, is something that has been talked about since the front was established, and the front is still facing [the possibility of] such an expansion which may include organizations, such as Christian associations and national and parliamentary coalitions; parliamentary and non-parliamentary leaders and figures; and equal numbers of Christians and Muslims. I am one of those who say this expansion is necessary, provided that it be carried out wisely, deliberately and quietly. This expansion has to be prompted by the interests of Lebanon, and it has to be done without publicity, without fanfare and without over confidence.

[Question] It is well known that the army of the Lebanese Front is the Lebanese Forces. But do these forces actually get their orders from the front? Who in the front issues these orders? Or do the Lebanese Forces get their orders from someone else or from a specific political party?

[Answer] The Lebanese Forces do not serve as the army of the Lebanese Front. The Lebanese Forces serve as the steadfast army of Lebanon, and they serve under their own command which issues orders after members of the command consult with their political parties and our front and after matters are considered and scrutinized. Thus, neither the front nor any one of the political parties of the front issues orders to the Lebanese Forces, and the Lebanese Forces receive their orders from no one else.

[Question] In case the state puts an end to the process of collecting funds that are known as common funds, how will the front obtain funding?

[Answer] Before I answer your question, two points must be made clear.

First, the common fund is not an institution of the front. It is an institution that was established by the Phalangist Party and by the National Liberal Party, and its business is conducted by representatives of the two parties who also oversee it. The Lebanese Front does not have anything to do with managing the common fund; it does not oversee it; and it does not benefit from the funds that are collected in it.

Second, these funds that are collected are not the only source of funds for the common fund. The common fund for political parties has other resources, and these are the more important ones. They go directly into the treasury of the common fund, which is replenished by these resources.

[Question] What does the Lebanese Front think about Christians' refusal to deal with Israel, especially in the south?

[Answer] Christians in the south are free to choose with whom they wish to deal. They choose to deal only with those whom they think would serve the interests of Lebanon and the interests of the Lebanese as well as their interests as residents of south Lebanon. It is not imperative that they think it necessary to deal with Israel. In this case the front goes along with them. The best evidence for this was seen when Christians of south Lebanon joined their fellow Shi'ites in a recent strike; their steadfastness in that strike was not less than that of the Shi'ites. None of them opposed it.

[Question] Would the Lebanese Front voluntarily disband and join those who oppose it and those whom it opposes to form one broad Christian front for the purpose of uniting the Christian ranks? Whom would you propose to head such a front?

[Answer] Why should the Lebanese Front disband? A broad Christian front can be founded by rallying around the existing front which can embrace all Christians who have hitherto stayed away from it. Who is it who told you that the Lebanese Front would agree to become a purely Christian front?

The Lebanese Front is a Lebanese front. This means that it is Christian and Muslim. It means, in particular, that it is open to all Lebanese citizens who wish to join it. Based on facts that have been revealed through investigation and facts that are in the process of being revealed, I know that there are major Muslim figures who would prefer joining the front to joining the "organizations" that are formed within their sector.

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SYRIA

TARTUS GOVERNORATE BEGINS RURAL DRINKING WATER PROJECT

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 28 Oct 84 p 4

/Article by Hasan Muhammad Waqqaf: "Drinking Water Situation in al-Duraykish Area; Start of Implementation of al-Dulbah-Bamahsar Project To Supply Water to 53 Villages; Lack of Complete Studies on Rural Drinking Water Projects Is Behind Waste and Delayed Implementation"

/Text/ We explored at an earlier time the situation of the Nab' Bayt al-Wadi water project in Dayr Raslan District, Tartus Governorate.

From the current situation of this project, it has become evident that there are a number of "reservoirs" in the same village and that, consequently, there is some mechanized equipment to pump water from one reservoir to another. This is due to the fact that these villages lack all organizational plans which, were they available to start with, would not allow people to live in houses above the water reservoirs. Moreover, the delay in implementing the study on this project has led to the same results, i.e., the presence of population centers which did not exist before the study was started.

In this report, we will try to explore the situation of al-Dulbah-Bamahsar water project in Duraykish area, Tartus Governorate.

Al-Dulbah-Bamahsar Water Project

The objective of this project is to supply drinking water to 53 villages in Tartus Governorate. The villages are located in a rugged mountainous area with rocky lands that do not permit the use of eternit pipes to pump water to the area.

The first part is al-Dulbah spring, which supplies water to 41 villages, and the second part is Bamahsar spring, which supplies 12 villages with water.

Importance of Project

The primary importance of the project lies in the fact that it supplies 53 villages, located in the two governorates of Tartus and Hamah, with

water at a preliminary cost of 20 million Syrian pounds. The project's designed lifespan is 30 years. The project supplies water to the citizens in these villages and spares these citizens the hardship of having to wait until 1 a.m. to fill a 10-gallon vessel with water. I will cite here as an example the villages of Abu Salamah, Bayt Nafilah and Bayt al-Hindi Quarter of the village of Fajlit.

Eng Muhammad al-Sha'ar, the man who conducted the study on this project, told us:

In 1981, the population of the village of Bamahsar amounted to 5,000 people, a number which will increase to 14,000 people by the year 2012. The spring's capacity is 30 liters per second of which we have utilized only 21 liters per second.

The capacity of 'Ayn al-Dulbah spring is 153 liters per second, of which we have utilized only 110 liters, per second, i.e., nearly 414 cubic meters per second. This means supplying tens of thousands of people in 23 villages with water until the year 2012.

Stages of Project

The project is divided into two stages:

The first stage includes the headwaters of al-Dulbah and Bamahsar springs, the 6 pumping plants, the pumping lines, ground reservoirs of different sizes (24 reservoirs), 2 reservoirs linked to gravitational flow pipelines and other details pertaining to the project.

The second stage, namely the stage we are studying at present, pertains to the networks of al-Dulbah-Bamahsar water project. We are supposed to have, and it is better to have, organizational plans for these villages so that we may conduct the study in a sound, scientific manner. However, such plans are not available to us yet. This is why we are working in coordination with the Tartus Technical Services Directorate to study the present networks in these villages, taking into account the possibility of utilizing them in the future. This study includes gravitational flow lines from a reservoir to the villages, with links to every village and a pressure breaker, if necessary. The study also covers other details.

Difficulties

The problems facing us include the unavailability of workers at reasonable wages to accompany the topographical teams. This is due to the worker's high income in this area and to the inability of the public to attract this worker, since the private organizations pay this worker 50-60 Syrian pounds a day. Whereas we pay only 20 pounds a day. This makes it difficult for us to find the right worker at the

right time. Were it not for the presence of a number of party organizations which have helped with labor in al-Duraykish area, the agency conducting the topographical study would not have been able to complete it with the required speed.

Regarding Study on Mechanics

Dr Riyal al-Shahmah, the director of mechanics at the Ministry of Housing and Utilities, said:

On the basis of the given facts supplied to us by the Drinking Water Directorate, the technical services or the water agency on a water source, we have conducted the preliminary study, which outlines the general specifications of the mechanical and electrical equipment and determines the dimensions of the equipment and the electrical or diesel energy they need.

In light of these determinations, the architectural dimensions of the pumping, purification or treatment plants are decided on the basis of the population's water consumption.

A detailed study is then conducted by architects and a construction engineer makes the computations concerning the foundations, reinforcements, tension and other aspects pertaining to the construction of an installation.

Then follows the detailed study on the mechanical work (pumps, diesel engines, mechanical parts for the links and the equipment, sterilization, hydraulic hammer and so forth).

There is then an electrical study to determine the level of electrical energy needs and the points of transformation from the general electricity network and distribution lines and whether the transformation should be made at medium tension or low tension. A study is also conducted on the needed cables and on the internal and external lighting of the pumping, purification or treatment plants.

As for automatic control, it is necessary to link all the pumping plants and reservoirs and also to link the mechanical and electrical equipment by remote control.

The preliminary study for al-Dulbah-Bamahsar was conducted in cooperation with the Drinking Water Directorate to determine the dimensions and specifications of the pumping plants. The detailed study is conducted on the basis of the above-mentioned mechanical, electrical and remote control studies. It is my opinion that the delivery of the mechanical, electrical and control equipment, should coincide with the completion of the construction work.

For Good Operation and Utilization

There has to be a capable mechanical engineer, a capable electrical engineer and at least four experienced machinists to supervise the installation of this equipment in the six plants at al-Dulbah-Bamahsar project. This will lead to the ideal operation and utilization. Should this happen, the project will be in constant operation and it will spare us the use of foreign expertise.

Responses from Technical Services in Tartus

I said to Eng Ahmad Mu'alla, the director of technical services in Tartus: We previously explored the condition of Bayt al-Wadi water springs project and al-Dulbah-Bamahsar water springs project and I noticed the extent of your interest in these two projects. But what is your response to the delay in delivering the mechanical equipment to Bayt al-Wadi water springs project. When will work start on al-Dulbah-Bamahsar project and are there plans for these villages so that there may not be numerous reservoirs?

Eng Mu'alla answered:

Regarding Bayt al-Wadi water spring in al-Duraykish area, the Military Housing Organization in Tartus has carried out the work according to the construction study, which covers the pumping plants, the reservoirs and the pumping lines. The Technical Services Directorate then conducted a study on the gravitational flow lines and a contract was concluded with the Military Housing Organization to build these lines.

As for the mechanical equipment, the Military Housing Organization was entrusted with studying and implementing the work as of 1983. But in the eighth month of this year, 1984, the organization declined to conduct the study on the mechanical equipment and the Technical Services Directorate is now conducting the study preliminary to concluding the contract for the equipment.

As for the multiplicity of reservoirs and for the necessity of pumping water from one reservoir to another, this is due to the presence of the first reservoir in a location lower than other populated sites in the area. Moreover, we were not able to select high peaks on which to build reservoirs due to the unavailability of roads and because we have not been able to asphalt some roads because of the poor weather conditions and the high cost of such roads. If there were organizational studies for these villages and if the studies were implemented quickly, we would encounter no difficulties.

As for al-Dulbah-Bamahsar project, which will supply drinking water to 53 thirsty villages, we have awarded the contract for this project to the Tartus Water Company at a cost of 17 million Syrian pounds. The gravitational flow lines are being now studied in cooperation with the Ministry of Housing.

We have given the said company the instructions to begin the work and the ministry representative also delivered the work sites to the Public Water Company for Technical Services in Tartus on 22 September 1984.

Impact of Plans on Projects

Eng Hilal al-Yusufi, the head of the Drinking Water Directorate, said in response to our questions:

The organizational plans have a fundamental impact on studying and implementing the drinking water projects because we depend on these plans when we conduct the technical studies on water network projects for all the population centers, be they in the villages or the cities. Comprehensive regional planning is also taken into consideration. It is also important and urgent to take the other projects and their location on the topographical plans into account when studying any project, especially water projects. To come up with a sound technical study compatible with the organizational plans and with the other projects existing on the spot, all the information pertaining to these plans and installations (locations of main and subsidiary roads, of electricity and telephone cables, of oil pipelines and of bridges) must be available. This is why there has to be a special agency to keep track of all the country's projects so that they may be taken into consideration when studying any new project.

Due to the unavailability of all the organizational plans for all the population centers, the ministry relies on studying the actual situation when preparing the technical studies for the water projects.

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SYRIA

QUWAYQ RIVER DRIES UP, CAUSES HEALTH HAZARD

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 25 Oct 84 p 3

/Article by Mustafa al-Najjar: "Quwayq River Has Dried Up, Becoming Open Sewer Penetrating the City and Spreading Obnoxious Odors and Mosquitoes; What Is Required Is To Cover River at Expense of Other City Beautification Projects Which Can Be Postponed"/

/Text/ Aleppo--The city which used to attract many of the country's citizens and visitors by its immortal historic sites, its thriving markets, its beautiful gardens, its ornamented stone buildings and its tranquility, beauty and cleanliness, this same city has become repulsive to its own inhabitants in numerous residential areas located in the city's eastern section from its northern to its southern limits!

The hardship may vary from one area to another but it is generally because of the lack of the sanitary conditions that are desired for the residential areas.

We can diagnose the city's most important problem as a lack of all or some vital utilities in the vast residential areas where residential code violations take place, the presence of industrial workshops in several residential areas inside the city and the problem of the river bed into which the city's sewers flow.

Areas With Residential Code Violations

The areas violating the residential code in Aleppo are vast areas located in the northern, eastern and southern parts of the city, including the quarters of al-Ashrafiyah, al-Shaykh Maqsud, al-'Uwayjah, Ba'idin, al-Shaykh Faris, Bustan al-Basha, al-Haydariyah, al-Sakhur, Tariq al-Bab, Karm Maysar, Kurum Bab al-Nayrab, al-Salihin, al-Sukkari and al-Ansari.

Most of these areas still lack water and paved roads. Some of them still have open sewers running between houses and garbage dumped on the roads or in unbuilt plots of land, where this garbage has been left and never hauled away.

Industrial Workshops

Though these areas suffer from the unavailability of utilities, other vast areas that are planned, that fall within the city limits and that are inhabited by thousands of people suffer from the problem of the presence of a growing number of industrial workshops in these areas, the most important of which are the quarters of (al-Halk), Bustan al-Bashs, al-Maydan, al-Sulaymaniyah, al-Kallasah, al-Qatirji, al-Sijn Street and al-'Urqub.

Wherever these workshops exist, dirt, trash, oil and lubricants spread on the roads and on the sidewalks; noise, the sound of hammers and the roar of engines rise; and smoke and poisonous gases abound.

River Bed

What has made things even worse in the eastern half of Aleppo is the intensifying problem of al-Quwayq River bed which crosses the city from the northeast to the southwest. The obnoxious odors and stench issuing from this river bed have spread hundreds of meters beyond and the insects hatching in it have spread to most parts of the city.

The odors issuing from the river bed, especially during the evening and at night, are unbearable. Anybody who wants to move into an area close to the bed can only do so if he blocks his nose or holds his breath. Some drivers even decline to go the areas close to the river bed.

The areas hit most strongly by these odors are the areas close to the river bed. These are large areas inhabited by tens of thousands of people and are the city's most important tourist, commercial, and industrial areas.

These areas begin at al-Kindi Hospital and extend to al-'Uwayjah residential quarter, to 'Ayn al-Tall factories, to al-Halk and Bustan al-Bashs quarters, to the Teachers Institute area, to the Directorate of Agriculture, to al-Sulaymaniyah Quarter, to Mahattat Baghdad, to al-'Aziziyah, to the public park, to the Tourist Hotel, to al-Barun Street, to the two bus stations, to Suq al-Hal, to al-Fayd and Bustan al-Qasr areas and to al-Kallasah and al-Sukkari quarters. Even the villages along the river course, such as al-Zarbah and al-Wudayhi, are not safe from these odors.

Problems Intensifying

These problems are not new. The areas violating the residential code are expanding day after day, their needs are growing constantly and their problems are intensifying. We have never moved seriously to curtail these problems and have never followed up on planning these areas or supplying them with regular utilities. Now, we will be unable to do so for long years to come.

The industrial workshops are also growing like a cancer and penetrating the economy-housing quarters inhabited by workers and people with limited incomes. These workshops have multiplied to the point of being thousands in number. We have also failed to do anything to curtail their growth and have failed to set up industrial zones outside the city, despite the recurrent talk about such zones for the past 10 years. For one reason or another, it has now become impossible to move these workshops outside the city.

As for the river bed into which flow the city sewers, it has become the major problem of the city as a whole. This problem is also old. Years ago, odors began to issue from it from time to time and communicable diseases which afflicted the governorate's inhabitants were attributed to the irrigation of the crops with its water. Despite this, we did not move to tackle the issue seriously in phases and did not give it priority over all the other projects. We have thus reached this critical stage and the cure requires, according to the estimates of the people concerned, 1 billion Syrian pounds for a sewerage network. This is a sum that is not easy to secure for this project at present.

It must also be noted that work was started several years ago to seal off this river bed, beginning at the public park and moving in the direction of Baghdad Station. We felt optimistic at the time but then the work stopped after 300 meters, the area where luxury cafes, restaurants and clubs are located on both sides of the river, were covered. Then Paris-style gardens were planted on the sealed-off part, including basins, fountains, marble ornaments and rainbow lights. The designer did not even forget the pigeon towers. A similar distance is being sealed off in the same area at present. Most probably, a whole century will be needed if work continues at the present pace. As a result of this work, the area has improved greatly and the prices of its restaurants and cafes have multiplied, as has the cost of frequenting them. The conditions of this area's houses have also improved. For this improvement, a fee has been imposed on the owners of these houses and they may not be able to pay this fee unless they sell their homes and move somewhere else.

Despite the touch of beauty added by these gardens to the neighboring area, we believe that improvement here has made things worse in other areas. The decomposed materials under the built area will find their way out in other parts of the uncovered river bed.

Essentials and Luxuries

Wisdom and logic call for securing what is essential first and then what is less essential and then for discussing the luxuries.

It is indubitable that the city of Aleppo has witnessed in recent years the implementation of numerous vital, important and essential projects, such as water, school, housing, hospital, clinic and telephone projects and others.

But considering that our topic of discussion pertains directly to the projects of the City Council, we will pause before the projects belonging to the "municipality" to find out whether they are essential or luxury projects.

In recent years, these projects have included the 'Abd-al-Mun'im Riyad Street construction project which has distorted the architectural fabric of this part of old Aleppo. This project has not been fully yet.

There is also Bab al-Faraj project on which millions have been wasted in land expropriations, in studies, in excavation work, in laying down foundations, and in some construction work. The work then stopped and the site was turned into a swamp where insects have bred and children have drowned. The latest such victim was the child Wa'il Qillah. After each drowning, the part of the swamp where the child has drowned is filled.

The projects also include constructing the municipal building, renovating Sa'dallah al-Jabiri Square, building numerous large public parks, renovating the gas lights, building Handarat Casino, the eastern bus station and a number of other projects, including opening and paving roads, and building houses for those who have been notified to leave their houses so that they may be demolished.

If we examine these projects, we will find that most of them are luxury projects or projects that can be postponed if compared with the major problems that pose a threat to the safety and comfort of the inhabitants in the eastern half of the city which is inhabited by three-quarters of the city's population.

We can even say that solving these river bed problems should take priority over the projects to build hospitals and clinics because regardless of what curative care is secured for the citizens, what is more important is to protect them from diseases by providing the citizens with the proper sanitary conditions.

Quick Solutions Required

The tragic situation from which most of the city's population is suffering as a result of the above-mentioned problems, especially the river bed problem, can withstand no procrastination or delay. A serious and quick initiative must be taken by the Aleppo City Council to deliver the inhabitants from this situation, even if the matter requires suspending all other projects. This council's efforts and resources must be bolstered to achieve this objective. There is nothing more important than the citizen's health and safety.

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SYRIA

AL-KABIR RIVER DAM SCHEDULED TO BEGIN WATER STORAGE IN 1985-86

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 25 Oct 84 p 4

/Article by Salma Karkutli: "After Years of Delay, Will Northern al-Kabir River Dam Be Implemented According to New Schedule; Completion of Dam and Start of Storage as of Winter of 1985-86"

/Text/ None of the people I have interviewed has offered a clear and definite answer for the causes of the delay in implementing the Northern al-Kabir Dam in al-Ladhiqiyah Governorate for more than 4 years, if the implementation schedules set in 1976 are taken into consideration.

An executive protocol was concluded with the Soviet side long after the idea was crystallized into a project scheduled to be implemented within the list of projects undertaken by the former Major Projects Organization. The idea emerged before 1970 when the first contract was concluded by the Major Projects Organization and the Russian Solkhoz Bromexport Organization to conduct engineering feasibility studies for a dam on Northern al-Kabir River in Latakia. The Soviet side finished the study, presented it in mid-1972 and located a dam site located 2 km north of Khan 'Atallah Bridge. The Soviet side, I am told, preferred another site but then abided in its study by the wish of the Syrian side.

Time was lost between 1972, the year in which the technical study was presented, and 1976, the year in which the executive protocol was concluded. During this period, none of the officials in the agency concerned made any effort to develop the right formula to manage the project or to determine if the Major Projects Organization itself would supervise the project or whether a special directorate would be set up to oversee the project in cooperation with Soviet side.

Executive Contract

In 1976, the Major Projects Organization stirred again to discuss the issue of the dam that was intended to be built and concluded another contract with the Soviet side to provide the technical assistance and to prepare the project's main blueprints. A contract was actually

concluded to build the dam structure and it was agreed to postpone discussing the question of the irrigation, drainage and reclamation networks to a later time. In accordance with this contract or protocol, 1980 was set as the date for completing the dam construction work and 1979 as the date for beginning construction of the irrigation and drainage networks so that some of these networks might be completed in order to irrigate 2,500 hectares upon completion of the dam, provided that construction of the entire network were completed in 1982. As for the detailed studies on reclamation of the lands to be irrigated by this dam, lands amounting to 14,000 hectares, these studies were left for the issuance of a decree at a later time to determine the agency to conduct the detailed studies and the agency to carry out the reclamation work.

Thus, the question of the irrigation networks and of the detailed studies for the reclamation project will be examined in the future so that a decision might be made on who will reclaim the 14,000 hectares to be irrigated by the dam.

Three Firms Entrusted with Implementation

These were the broad lines of the project until then. In view of the Soviet side's abidance by the executive protocol, the first consignment of machinery to begin the dam's preliminary works was delivered but the lack of sufficient cadres led to suspension of the work shortly after it was started. During this period, some excavation work was done at the dam site. But then the suspension of activity continued in a noticeable manner until 1980.

During this suspension period, the Major Projects Organization found itself unable to carry out the work to prevent leakage in the dam foundations and suggested that an Italian firm carry out this work. But the government did not approve the proposal and entrusted the Construction Works Company to do this work. This company was given the instructions to begin the work in 1981. At the same time, the task of constructing the conversion canal was entrusted to the Irrigation Works Company (Sarico) and the Military Housing Organization was entrusted with earth-filling activity at the dam.

Data Between al-Ladhiqiyah and Damascus

Before I go on, I must point out that a visit I made to the dam site did not enable me to gather detailed information on the delay. All I have been able to get are partial data on the project's technical details, since each company can discuss only the part entrusted to it. The details are at the Land Reclamation Directorate--formerly the Major Projects Organization--of the Ministry of Irrigation. This is what I was told by Eng 'Ala'-al-Din Sulayman, the director of reclamation in Latakia, who invited me to Damascus where detailed information can be obtained.

In Damascus, I did not get an official answer from Engineer Sulayman in his capacity at the officer in direct charge of this major project. He advised me to modify the phrasing of my question on the delay and to disregard the time lost before 1980 so that the question may become: What about the implementation timetables?

Even though I took the advice and rephrased the question, I got no answer. He returned to Latakia after referring me to another official. Consequently, I have reached the conclusion that getting the details is a complex issue. It seems to me that clear words arouse sensitivities and that talk about the dam altogether causes confusion.

Crisis of Wishes

Why was the dam delayed from 1976 to the year when it was started?

Why did the Major Projects Organization not provide the cadres necessary for this vital project during the period of preparation and of the conclusion of the contract and even 4 years after the contract was concluded? The answer has not been clear but there are those who imply that the Major Projects Organization, which has not become the Land Reclamation Directorate, did not wish to implement the project.

Why?

Was the reason the resources and the appropriations? They answer: this is not the reason. The contract with the Soviet side called for supplying all the necessary machinery.

They add: the project has encountered difficulties pertaining to the side where the underground water posed a problem at one time and where the earth cracked and caved in at other times. The underground water stopped the work for a period of time until the opinion calling for the use of local pumps instead of imported pumps triumphed. In fact, local pumps, which are still in operation, were installed. The cracks which developed at the site delayed the work until the right solution was found. In this period, the national firms involved in the project worked at the site and used the machinery available in the country. As for the machinery delivered by the Soviets in 1976, it remained unused until recently, when the construction firms bought it.

Working at Present

After 1981, the project entered the actual phase of implementation. The Construction Works Company completed the leakage barrier in 1983 according to high standards required for the implementation of such work as was carried out under complex hydraulical conditions. Because of the extraordinary importance of this barrier to the future survival of the dam, a wall of (clay) concrete set into alluvial deposits at foundations, with a minimal thickness of 60 cm, a depth of 33 meters and a length of 220 meters. The task of this wall is to prevent the erosion and destruction of the dam's foundations.

When I visited the dam site, the Public Irrigation Works Company (Sarico) had completed the conversion canal. As for the Military Housing Organization, which is entrusted with the land-filling work and to which the task of building the irrigation tunnel was entrusted recently, it has reached an elevation of 66 meters in its land-filling work and its activities in this regard are expected to be completed by the end of this year at an elevation of 78 meters. It is expected that the level will then drop after the rainy season and that the necessary complementary work, such as paving, asphaltting and other work, will be carried out in the dam structure afterwards.

As for the irrigation tunnel, its construction is expected to begin shortly, after a delay of 2 years while waiting for the machine that will dig the tunnel, as they have said at the Land Reclamation Directorate.

New Implementation Timetables

According to the current plan, we are supposed to be able in the winter of 1985-86 to start storing water in the lake, which the dam will create behind it. During this period, the following work is supposed to be completed:

- Pour 28,000 cubic meters of concrete in the sedimentation basin.
- Build and install the metal lock gates and maintenance gates.
- Complete the concrete works for the diffusion basin and part of the rear rock fill.
- Complete the first part of the project to reclaim the lands to be irrigated by the dam, which amount to 14,000 hectares. This part comprises an area amounting to 2,500 hectares on the river bank.

Will Dam Be Completed on Schedule?

The work is big and complex, and even though the volume of the work at the Northern al-Kabir Dam seems modest when compared with the volume of the work carried out in the Euphrates Dam, the fact remains that it is still a dam and that its implementation entails a high degree of complexity and technology.

The question raised now is: will the work on the dam be completed according to the new implementation timetables?

When I posed this question to those working on the dam, led by the officials in charge of its implementation, I did not get a satisfactory answer. In addition to their desire to work and to complete the work on schedule, all were somewhat reluctant. The work is divided between several companies and the supervising management is the only side capable of answering this question, if it wishes to do so.

Does this management have the answer?

They say: it must have it. A project like this requires primarily firm decisions and the ability to solve the work problems.

We, in our turn, pose this question and expect an answer from the authorities concerned.

8494

CSO: 4404/143

AFGHANISTAN

FRG REPRESENTATIVE ACCUSES SOVIETS OF SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 5 Jan 85 p 28

[Text] (Hafer): The Soviet Union intends to create a new republic as a branch of its Communist Party on the ashes of Afghanistan.

Tehran, IRNA.

A West German diplomat, who has recently visited Qandahar Province in Afghanistan on the invitation of the Afghan Mujahidin, accused the Soviet Union yesterday of "systematic destruction" of the Afghan people.

According to the WEST GERMAN NEWS AGENCY from Bonn, (Tuden Hafer), a Christian Democratic representative to the Parliament of that country, said that he is seriously horrified by the situation in Qandahar Province.

He said: The occupying Soviet forces drop bombs in the shape of toys, combs, pens and watches from helicopters and airplanes.

These objects explode as soon as someone touches them, causing the severance of arms and legs.

According to this diplomat, the Soviet forces are engaged in the genocide of the Afghan people, killing thousands of Muslim women and children.

Thus far, thousands of children have been crippled as a result of the explosion of such objects.

(Tuden Hafer) said: The Soviet Union intends to create a new republic in the form of one of the branches of its Communist Party on the ashes of Afghanistan.

The West German Parliament representative was invited for eight days by the Mujahidin to Qandahar Province on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

He said that in the Province of Qandahar, he visited the ruins of two villages, Lavarcheh and Ahmad Hankal, which had been totally leveled a few days earlier by the helicopters of the Red Army, and most of the residents of these two villages, particularly women and children, were massacred.

He added: The Afghan refugees suffer from severe shortages of food, clothing, and medicine in the camps. A group of children who were placed in these camps have died as a result of cold weather. (Hafer) said that he met with a group of captured Soviet soldiers in the camps of the fighters. One of the soldiers, who is from Leningrad and is 22 years old, said: They sent us to Afghanistan in order to fight the so-called aggressive U.S. and Chinese forces.

10,000

CSO: 4640/283

AFGHANISTAN

FLIGHTS LIFTING WOUNDED TO USSR SAID INCREASING

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 5 Jan 85 p 28

[Text] New Delhi, IRNA. According to Afghan Mujahedin sources in New Delhi, on the fifth anniversary of the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan, the Afghan Mujahidin forces engaged in expansive operations against the military bases of the occupying and Kabul government forces.

According to this report, the flights of Soviet airplanes transporting the bodies of those killed and wounded in Afghanistan to the Soviet Union have increased and in their place, every day, a number of fresh Soviet troops enter Afghanistan.

This report indicates that the Afghan Mujahidin forces targeted the place where a group of the members of the espionage organization of the government of Afghanistan were gathered in the center of the city of Kabul last week, which inflicted much damage on the building. No report has yet been communicated concerning the number of casualties in this incident.

Another report indicates that in their most recent battle against the forces of the puppet regime of Karmal, the Muslim Afghan revolutionaries killed 20.

In the course of this battle, which took place two days ago against the Barikowt border barracks, the Muslim revolutionaries destroyed two important positions of Karmal forces and set fire to an ammunition warehouse.

According to the CENTRAL NEWS UNIT, quoting the FRENCH NEWS AGFNCY, the Barikowt barracks, with 900 personnel, has been under for several months.

The continuous efforts of the Afghan regime to break the siege on this barracks has thus far failed and the soldiers stationed in the Barikowt border barracks are suffering from food shortages.

AFGHANISTAN

MUJAHIDIN REPORTEDLY DESTROY SOVIET PLANES, HELICOPTERS

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 25 Dec 84 p 3

[Text] In a partisan battle against the occupying Soviet forces in the area of Khak Jabbar, 20 km from Kabul, the Afghan Mujahidin inflicted severe damages and casualties on the aggressive Soviet forces.

According to a report by the IRNA reporter from New Delhi, in this conflict, one of the high-ranking commanders of the Soviet army in Afghanistan lost both legs upon hitting a mine.

In addition, according to Mujahidin sources in New Delhi, as a result of violent skirmishes which have continued for some time between the Mujahidin forces and the occupying Soviet forces in the Province of Paktia, in the course of the past two weeks, Afghan Mujahidin shot down seven fighter planes and helicopters as well as two cargo planes carrying winter provisions for the Soviet and government forces.

According to this report, last week, a column of Soviet and government forces, which were going through Salang highway, were attacked by Mujahidin and a number of their trucks and vehicles were destroyed. Afghan Mujahidin sources in New Delhi said: Last week, placing bombs in the residences of a number of the members of the espionage organization of the Afghan regime, known as KHAD, in the Province of Mazar-e Sharif in northern Afghanistan, which shares a border with the Soviet Union, the Afghan Mujahidin forces killed or wounded seven members of this organization.

Beginning of the New Attacks of the Soviet Forces on Panjshir Valley

The Afghan Muslim Mujahidin announced yesterday that the attacks by the Soviet forces have resumed in the strategic valley of Panjshir to retake control over nine guard stations which early this Christian month were taken away from them in fighting with the Muslim revolutionaries.

According to UNITED PRESS, a spokesman for the Muslim Mujahidin said: The Soviets transferred 200 parachutes and 30 tanks to the Pashgur area early this week, but the Mujahidin have neutralized the attack.

According to this report, the Muslim Mujahidin also destroyed 60 tanks and 100 occupying and government soldiers in the skirmishes around Pashgur and in the course of two attacks on the Soviet reinforcement column in northern Bazark.

According to this spokesman, the report indicates that an (SU-25) airplane and 54 Soviet helicopters were also shot down by the Afghan Muslim Mujahidin. This spokesman added: The Muslim Mujahidin, who control the operational division of the Panjshir Valley, have been strengthened by the food, weapons, and ammunition which they captured in taking over the area guard station.

He added: Also, in the course of these skirmishes, several soldiers and 24 Afghan officers have been captured.

Asylum of Two Afghan Engineers to Pakistan

The Pakistan newspaper HEYDAR, published in Islamabad, wrote in its yesterday issue that two Afghan engineers have taken asylum in Pakistan. According to reports from Islamabad, these two Afghan engineers said in a report on the situation in Afghanistan: In the Kabul engineering university, which is now managed by the Russians, young students are given Communist training.

10,000
CSO: 4640/291

AFGHANISTAN

CHRISTOPHE DE PONFILLY DETAILS PANJSHIR'S DESTRUCTION

Paris LES NOUVELLES D'AFGHANISTAN in French Dec 84-Jan 85 pp 7,8

[Text] Christophe de Ponfilly spent the month of September 1984 in Panjshir, where he met on several occasions with Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, the valley's prestigious commander (reported dead in April by an Indian press agency), who had already been interviewed in late August by Patrick de Saint Exupery for FRANCE-SOIR MAGAZINE (29 Sep 84). The Aide Medicale Internationale medical team had also met him several times during April and May.

"I set out for Panjshir with Bertrand Gallet to make a film for Antenne 2, to be produced by the International Telescoop Company. (this film will be shown during January 1985, under the title: "Afghanistan: The Insolent Warriors").

Piles of Wheat Charred to Ashes

We reached the Paryan valley, where the Panjshir has its source, on 9 September, two days after a major attack by Soviet commandos, brought in by air at the very beginning of September. These commandos, about 6,000 strong, were landed at 0530 from about 100 helicopter ferries, at Dacht-e-Rawat, Safed Shir at the head of the valley, and in the Dara valley where Mas'ud was camped in August. Mas'ud's men, following tactics agreed upon ahead of time, had withdrawn, leaving only a few small units of 5 to 10 fighters, very well hidden, including a scout assigned to watch the commandos' movements.

The Soviets completed the destruction of the villages, dynamiting the foundations of such houses as were still standing. They also used flame-throwers to burn the harvested wheat where they found it in a neighboring valley where a handful of peasants had ventured out to gather it. We saw these heaps of charred grain.

Meeting no resistance, the Soviet's vigilance relaxed somewhat, and they took to gathering around the fires in the evening. On the

third day, Mas'ud's men took them by surprise attack, and inflicted very heavy losses.

Next day, the commandos were picked up by helicopters. The operation lasted only 4 days. The Soviets decamped, abandoning equipment and large quantities of rations, as well as canned goods from the USSR and Bulgaria, which we sampled. Mas'ud's men suffered only 13 dead and 2 wounded; as for civilians, there were none left in the valley.

Following the rout of that operation, the Soviets evacuated their fortified camp at Khendj, leaving only some Afghans; and the Soviet general staff, which had settled in at Bazarak, fell back to Anawa, at the very bottom of the valley. Afghan garrisons were left at Pochrul and Astana.

From there, we descended the valley as far as Astana, looking for Maj Mas'ud. The landscape was nightmarish. The valley is totally destroyed. There is not a single house that has not been hit by a bomb. The stone walls around the fields and the irrigation channels have been crushed to dust under the repeated passage of tanks. Astana has been razed to the ground: of this large village nothing remains but low mounds of dirt.

There is no longer a single soul living in the valley. They have all taken refuge in the neighboring valleys or, further north, in those of Andarab and Khost-e Fereng. One wonders how these refugees are going to survive this winter. They must already be in debt to the people in the nearby valleys who lent them rice and flour.

By September, the Soviets hold only Anawa, which put them back at what were their 1982 advanced positions. In 3 years, they have made no progress, but the Panjshir Valley is utterly destroyed, house by house, and abandoned by its people. Since the local people had left by early March, the 21 April offensive, mounted by the 105th airborne division of the Guard, claimed only 150 victims, all of them fighting men. On the other hand, a thousand peasants were killed during the Soviet commando offensives, which lasted 10 days at the end of April in the Andarab Valley and into May in that of Khost-e-Fereng. The commander of Hebz-e-Islami (G. Hekmatyar*) from the Andarab Valley, collaborated with the Soviets during that offensive and at the capture of Banu, where the government troops have set up a garrison.

*(NOTE: This commander had watched his influence wane when Mas'ud, exploiting the 1983 truce in Panjshir, established his authority over most of the Andarab Valley. Outnumbered and in trouble, the Hebz leader turned to the Soviets in an effort to recoup some of his lost importance Ed.)

Message from Mas'ud

I subsequently met Mas'ud in the Panjshir Valley itself, near Astana. He came to take a field-glass look at the Khendj garrison (where only a token force of government Afghan troops had been left), in order to plan an attack. It may be that the Soviets' reason for mounting a new offensive, using air-lifted commandos, on 26 October was to relieve that garrison.

Mas'ud was returning from a meeting that had been held early in September, after Parande, with leaders from the Shamli Plain north of Kabul, to settle quarrels among the local chieftains. Much the same sort of meeting was scheduled for late October at Badakshan.

We left the Panjshir Valley on 30 September. Mas'ud had just unconditionally freed 5 of the 15 Soviet prisoners he had held for more than a year. He had refused to turn them over to the Red Cross which, according to him, serves neither the interests of the Afghan resistance nor those of the prisoners, by accepting a compromise with the Soviets.

Mas'ud gave us a message to deliver:

"Soviet pressure on Afghanistan has intensified considerably this year. If the West does not help us, the Afghan resistance is doomed, and will very shortly disappear.

"The Soviets are conducting an intensive underground campaign in Pakistan, using their agents and their spies. For the Soviets, Afghanistan is only a way-station; and there is good reason to fear that Pakistan, too, will fall to Soviet domination."*

*(NOTE: See detailed coverage in PARIS-MATCH for 23 October 1984 Ed.)

6182

CS0: 4619/24

AFGHANISTAN

FACING OBSTACLES, FAMINE, RESISTANCE CONFIDENTLY PUSHES ON

Paris LES NOUVELLES D'AFGHANISTAN in French Dec 84-Jan 85 p 11

[Article by Olivier Roy]

[Text] For a year, now, the war has been steadily heating up around Qandahar, as it has in the rest of Afghanistan. Daily bombing-runs are routine, and offensive follows offensive at a steady pace of one every other month. The civilian population has evacuated most of the villages; the Mujahidin have dug into the ruins, where they have built bomb-shelters and dug trenches. This is flat country, where Soviet armor can maneuver at will, but the resistance bases are set up in oases closely surrounding the town: irrigation channels and creepers hamper the advance of armored vehicles. So has improvement in the anti-aircraft capacity of the resistance (12.7mm machineguns), which affords protection against the armored helicopters which no longer dare fly very low. The Soviets have switched to reliance on fighter-bombers and artillery. To avoid reprisals against civilians, the Mujahidin have evacuated all villages where there were still people living; meanwhile, the government has not been able to move back in, and relations between the resistance people and the local population are good.

Resistance fighters stroll freely through the town, whose outlying neighborhoods were hard-hit by the fighting. Skirmishes in the town itself are everyday occurrences. As usual, the Soviets have shunned the center of the town and have taken over the airport; they are doing their best to keep the Herat road open with a string of small control-posts, but, at the time we were there, the resistance people had blocked the road.

The government still holds three uluswali (district) capitals, mainly with the help of militia groups: the government army is hunkered down, despite the presence of a division (whose strength is in fact about that of a regiment). And yet the Qandahar region was one of the last to rebel against the regime and its agrarian reform has been applied here. Resistance cadres here are extremely traditionalist: clergy, Sufi leaders, and petty dignitaries. There are no intellectuals to be found here.

An Astonishing Cool

Politically, there is broad diversity of affiliation in the Qandahar region, and you can find all the political parties represented. Even so, in the last 2 years the Khaled Party has made gains at the expense of Harekat-e-Enqelab. Tribal loyalties, though, count for a lot more than political ties, and the Karzai family still heads the Popalzai, even though not many belong to the Mujaddedi party. There is an absolute swarm of committees, some of which can muster a scant 30 fighters on a turf roughly the size of the Place de la Concorde. Horizontal relations among the groups are excellent: we moved from group to group without the least problem. Their weaponry is standardized and steadily improving. The resistance fighters are clearly eager for battle, and their "cool" is astonishing, while the conditions under which they fight are hard. Meanwhile, as everyone knows, the road to Pakistan grows more perilous every day.

While the Qandahar region itself is hardly threatened with famine, there is a water shortage in the northern part of the province, not only for dry crops, but even for irrigation. This will be a hard winter, and we must anticipate even heavier emigration to Pakistan.

6182

CSO: 4619/24

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

CONVOY TO PAKISTAN ATTACKED--Russian armored helicopters attacked a civilian convoy traveling from Qandahar to Pakistan, martyring 24 persons. According to the CENTRAL NEWS UNIT from Islamabad, Pakistan newspapers which published this report, quoting the Afghan agency, add: Of the 25 members of 1 family who were immigrating from Qandahar to Pakistan with this convoy, only 1 survived. According to reports, the Afghan government and Soviet forces in Panjshir Valley have begun a counterattack against the Muslim Mujahidin. According to Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, one of the leaders of the Afghan Mujahidin, three Soviet generals command the special units which have begun an expansive attack in Panjshir Valley to retake several army guard stations. The Afghan Mujahidin took over these guard stations some time ago and inflicted heavy casualties on the Soviet and government forces. A letter from Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, dated 17 December and reaching Pakistan on Friday, states that in the course of the battles of last week, a group of Afghan soldiers joined the Mujahidin with their weapons. They include the commander of a special commando unit. The new Soviet attacks in Panjshir Valley confirm the opinion of Western diplomats that the Soviets intend to continue their presence in this area by any means possible. [Text]
[Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 23 Dec 84 p 3] 10,000

KARMAL SPIES ARRESTED--Pakistan authorities recently arrested two agents of the Karmal government in Pishavar and confiscated a number of bombs and Russian publications. According to the CENTRAL NEWS UNIT, the Urdu language newspaper (JANG) wrote: Two Afghan agents entered Pakistan along with Afghan refugees for terrorist activities. It should be pointed out that thus far, Pakistan authorities have arrested about 150 agents of the Karmal regime, obtaining large amounts of weapons from them. [Text]
[Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 2 Jan 85 p 3] 10,000

CSO: 4640/291

INDIA

ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF SAYS PUNJAB FREE OF TERRORISTS

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 15 Jan 85 p 4

[Text]

New Delhi, Jan. 14 (PTI): The Army has more or less successfully completed the task of rooting out terrorists from various villages in Punjab and unearthing most of the weapons and explosives hidden in the state, according to the Chief of Army Staff, Gen. A.S. Vaidya.

The Army had maintained its "good reputation," despite the very sensitive tasks assigned to it in the past year. The quantity of arms in Punjab and in the Golden Temple at Amritsar made operations by the normal police forces or even paramilitary forces like the BSF and CRF very difficult because their training was more restricted and only the Army was trained to handle such situations, he said.

In an interview to the armed forces weekly *Sainik Samachar* in connection with Army Day, Gen. Vaidya said it was with a great sense of dedication—to keep the unity of the country and to restore places of worship to their original purpose—that the Army went into operation in Punjab.

In Operation Bluestar, the Army was able to rid the sacred shrines of terrorists and capture their weapons in spite of defence preparations that had been made in the various shrines including the Golden Temple.

The Army chief said the troops had to exercise great restraint in the performance of this task. "They were told not to fire back even if they were fired at from Sri Harmandir Sahib—an order, the kind of which had never been given to me by my superiors, nor have I ever had an occasion to give a similar order to my juniors before this," he

said. It was a "very very difficult order indeed to give," and "much more difficult to obey."

The order not to fire was very difficult to obey as it was but natural, with the training that the Army was given, to lift up weapons and fire back when one was fired at. It went to the eternal credit of the soldiers, officers and JCOs that not a single shot was fired at Sri Harmandir Sahib by them even though they were fired at by a large number of machineguns from the precincts of that shrine. External aggression: Troops have been kept in requisite strength and in proper position to ensure that an "unfriendly neighbour" did not take advantage of "internal unrest" in the country to carry out an aggression, Gen. Vaidya said.

Though the Army was not really geared to discharging the term task of defending the country against external aggression controlling civil disturbances, if called upon it offered effective assistance to the civil administration.

However, he categorically stated that the Army's involvement in such secondary role had in no way compromised its integrity or reduced its ability to deal with external aggression.

Gen. Vaidya felt that secondary calls to the Army should be made "sparingly" and only when the situation was definitely beyond the control of normal law-enforcing agencies like the police forces, which must be fully employed before the Army was called in.

Secular Army: The Army had always been a secular institution and an example of "oneness."

The last year had been rather trying but the Army had withstood it with its "dedication, utmost sacrifice, high professionalism and impartiality." The nation had closely followed the Army's conduct. "I have no doubt that faith and trust placed in the Army has been honoured and upheld," Gen. Vaidya said.

The Army does not differentiate between the castes, creeds, religions or states from which soldiers come, Gen. Vaidya stated. During the recent disturbances, Army personnel at various railway stations stood guard to see that their comrades of a particular community were not victims of mob violence.

However, Gen. Vaidya said there could have been cases where this sort of help did not come forth and warned that if

any such case came to his notice, "I shall have no hesitation in my mind to bring to book such officers, JCOs and men who have failed in their duty and give them exemplary punishments.

Northeast: Gen. Viadya said the situation had considerably improved in the northeast states over the years and there was hardly any terrorist or insurgent activities in Nagaland and Mizoram.

Modernisation: Talking about modernisation of training aids in the Army, Gen. Vaidya said concerted efforts were being made to introduce greater realism and to achieve effectiveness in training. With this in view, a modernisation plan was under way to introduce sophisticated and latest training aid.

CSO: 5650/0066

IRAN

KHAMENE'I INTERVIEW ON PROBLEMS FACING COUNTRY

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 8 Jan 85 pp 3, 22-23

[Interview with President Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Ali Khamene'i by KEYHAN on 1 Jan 85 in Tehran]

[Text] When will the final bullet be shot?

President Khamene'i says: "Today or tomorrow."

The president now stands next to a collection of effective explosive weapons. The first choice is certainly the most important. Precise targeting with the most effective weapon and then the explosion of the final bullet of the war will certainly break down the array of domestic problems and difficulties. Later, it will be easy for the president as the coordinator of the three branches to choose the appropriate weapon to aim at the target.

The next targets of the president will be the different problems that we face in the economic and political areas. A shot to end the housing problem, a highly precise aim at the land problems in the cities and villages, and sufficient ammunition to destroy the disproportionate structure of high prices and construct a new building, and so on, these are not all the targets of President Khamene'i. But once the final shot is fired in victory on the front and the cries of salvation are heard in the war, then the stronghold of problems can be conquered without the use of artillery.

President Khamene'i, with much hope in the final bullet to be shot with the fall of the heathen enemy in the war, has his eyes set on a bright future which will spread tomorrow's victory and the end of the war before us.

The general lines of this bright landscape were drawn by President Khamene'i in an interview with the chief editor and several of the editors, writers and correspondents of KEYHAN.

This conversation occurred on the last day of last week [1 January 1985]. The distance between KEYHAN and the presidential office was small, ten minutes by car. Along this distance, the colors of life on the street were worth watching. Along this distance, we were thinking about painting for the president the various shades of color which we pictured in various minds: A color of war, with all its shades and whiteness, a color of work, a color of culture and politics, and colors of life in the life of war, independence and freedom, standing proud before various kinds of global enemies.

Will President Khamene'i provide an overall analysis of the separation and combination of all the colors?

The colors in the president's office were bright and calm--blue colors, green colors, shades of cream--and everywhere a picture of the Imam and Dr Beheshti. Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i loved the doctor very much. This can be seen in the presence of the pictures everywhere in his office to keep the memories alive.

We were waiting in a room in his office for him to come. He came in with a smile, said hello, and asked after everyone's health. We sat down, tea was brought in, and he said: "Let us begin."

We begin in our hearts. The face of Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i has become much older than three or four years ago. His face has matured and the lines of bittersweet experiences can be seen everywhere on his face and in his stature. His right arm still bears the signs of that bitter tragedy.

He has left behind some bitter days. A review of the memories of the years far and near and the distant and close past all occur in the unbelievably brief interval of swallowing a cup of tea.

The president was sitting before us looking dignified, but sincere and warm. Outside the room, there was the clatter of the sparrows in the slightly warm sunlight which was shining in the cold and ice, and inside the room we were searching for fiery words which would float like the autumn sun over the heights of imagination and memory. With all the interest and hope, we ask the first question. Then the second and the third as well. We entrust ourselves to time, which has picked up uncontrollable and unbelievable velocity.

One hour goes by. We are still circulating around one or two questions. Before meeting with us, the president had spent some hours of hard work and discussions with the authorities and officials. But we have much to say, as does he.

Up to here, President Khamene'i has shown that he is engaged in evaluation with vast understanding and perception.

To ourselves, we say, as always, his judgments are quite explicit. Like an experienced politician, he deeply ponders the question and builds a strong trunk out of the roots, then comes up and places leaves and fruit on it. The answers are decisive, explicit and generally very beautifully decorated with his own words. Sometimes we think we are before Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i under the green shade of a forest of culture, poetry, mysticism and religion, where all the trees are joined by the same roots and the visible or invisible distance between the branches is the climax of the night assault of a combatant carrying the burden of danger and memory on his shoulders. Or we are before President Khamene'i, who is now, as a famous president, coming out of the dust of the storm of revolution and must, therefore, choose politics as a profession with truthfulness, although he does not like it. But he is the coordinator of the three branches and must evaluate all aspects.

In the foreground are colors from the forest of poetry, literature, mysticism and struggle in the clear spring of Islam on a bed of politics. First, we were offended. Why does he speak so politically? Perhaps our position as reporters has put Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i on the spot as an experienced politician.

We even rephrased this thought and told him. He also spoke, became our companion, reminisced, and said: Put the president aside, sit and talk about everything, of poetry and literature, of newspapers and journalism, of land, the sky, the sea, and all that God has blessed us with.

Of the joy and happiness of all children who wake up in the early morning in their beds of dreams and imagination and look to the sun, of old men and women who have shot the arrows in their quiver to far away places and sent them to the fronts--we are speaking of their young children--in order that the arrows will hit the target, and for the young men to return victoriously and for their tale of victory to become a tale for all of our nights and days.

The conversation with President Khamene'i lasted two hours, but not all our questions were asked. However, we were satisfied, hoping that he was as well. And we hope that this conversation will satisfy our readers. It is hoped that another opportunity will occur to speak with him and once again reminisce about other times, God willing.

With the acknowledgment of the sincere cooperation of the public relations office of the president, let us read the complete text of the questions and answers of KEYHAN with the president.

First, we began by speaking about constructive criticism and the necessity for it in the press. We asked: Constructive criticism is discussed at present as an unavoidable necessity. On the other hand, the problem of self-censorship is seen in the mass media for various reasons. We would appreciate knowing your view concerning the necessity for criticism and how much this conversation can be free of self-censorship.

The president said sincerely and jokingly: In regards to this interview, you should not censor me. As was pointed out, you have the prerogative to censor or not.

Criticism, if it is constructive, is not only beneficial but necessary. It does not require any limits or restrictions. Criticism, if it is constructive, is desirable and beneficial at all times and in all places. Several delicate points are noteworthy here. First, what is constructive criticism and where is the line drawn between constructive and destructive criticism? Secondly, what is criticism? Is criticism the same as finding faults or are they different? Thirdly, if criticism and finding faults, as some understand these terms to mean, stem from an unsound intention, can it be constructive and beneficial? When you witness a discussion on criticism and whether it is a good thing or, as some argue, it is not useful, the discussion concerns these few points and not the principle of criticism.

As the regime of the Islamic Republic, in the beginning of the revolution, we felt that we had the ability to listen to criticism. In other words, the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran never demonstrated that they are unable to listen to or tolerate criticism. You must admit that the Islamic culture creates this sense. Of course, in certain cases, this sentiment was coupled with a certain amount of carelessness, on the one hand, and bad-intentions, on the other, and the consequences were that early in the war, while the country and the nation needed to concentrate their thoughts and forces totally on the war and there were also conflicts on the political scene of the country which diminished the true power of the nation, some writers began to engage in criticism. Now, I ask, can criticism under such circumstances be constructive in the true sense of the word? Were the articles written in some newspapers in those days criticism or destructive fault-finding, engaging the people's minds in other than the current realities of the country? This was an example by which I wanted you see how sometimes the belief in being able to be criticised will change into carelessness in regards to an action which is carried out as criticism. This is, in fact, not criticism but revenge, and these two must be separated. I am sure that you know those newspapers and those writers.

The Self-Restraint of the Press

Suppose in some area of the country a bitter incident occurs today which is at most due to an error on the part of an official. How will the pen of the critic present this incident? This is exactly the question. We do not expect a critic to gloss over on an ugly incident and make it appear pretty. But the critic is expected to mention the incident and not to attach any interpretation that he would like to this incident, so that it would be recorded on the minds, even though that interpretation would not be the correct interpretation of the incident. One can generalize a small incident in the name of criticism, generalize about it and suddenly present a series of issues which do not exist in reality. Now, if we stop ourselves from doing such a deed, this cannot be called self-censorship and the newspapers must not think that if they take the interests of the country into consideration and engage in proper criticism, they must suffer from self-censorship. Some imagine that the meaning of self-censorship is that newspapers or any other mass media not give themselves the right to mention whatever they see to be ugly as something truly ugly, and in a bitter tone, and that if they do not give themselves this right, self-censorship would not exist. This is not self-censorship but a true and necessary self-restraint for a person whose work is to clarify and explain the facts to the people. We should not mistake the "self-restraint of the press" for self-censorship. What exists in the press alongside censorship and self-censorship is cultural and journalistic self-restraint, which we must pay attention to. Therefore, I believe that criticism is good, but the boundaries must be observed. The question of who is responsible for identifying these limits and boundaries is a different discussion. If you think that we have not reached a place when we can openly distinguish the space and boundaries between proper and improper criticism, well, we must discuss it in order to clarify it. The press, the media and our thinkers must discuss what is constructive criticism in order for it to be understood by the people and then everyone will engage in constructive criticism. In this case, neither the war or any other social incident can prevent constructive criticism.

[Question] Opinions differ regarding the determination of whether criticism is constructive or destructive. Normally, the Majlis must discuss these differences of opinion. A bill was discussed in the Majlis a year ago in the concerned committee and the press operators provided the necessary explanations. It seems that this bill restricts the press more than ever before and, contrary to what the Constitution mentions in regards to the freedom of the press, according to this bill, the freedom of the press seems to be prohibited, except in certain cases.

This idea about the freedom of the press has spread to a great extent in the society.

[Answer] If this bill is contrary to the Constitution, it will be stopped in the Council of Guardians.

I need to point out that you should not expect the Majlis to offer you these concepts in the form of laws, because these are a part of the culture, and culture and law are different things. Laws are formed within the framework of the culture. Before we have a mature and accepted cultural concept of criticism and constructive criticism, it must not be expected that a law will be offered to clarify the boundaries between constructive and destructive criticism. In fact, this problem does not concern the law or the legislature; it concerns the art of those who are in charge of the cultural affairs of the society. Of course, in a sense, the Majlis is one of these authorities. In other words, the pre-voting speeches in the Majlis help such a cultural atmosphere. Discussions in a committee and the speech of a representative in a classroom or in a public lecture also help the maturation and formation of this cultural concept. It is in the creation of such an atmosphere that a proper law goes to the Majlis. Therefore, in order to find the boundaries, you should not go to the Majlis, because it is too early for that. You should go to the media, the thinkers and those who are involved in the culture of the country at present and will be in the future, because it is they who must clarify the issue. Of course, neither can this group, in its articles, speeches and writings, accomplish this task. When this discussion becomes current in the society, the mind of the thinker begins to work. It is through the totality of such speeches and actions that our society will reach a particular perception of constructive or destructive criticism. Under such circumstances, the particular law which is necessary will certainly be created and will establish the necessary boundaries.

[Question] In connection with censorship, what puts pressure on the press more than anything else is creating an atmosphere against the press.

[Answer] (The president, smiling and jokingly) In creating an atmosphere, no one can match the press.

[Question] At least criticism can be expressed within the limits of issues that have been stated in the Constitution. For instance, the Constitution refers to liberties and as long as there is no law to guide us, the articles of the Constitution and their interpretation can be used. For example, if we discuss the issue of freedom in its broad sense and say that it does not exist, very little of it exists, or pressure is imposed on it and generalize this issue in the newspapers, the writer faces

confrontations and sometimes is defamed, and so on. Now, we would like to know if such an issue as liberties or foreign policy can be discussed and strongly treated in the newspapers? At the same time, we do not want our model to be those publications and writers whom you referred to, because they were agents and we do not think we should discuss them.

[Answer] There is a problem here, which is that the press is a public podium. In other words, millions of people hear you from this podium. I have heard that the first half of the first page has several million readers. Now, tell me, what guarantee do you give that what you say from this podium, supported by the freedom of the press and the prohibition of censorship, is worth saying? I am not questioning whether what you say is right or wrong. What I mean is, is what you have to say worthy of being said? You mentioned foreign policy as an example. The Majlis, the official organizations of the country and the people have made a group of people responsible for devising and implementing foreign policy. This group has taken a particular political viewpoint from the Imam, the authorities and the Majlis, or a combination of them. They have thought it through and have drawn and follow a particular line in accordance with their requirements and they need the support of the people. The person who implements these policies enjoys such support. Where is the support from you who want to destroy it all in one sweep? This is truly a problem. I do not want to discuss this as a solution to the problem of censorship and criticism, but I want to say that if there is no self-restraint on the part of the press, we can suddenly crash a load of glass in one strike. Is it really feasible for the people and the regime to build a nest for someone else come along and crush? If there is no self-restraint on the part of the press, such a tragedy will occur. But if there is journalistic and cultural self-restraint, I would guess that criticism would take place when all sides of the issue are examined. In other words, when you want to protest some economic action of the government, you would have already discussed it with those in charge and the authors of this action and felt that they are either ignorant or have evil intentions. But suppose the government engages in an economic action. If we, that is, I, the writer about whom you are worried, am not disrespected and write an article for publication, can a writer and one idea be permitted to shake the foundations with such an action on such a large scale and question a great action, or weaken the support of the people? It is here that we feel there are requirements to which attention must be paid. You see, there are certain problems that cannot be criticized by any means. For instance, during the war, if they want to stop the people from going to the front, this cannot be accepted at all. In the same vein, there are a series of other issues that might seem less prohibitive from a fair and logical viewpoint, but again, a fair look at them may be considered prohibited, even though a law might not exist.

Now, in fact, such freedom of the press has never existed in this form. Of course, such freedom is not in certain cases praiseworthy. It is such kind of uncontrolled freedom that the press and cultural authorities of the country must prevent. At the present time, there exist in the press--of course, the non-newspaper press in the country--issues which are not appropriate at all to the war conditions of the country. These are due to lack of control. If the cultural authorities of the country concentrate their attention and are careful, they will see that they must by no means allow the interests of the country to be threatened under the pretext of freedom. Today, fortunately, we have the ability to speak, but there are things which the people themselves do not like to hear. For instance, someone might say that there are no stories and pictures of a particular kind in the newspapers and consider the absence of such issues and pictures as confirmation of the existence of censorship. Now, supposing that such things are printed in the newspapers, the people will not accept them.

Necessity of Cultural Awareness in the Press

[Question] Your honor mentioned destruction, whereas we did not mean destruction but cultural awareness. In other words, if a newspaper has a strong cultural awareness, it can bring about changes in the culture of the society. This idea that whatever is presented in the press is sacred will be eliminated and consequently the people will be forced to think in this connection.

[Answer] At present, this is not possible, because we have nothing with which to replace the press, so that the people will realize that it is not sacred. If we had strong radio and television, yes, it might have been possible. At one time, we had preaching and discussion sessions. In one of those sessions, I tore one of these newspapers to pieces in front of several thousand people and that newspaper was defeated very obviously. During the previous regime, we could do this and did it and the newspapers were defeated. Today, the same revolutionary cultural substance has been poured into the society, been diluted and is not as thick and substantial as before. The country has developed. Now you see what difference exists between the classroom that every mouth had one speech by Mr Mottahari and a society that has received several of his speeches in the course of several years in different forms. Of course, the speeches of Mr Mottahari could have been used even more than they have so far, but I just wanted to give you an example. At that time, the stronghold of cultural preservation with regard to newspapers which acted improperly was safe. But today, we lack that stronghold because at the present time, the newspapers themselves are in the same strongholds of cultural preservation.

In other words, in place of those loudspeakers of the preaching and discussion sessions, newspapers speak. Therefore, the press, under the present circumstances, must be careful not to commit errors, because they are a trusted source for the people.

[Question] Let us set aside the discussion about the press. Another issue about which we would like to know your opinion is that these days, in certain cases, discussing and defending the Constitution has become difficult. A number of people, under the pretext that we have the Koran as a Constitution, question the Constitution and say that it is not valid with regard to the Koran. They cry excommunication when the Constitution is defended and in this way, less attention is paid to its implementation. We know that those who wrote and ratified the Constitution were mostly religious jurists who were conscious of the times. Can you please tell us how these kinds of ideas should be treated?

[Answer] I have not heard so far that since we have the Koran, we do not need a Constitution. Of course, if anyone has said this, it is incorrect, because the Constitution is based on Koranic culture and is a detailed version of it. You cannot buy a pound of cheese with a 10,000-rial note; you have to change it into 100- and 200-rial notes. The Constitution is like the change for the Koranic ideas, at the level of our understanding of the Koran today. As you said, when the Constitution was written in the Majlis, it involved people of high rank in Koranic knowledge. Grand Ayatollah Montazeri was the chairman and other personalities, such as martyr Dr Beheshti and the martyrs of the pulpit were in that Majlis, who possessed the highest existing understanding of the Koran at the time. If there are persons who have made such statements, I do not think they need to be dealt with in a newspaper. Today, fortunately, the people accept the Constitution. Even if five years ago there were people who did not accept it because they did not understand it, they understand it today.

The Constitution in terms of the foundation and basis of a sound social system is very desirable. Of course, in certain circumstances in the country, it suffers from certain imperfections, due to the lack of knowledge on the part of legislators in the experiences of political systems. There are some problems of this kind which cause conflicts in certain cases regarding the positions of the authorities in the country. In the future, God willing, whenever a law is going to be perfected or amended, it will be reformed. But in terms of the general institution of the regime which draws this law, it is a very strong and rich Constitution, taken from the Koran and Islam, and conforming to Koranic principles.

[Question] Let us say more openly that these discussions are held mostly in Qom and by some of the political groups in Tehran. And although in terms of quantity they are few, in terms of quality they may be effective to some extent.

[Answer] Believe me, I cannot accept this matter. Who are those in Qom? If you mean the scholars, teachers and theological students, we all know that their views are to the contrary. If you mean those with turbans who have been disrobed in their own cities because they had been identified in those cities and have then mingled in the sea of clerics in Qom and put their turbans back on their heads, yes, I agree that there are some counterrevolutionaries disguised in clerical robes who have been rejected by the people and have gathered in Qom to make such statements. But I assure you that what they say will not be effective.

[Question] Another issue is that among the faithful forces committed to the revolution, there are two kinds of opinions concerning political and social issues. One view states: We want Islam because it nurtures justice. For instance, in the book by the late 'Allameh Amini, there are poems by the Prophet's family praising the imams, stating that if we want to find justice in the world, could it be found anywhere else but with you. In other words, they see Islam and the Prophet's family in contradiction in regards to the lack of the existence of justice. This group considers social justice as part and parcel of Islam. Another view believes that we want Islam regardless of the social consequences. Especially in response to the issue of the differences between the poor and the rich, they say that our duty is to act in accordance with a series of injunctions and the results do not concern us. What is your opinion in regards to these two viewpoints? Is the principle of social justice part of the very nature of Islam or is it something that makes no difference whether we achieve or not? Perhaps it can be said that this is a superficial understanding of Islam. In any case, these two types of opinion have existed and compete in the society. Perhaps the source of many existing arguments in the Majlis, the press and various circles is the difference between these two viewpoints. Of course, we must note that the mother of all tyrants is economic injustice and that other injustices stem from it.

[Answer] Justice is part of the nature of all religions, not only Islam. The well-known verse in Hadid Sureh describes the aim of sending the prophets and holy books as to encourage the people to justice [Arabic], in other words, to encourage the people to rise up for justice. This verse shows very well that religions come to establish a just system and without this goal, there is no religion. Therefore, there is no doubt that justice is a part of the nature of Islam and all religions. Of course,

when we speak of justice, it is not only justice in financial and economic issues.

Discrimination, the Source of Injustice in the Society

A just society has issues other than food and the stomach, in which justice is as important as it is in regards to food and the stomach.

Here, I should correct and complete your last statement in regards to economic injustice being the mother of injustice. I think it might be better to say that discrimination in the society is the source of other injustices, because economic injustice is not a complete interpretation. In a tyrannical system in which economic injustice exists, not only is the person who is economically oppressed the victim of injustice, but the person who is by no means a victim of economic injustice is also a victim of injustice, although not in economic terms. Do you think that those in a society who achieve a high level of comfort because of the resources which are put at their disposal, who are dragged into wastefulness, eat and dress in anything they wish and do whatever they like, are treated with kindness by such a system? It is without a doubt not so. If we place value on morality, spirituality and virtues, we must know that they are also among those who are victims of a greater injustice, because they have lost their morality and become victims of moral corruption, personal weakness and passion. Of course, there are injustices which are not rewarded. A clear example is that they must be given lashes, punished and be subjects of vengeance, because they have purchased such a harm for themselves which has resulted in harming others.

Therefore, justice is part of the main makeup of all religions. Neither of the two views that you present, in my opinion, belong to those who have lived in an Islamic environment. Both views are wrong. If we say that we want social justice and we want Islam because of social justice, this is wrong. And if we say that we want Islam and do not concern ourselves with social justice and say that the kind of Islam which would result in injustice and discrimination is also accepted by us, this is also wrong. I want to say that neither of these two views are indigenous to an Islamic environment. They belong to strangers. Even though such strangers appear to be a part of the Islamic society, they are alien to Islamic thought and culture.

Now, it is wrong to say that we want social justice and since we know that Islam provides us with social justice, we have accepted Islam, because Islam is not merely a system for the production of social justice. Islam is a world view, a vision and a philosophy. That philosophy believes in justice in all respects, particulars and foundations of the world. It believes that the

same calculation and balance that exist in the whole world must also exist in the Islamic social system. Justice is not exclusive to human life, but it has existed and exists in all creation. The Islamic idea and view is that justice exists and human life must possess it.

Justice is Right

Justice is right. Right means that law which conforms to reality. Therefore, we do not say that Islam, minus its philosophy, world view and morality, is only a means for the implementation of social justice, and that in its limited sense, in a society there should not be two economic poles, poor and rich. In my opinion, limiting social justice to its economic dimension, or limiting Islam to social justice is to belittle Islam and is not correct. Someone might say that you can also talk about social justice minus Islam. Here, he might present an excuse for some individuals to leave Islam and go toward that idea. The second view, which is that we do not concern ourselves with social justice but we want Islam, is also false. It is like someone saying: I do not understand monotheism, but I want Islam. Islam is nothing more than monotheism. Islam is nothing but social justice and the revitalization of human values, giving the opportunity to all human beings to journey towards the infinite. This is all social justice. A just social system is one that gives space and opportunity to all human beings to move within the domain of their own infinite talents and for their talents to blossom. It does not give a monopoly to any stratum or class of people and would not deprive others. Therefore, this is exactly the meaning of social justice.

If someone says: I do not understand justice and only want Islam, even if Islam rules for injustice, this person has not understood Islam. Those who do not have knowledge and understanding and have busied themselves with worship do not possess human worth even before the creator. Therefore, both views on Islam are wrong. The correct view is that we want Islam, which means a world view based on an ideology, which determines everything. On the basis of that ideology, it establishes a social system, an actual tangible system, not a mental, Platonic one. It is a system in which human beings can live with comfort and security and without discrimination and injustice. In this system, the uproar of wealth and resources is not at the disposal of some individuals. This is the meaning of Islam and we believe in such an Islam. This is the correct view. You said that the two views exist among committed individuals. I think that among faithful and committed individuals who are informed in this area, such views would not exist. If so, they are wrong. Committed individuals have also understood Islam and have come to it with different visions.

Social Gaps and Conflict in the Society

[Question] Continuing this discussion, we must add that if we look at the situation in the society, we see that the flow of cash in the private sector has significantly increased. On the other hand, statistics and the makeup of the people's deposits in the banks show that a large amount of the cash volume is at the disposal of a small stratum of the society. This problem indicates a severe social gap which has existed before and continues to exist. We must see what role the general policy of the government has played in this area. Also, how can this social gap and conflict be eliminated, considering the directives of the Koran and tradition in order to create social balance in all areas?

[Answer] If this cash at the disposal of the private sector is spent under the supervision and policies of the government on productive work, the gap that you referred to will be filled to a great extent. If this cash circulates in some service sectors which do not render proper services, the existing situation will even worsen. Of course, a discussion of the issue of bridling inflation and controlling the cash and the monetary issues of the country does not fit in with your previous question. There is a great distance between a look at the just social system in Islam and the monetary problems of the country, which are very complex and do not have only one solution. In other words, if we suppose that by engaging in some action, the volume of cash in circulation will decrease or one thing or another will happen, this is too simplistic. Hence, several initiatives and actions must be implemented side by side to solve this problem. Unfortunately, sufficient attention is not paid to this point. Today, among those who express views on these issues (I am not saying that these are all experts, because many of those who express opinions are not experts and just say something), there is often some degree of wastefulness. Some imagine that in order to control some of the monetary and economic problems, the government must take over all affairs and not allow one or another unjust and greedy sector to increasingly swallow the capital of the society. They think that in this way, they can influence the private sector and isolate it, ignorant of the fact that this in itself will increase the cash in circulation, because when the government wants to do this, it will do so with employees, which in turn causes an increase in the budget, itself one of the greatest causes of cash flow increases and inflation.

On the other hand, some people believe that in order to spend cash in productive affairs, they must obtain unlimited and unconditional resources and freedom. In other words, they want us to say: Oh, rich people, come and spend your money any way you want. All we expect of you is that you build and produce. These people think that this solution will cure our economic

problems. But some of the owners of cash are those who are at least as familiar with their own work as a politician is with his and know well the secrets of their own work. In other words, as the saying goes, they would not lie down where they might get wet. Therefore, if this money is utilized without correct supervision, planning and policies, the same problems will increase and will expand the areas of influence of this cash flow. For this reason, we cannot act on one dimension. The government must have control and supervision and, on the other hand, the private sector must sense a security in work and efforts under the supervision and policies of the government.

Another way to fill these social gaps is the issue of charity, which has, unfortunately, been abandoned and rejected by intellectual opinion, whereas, charity is one of the main issues in Islam and must be revitalized and propagated.

You see, in the course of history, so much money which could have been spent on debauchery was spent on building a mosque, for instance, in accordance with special methods and tapping the religious sentiments of the people, even though it might be said that the ruler or the founder of that mosque intended to make propaganda use of it. First of all, it is not always so, and secondly, even if this were true, this money could have been spent on personal expenditures, but was spent instead on a long-term, beneficial task for the people. All these religious endowments and the charity which has always existed can be revitalized today. In my opinion, this is another way to fill the social gaps. Therefore, the economic and monetary problems of the country require comprehensive studies by the authorities. Of course, efforts have been made, but the problems that exist today in the country in this connection are not very unusual for a country in revolution and war. In any case, once the situation improves and normalizes, results will be achieved through the initiatives of the authorities.

[Question] Mr President, allow us to return to the previous question. As the Koran explicitly states, the aim of creation is worship. In fact, the perfect state of man is when he worships God with joy. In practical terms, those who go towards God with awareness and mysticism enjoy the highest pleasures in the world, which cannot be exchanged for anything else. Therefore, the aim is for human beings to achieve this state of growth and perfection. But, the existence of discrimination, as you pointed out, may prevent human beings from achieving that state. A society in which such differences and discrimination exist, an example of which is found in the economic dimension, would not offer the opportunity for growth to human beings. If we are speaking of this issue on a social level, it is not on an ideological level, but on the implementary level. Undoubtedly, a person who gives to charity and has achieved certain states

enjoys helping others more than a person to whom help is given. But, if there is a difference in resources, a person who acquires more wealth and comfort can be most boastful and make use of more resources. A person who does not possess anything enjoys such resources less. Therefore, our view mainly concerns this part. If such a problem exists in the society and it is felt that discrimination must be eliminated, it must be dealt with strongly in order for all human beings to have equal resources for growth.

[Answer] No doubt.

Reasons for Not Preparing Essential Laws in the Majlis

[Question] Mr President, we have a question regarding the Majlis.

On the inauguration of the second Majlis, in a message, the Imam urged the Majlis to engage in essential issues. Also, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri has made mention of this point several times. However, it is observed that the Majlis spends little time on this important issue, spending most of its time instead on rather insignificant, routine matters. Considering that you are responsible for the three branches, what have you done in regards to preparing and writing such essential laws which will show the direction and structure of our regime and what must essentially be done?

[Answer] The Majlis cannot be expected not to engage in small issues. If the small issues that you mention are not dealt with, the government will come to a halt. It is the government that asks the Majlis to amend some law or other in order to be able to continue its job. If these small issues are not attended to among the larger ones, the government will be unable to function. It will be left with no laws or with inadequate laws, which will cause problems. Concerning the general policies, the Majlis is a legislative center. As I mentioned in the previous discussions, we have no problems except for legislating, which is to structure a culture and, in a more clear and tangible form, is to shape and strengthen a series of concepts. Of course, the Majlis has in turn been and can be effective in devising certain laws and some other issues in creating this cultural framework. But before we expect of the Majlis laws concerning, for instance, land issues, first the problem of land must be resolved in terms of standards and regulations which are valid for us today, such as Islamic jurisprudence, because before a religious jurisprudential framework and general policies are clarified in this case for this regime and government, the Majlis will not be able to engage in complete legislation. In response to what I have done, I must say that with the contacts and meetings in various forms with the representatives, I have asked the Majlis, and in more private gatherings, we have discussed views on the general issues of the

country and policies and have exchanged views on the general framework. We have had an ongoing effort in connection with the government and the Majlis in general areas. But what I would like to call attention to is that before reaching legislation, there is need for a more general legislation than laws so that the laws will be able to implement those policies and materialize them. These policies are formed in the Majlis and outside it. But before reaching the stage of the law, we have certain problems in some issues. For instance, the Constitution is among the factors which can help in shaping the general concepts of these issues. Where the Constitution has addressed certain problems directly, our work is easy and the Majlis can easily devise laws concerning these issues. However, in certain cases, when the Constitution has no explicit statement, we have problems and in this connection, there is need for general legislation.

On the whole, I believe that government and the Majlis in addition to the cultured thinkers of the Islamic Republic must cooperate to form the necessary concepts in legislation concerning this important, vital issue. Fortunately, today, we are more advanced than in previous years. Many of the problems which were ambiguous in the beginning have become clear to us and, naturally, the advancement of the revolution brings cultural expansion and victory.

Next Presidential Elections

[Question] You have been president for more than three years. How do you evaluate this period?

[Answer] In terms of results and the type of work we have accomplished, evaluation may not rest with me. But what I can say is that during this period, we have made an effort to carry out our legal duties. Efforts have been made, but whatever the results, they require more examination and the opinions of others.

[Question] Will you run in the next presidential elections?

[Answer] It is still too early to think about it. There is still much time left. In the Islamic Republic, we must not get our models from the West, where they prepare themselves two or three years before the elections and begin their efforts. Even in this term, I had not decided 10 days before the registration date.

[Question] Perhaps the reason was the particular circumstances of the revolution at that time.

[Answer] No, that did not concern me. What I mean is that I was a person who would think about it. Not even one day had I

thought about becoming a candidate for the presidency. At that time, a few days before the revolution, the issue came up, and at the insistence of friends, I submitted. Should we sit and think about whether we will or will not take part in the elections several months earlier? In my opinion, it is not worthy of the Islamic Republic to acquire such habits from the Westerners.

Necessity of Political Parties

[Question] Dealing with the various political and social currents from the left and the right is now a responsibility of the officials. Some degree of energy has been spent on such confrontation, which, in fact, has become a preoccupation with our regime. Whereas, such ideological confrontation could be conferred on political parties which believe in Islam and the Islamic revolution, if they existed. Is there a void felt in this case? Also, can you please explain why the law for political parties has not been implemented yet, even though it has been a long time since its ratification and announcement?

[Answer] I especially agree with your idea and not only do I not oppose the existence of political groups and parties, but I believe that they are necessary for precisely your reasoning. As you know, the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for implementing this law and, as far as I know, and it has been discussed several times, the Ministry of the Interior has bylaws which must be ratified by the Cabinet. The reason why it has not been implemented is that these bylaws have not been ratified, and certainly there has been no intention of not implementing the law. This law must be implemented. On the other hand, this law covers a large area and, therefore, the necessary time must be spent on writing the bylaws.

War Coupled with Victory

[Question] Mr President, our next question is about the imposed war. You are certainly aware that the United States and Europe want to stop us on the land and escalate the situation against us in the international circles. On the other hand, the Persian Gulf Cooperative Council also simultaneously considers a major threat to be the escalation of the war. On the whole, they (the above circles) want the war to be a draw. In other words, they want both peace and the continuation (of the war) without victory. We consider the reason to be a lack of expansive attacks. What is your opinion?

[Answer] What the enemies want, as you explained, is for us not to be victorious and what we want is the opposite. Now, we must see how victory can be achieved. Sometimes victory is achieved through a rapid attack and sometimes in other forms. Now, do you

not think what you see today is not stagnation but a measured and calculated move to be followed by an ultimate victory?

Now Time Is at Issue

Today the issue of time is not as sensitive as it was three years ago. It is true that time, under such circumstances, is never on our side, but you must know that it is not in the interest of the enemy either.

[Question] We resort to what you have frequently mentioned, the fact that the skill of the enemy at the present time is to hide well.

[Answer] That is correct. The enemy has no other skill but to hide behind barbed wires and trenches in order to prevent striking us [as published]. But we also want to strike our blow. Now should we do so, in a measured manner or otherwise? Sometimes striking requires some delay. The enemy wants a situation of neither war nor peace to exist; whereas, we want a war coupled with victory. In a war coupled with victory, a person must take advantage of all necessary resources and all of these cannot be obtained in a short time. Suppose that we are going through this period of time.

Stealthy Move

[Question] Was Iraq not able to spread the war from land to the sea in this interval?

[Answer] These are not related, because in the past also we had sea battles with battleships, and now it is not as severe as before. At the present, there is a strong air move by long-range missiles. They choose an unarmed and defenseless sea target and bring in a Super Etendard airplane, despite all the dangers, for example, if the plane is shot down, as it was, and Iraq and France are exposed. They engage in a stealthy move, not a war action. To put it accurately, it is more a political move than a military one. In this way, the enemy wants to pretend to its supporters that it still exists, whereas this is not existence, but precisely non-existence. And we have not neglected the land but, God willing, we will strike both on sea and land. Now do you feel better?

[Question] Let us return to the past. About 12 years ago, you went to the Mashhad literary society and it seems that you were the best single couplet reciter of that society. How much time do you have now to spend on poetry and literature?

[Answer] Once I went to the late Jalal Homa'i and discussed philosophy and books. He said: By the time I heard a page of

"Kalileh", I forgot 300 pages of "Shava." Now, as soon as we have 1 sheet of these political files and the work around us, 300 pages of poetry and books of odes are closed to us.

I do not have much time for poetry now. Early in the revolution, for two or three years, I did not have the opportunity to read, and suddenly I felt that I was becoming hollow. Therefore, I began to read and for two years now, I have been engaged in various studies, including religious jurisprudence, history and literature. Of course, what I mean by literature is not reading poetry, because I do not have the time to read poetry.

Concerning the single couplets, as you mentioned, at the time, I collected good and significant single couplets and would recite in a gathering of friends. But now I do not have the time I used to. However, I take a look at literary books and sometimes read famous stories. Of course, previously, I used to read novels a great deal and have read most of the famous novels of the world, including the well-known 10 novels, such as "Les Miserables," Shlokhov's book, Jean Christophe, Romain Rolland, and the like.

[Question] The political currents have shown a political view of you in the society, whereas you are also a writer and researcher. For instance, you translated the book, "Future in the Domain of Islam" or "Imam Hasan's Place," which is one of the good books in history that you have authored. Do you still have time for such work?

[Answer] I do not have the opportunity to write, but I look at historical and literary books and take notes. Since about two years ago, I have been able to read a series of well-known books.

Of course, my time for studying, as the nosey theological students put it, is often times half an hour before sleeping, or little by little. And now I have returned to studying. Hence, you should appreciate your journalistic and cultural work and as you said, I am also a cultural element, but now the duties and pressures of responsibilities have dragged me into political work.

When I was on the Revolution Council, there was a meeting for students where we performed our noon and afternoon prayers in the university mosque and then sat to talk. Many times the students wanted me to speak on interpretations of the Koran and "Nahj ol-Balagheh." I would say to them: Rest assured, God willing, when in a few months, the work of the Revolution Council is completed, I will return and begin interpretation of the Koran and "Nahj ol-Balagheh," not knowing that other work and engagements were ahead for us. Firstly, the work of the Revolution Council had not finished yet when the work in the Majlis began. I went to the Majlis, and in the early months of the Majlis, the war was imposed on us. With the permission of the Imam, I was on the

front for a few months and another part of the time was taken by the political currents of the time. Later came the explosion incident, and now I am in this situation.

[Question] It is known that you have worked in history more than any other area. Could we expect to read history from you?

[Answer] No, I have only worked somewhat on the history of the lives of the imams, which was my marginal work. Since 1969, I began to think that some work must be done on the lives of the imams.

Poverty, Bureaucratic Corruption and the Problems of the People

[Question] The authorities constantly mention the necessity for bureaucratic change, even revolution, stating that this change can be the solution and remedy to our bureaucratic problems. Only there are two other points connected to this issue which the lower officials ignore in regards to changes in the offices. One is administration in the offices. Here and there, it is seen that administration is less than desirable, not the kind of management which can attract, but in certain cases has caused rejection. Management that can absorb a desirable individual with minor weaknesses and build him has resulted in shortages in certain cases, so that they have resorted to 3rd and 4th rank experts. The second point is that alongside such management there are the employees' problems, problems that Your Excellency is sufficiently aware of. Employees have a hard time, so that an employee's mind is fully preoccupied with getting out of the office at 2:00 in the afternoon to drive a taxi or a van. This is true of those working in education as well. This problem has arisen since services have become expensive. In other words, services have become expensive overnight without any warning. Even health and treatment services in government hospitals have gone up. Of course, there is no doubt that emergency measures will be taken by the government and authorities to eliminate the problem of the employees, but such ideas and solutions will be long-term and not for the short run. Therefore, under the present conditions, the problems are not easily overcome. You often see an employee or worker who works generously on his own, whose son is on the front and he is on the scene himself, but his economic problems are paid less attention to, which causes worry for him. An employee has treatment, health and housing problems. At the same time, that employee sees that there are persons who have the opportunity to make more money, get fatter every day, build homes with covered swimming pools and palaces with marble pillars. It is even argued that now that there is talk about taxing non-government employment, and it has been decided that taxes must be collected from them in proportion to their income, they might again raise the price of their goods to compensate for

the taxes, and in fact place the burden of the taxes on the people.

[Answer] I should explain that this was not a question but an answer. To continue what you said, I must say that both points are correct. This is something that we always repeat to the brothers at high levels in the government, that all the problems cannot be blamed on the war. Some of our problems are certainly the result of weak management in certain sectors. Strong management can make up for poverty, lack of money and problems of this kind. A strong manager with initiative and creativity, by placing everyone in their proper position and regulating the relations of those who work with him, can increase the output of work so much that you might think a large budget and many resources are at its disposal. Therefore, on the issue of management, I agree with you. In regards to the financial situation of the employees, it is an obvious issue. But the cure for this problem is very delicate and we can by no means be careless, because as a result of a little carelessness, harm will follow, the effects of which will not be less than the present problems of the employee stratum. Therefore, I feel that the way to treat this problem is to anticipate a general plan for the economic situation of the society in which all aspects of the task, including the situation of employees, are studied. But in the short run, certain steps can be taken in regards to the situation of the workers, including housing, which is a major crippling expense. At present, we have thought about employee housing in order to solve their housing problems, which sometimes swallows one-half their income. Non-cash aid is another short-term step which the government is trying to plan.

I believe your questions are finished.

The Place of Revolutionary Forces in the University

[Question] No, Mr President. There remain many issues, including the issue of the universities. It can be said that the duality of the need of the society and the revolution for specialists and, on the other hand, the necessity of the activities of the university crusade and Islamic societies in the universities to strengthen the spiritual influence of Islam raises the question of how to resolve this duality?

[Answer] I do not see any contradiction in this issue. Your question seems to take for granted that the university crusade and Islamic societies oppose specialization and training specialists is also hypothesized to be contradictory to the needs of the university crusade and Islamic societies, whereas, they are not contradictory. In other words, Islamic societies can even be at the service of training specialists. The university crusade is a revolutionary executive organization for the

universities and can serve to increase specialists. A point that must be noted is that specialization and commitment are not two opposite poles, but two factors that improve the human personality for a sound system. In order to have specialization grow in the universities and to increase scientific quality, we need scientific work to be carried out with correct planning, perseverance, and true belief in the fact that knowledge is necessary. This is the meaning of commitment. The atmosphere in which this scientific movement takes place must be Islamic, and alongside specialist training, individuals will also grow in terms of moral and Islamic vision and awareness of the political issues of the society. Both organizations are capable of carrying out both actions and both can be side by side. I seriously believe that the revolutionary and faithful forces in the universities even help the growth of specialization and science in the universities. Of course, the important thing is for the revolutionary forces to find their place and not to make an error in the position that they must take.

A point which is sometimes neglected is that we must see where in the university the revolutionary forces should take their position in order to be able to make the universities committed. I have always told the students that Islamic societies are a necessity for establishing a correct, Islamic ideology, the propagation of purity and piety and preparing the grounds for committed students in the universities. They must keep the atmosphere in the universities revolutionary and Islamic. We believe that studying and benefitting from specialized professors are not contrary to one another, because the specialized professor teaches in his classroom and the faithful and committed Muslim student learns his lesson. Thus, commitment and specialization mix.

[Question] The duality that was spoken of has appeared in the form of the increased isolation of and insults to the university crusade and the people in the Islamic societies resulting from the return of some of the specialists and professors. Duality is meant here in the sense that if the necessary ties between the specialists and the kinds of activities that the Muslim students must carry out are not created and the framework and general direction of the actions of the administration are unclear for the members of the Islamic society, with the kind of training that these professors have had, the future political and economic positions of the regime will be filled by persons who are not responsible with regard to the people, Islam and the revolution, and the tendency towards lack of commitment to Islamic issues will grow. Therefore, it is necessary to have coordination between the administration and the framework of the activities of the Islamic societies in order to enable them to advance the movement of the universities in the direction of the essential values of the revolution.

[Answer] That is absolutely correct.

IRAN

MUSAVI-ARDABILI INTERVIEWED ON FOREIGN, DOMESTIC ISSUES

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 30 Dec 84 p 4

[Interview with Chief Justice and Head of the Supreme Judicial Council Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabili on 29 Dec 84 by media reporters; place not specified]

[Text] In the name of the Almighty

Yesterday, Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabili, the chief justice and head of the Supreme Judicial Council, responded to questions of reporters in a radio, television and press interview.

In the beginning, Ayatollah Musavi pointed out that there are questions about the judicial branch, the problems of the judicial branch, the prisoners, . . . , air piracy and its consequences, which may still continue, price hiking, punishments, the Tudeh Party members and the propaganda of these enemies in the world, spreading rumors, creating atmospheres, the lies which are told, the OPEC issues, the Islamic conferences, the current issues in southern Lebanon and the Muslims there, and similar issues which must be explained.

The main issue for everyone, I think, is clear. There is no one in the world who doubts about all the conspiracies of the superpowers against those whom they surmise one day want to live freely without bothering them or over whom they might not be able to have political or economic domination. Although six years have passed since the establishment of the Islamic Republic and it has announced its ideological and practical positions in the world openly and unambiguously both before and since its formation, and it has found its place in the world, and it has become clear that the words and actions of the Islamic Republic are the same, despite all this, it still does not prevent a question in the minds of the public who want to hear answers to their questions again. Have the positions changed or not? What is the fact of the problem? Hence, we feel that it is appropriate for us to respond to these questions as we are able to, although this will not prevent them from creating an

atmosphere and spreading rumors again and again engaging in conspiracies. But this does not prevent us from answering the above questions; repeating them would be effective.

In the Name of God the Compassionate and the Merciful

The questions which have come to us so far are as follows:

[Question] The first question concerns the recent meeting of the members of the Supreme Judicial Council with the imam of the nation and the importance and independence of the judicial branch.

The Imam decisively emphasized the independence of the judicial branch several months ago. Please tell us for what reason and because of what events, once again, the Imam stressed the independence of the judicial branch and declared his support for the Supreme Judicial Council? Considering the recent support of the Imam, what individuals or factions interfere or cause disruptions in the affairs of the judicial branch?

[Answer] The judicial branch has a special position in the regime of the Islamic Republic, both its authority is vast and its responsibilities are heavy. Perhaps the regime of the Islamic Republic has placed these responsibilities on the shoulder of the judicial branch in accordance with Islamic and religious standards and in harmony and along with other organizations and institutions. A very constructive role has been conferred by our Constitution and also a sacred Islamic law on the judicial branch. Our judicial branch is altogether a new one. The previous judicial branch was almost totally dismantled both in terms of organization as well as personnel, laws and regulations and a completely new judicial branch was formed.

Thank God it has been successful. It attends to many issues and every day its responsibilities increase. In the opinion of the honorable Council of Guardians, a great deal of what was in the hands of the committees will be taken away from them and conferred on the judicial branch.

Therefore, with such heavy responsibilities, no matter how competent, this branch is after all a new one. The Imam believes that it must be highly supported in order to be able to respond to such heavy responsibilities. Therefore, every once in a while he issues a reminder that the judicial branch is an independent one in which there shall be no interference and no one, not even a religious jurist, may give an opinion contrary to that of a magistrate.

Question: Following the recent statements of the Imam concerning the independence of the judicial branch and freedom of action of

the magistrates in the courts which took place after the meeting with the honorable members of the Supreme Judicial Council, has the Supreme Judicial Council made decisions in regards to strengthening and preserving the independence of this branch? In the event of an objection to the ruling of a magistrate, what courts will attend to such issues?

Answer: The judicial branch, as I said, is a new one. In the course of its sessions, the Supreme Judicial Council will make new decisions regularly. Every day, we have new decisions concerning the expansion of this branch, its budget, descriptions of duties, changes in the laws which concern this branch, preparing and sending them to the Majlis for ratification, defending them, and the like. In regards to violations of magistrates, we have an organization in the judicial system called the disciplinary prosecutor's office and court of magistrates. This prosecutor's office and court also existed in the previous regime, only in a different form. However, now the content has changed, but the principle exists. All the violations of magistrates are investigated here, with the exception of ordinary violations. If a magistrate commits an ordinary violation, first his file goes to the disciplinary court and the court suspends him. Then, he is summoned by the public prosecutor's offices and courts. In other words, until a magistrate has been suspended, other courts do not have the right to interfere in his cases.

Question, REUTER'S NEWS AGENCY: On what date was the Imam's decree concerning the prisoners issued; what effect has it had on the prison situation; how many prisoners have been released as a result; and what kind of prisoners were they? SOBH-E AZADEGAN: A question was asked concerning the pardon of prisoners and decisions which are made or will be made in this regard, and following the withdrawal of two of its members, what is the supervisory council of prisons doing?

Answer: The supervisory council of prisons has been renewed and is working. I will give an answer to all these questions.

During the period 21 March 1979-20 March 1982, we had a problem in Iran called the hypocrites and counterrevolutionaries, who were belligerent terrorists. They took up arms, engaged in military actions and the like. They were in most parts of the bazaars, streets, universities, offices and ministries. The revolution courts and prosecutors' offices began to fight them and were completely successful in this fight. Now in Iran, we no longer have a problem called the counterrevolutionaries and minigroups. I do not want to say that there are not even four persons to sit and engage in some action or set an explosion in a corner. This exists all over the world. But as a social phenomenon with which we must have an organization to deal and

which occupies our minds, it no longer exists. Internally, we have complete peace of mind in this regard. Of course, some of them escaped justice and went abroad, where they wash clothes and dishes and in the meantime engage in some conspiratorial acts. I do not know what will happen to them.

Therefore, since 1982, we have not found it necessary to follow the same course that we were following during the years from 1979 to 1981. The imam also instructed: Now that you have reached this situation, help the prisoners not to become misguided, on the basis of forgiveness--not those who have spilled blood, because in that case, in accordance with our judicial laws, the guardian of the victim also requires his problem to be resolved. Otherwise, it will not be possible. Therefore, the issue of pardon is making rapid progress at present and the prison population is being reduced. Of course, prisons in Iran started two things, one was constructive and the other was judicial punishment. They would arrest someone, debrief him, discover his conspiracy, and set a punishment for him. This was one thing that they did. Alongside this, training also began; in other words, they tried to really reform these people and to really answer their questions. This task still continues. Of course, this work has had results. The people who are called repentants are individuals who have been given training and have changed their ideological positions. If we are certain that once they are released they will not cause trouble again, that is, engaging in military actions and the like, in that case, they will be released.

There are two or three groups who are now engaged in investigating and releasing these individuals. The number of individuals who have been released is large, but at the present time, I do not recall the number, because statistics on released persons are given to us twice a year, once every six months. The latest statistics will be given on New Year's day. And now, many lists of those who are to be released on 11 February have reached us.

Question, SOBH-E AZADEGAN: Has the spread of narcotics been bridled; what is the situation now; and what have been the effects of the experienced addicts going to the island?

Answer: In regards to sending them to the islands, according to its director, it has been very effective. According to a report which the director has given us, the effect has been very good. He said: In the beginning, when we wanted to go and arrest the addicts, it was very difficult. Recently, the situation has totally changed and the reason is that we have been sending them to the islands.

But in regards to careful control, no, unfortunately, it must be said here that careful control has not been imposed. Much has been done in this regard. It has even been discussed whether or not these efforts have been relatively positive. It was said that they have been, but there is a gap between these efforts and absolute control. Of course, the imposed war and the situation of the borders make control farfetched before our other problems are resolved and the borders are closed.

Question: Concerning the problem of prostitution, prohibited acts and unveiling.

PAYAM-E ENQELAB: We know that the spread of prostitution and prohibited acts is one of the methods of global oppression to harm the Islamic revolution. What programs do you have underway to fight this filthy intention of global oppression?

(SHATER AL-SHO'ALA'): Every now and then a group tries to create conflicts with the law in regards to the unveiling issue. What is the view of the Supreme Judicial Council in dealing with this group and also unveiling or improper veiling?

Answer: If the problem is that global oppression propagates it, we must neutralize it in the same way. They make propaganda and engage in cultural work, but paramilitary culture. We must also confront it with sound cultural efforts. We must act logically. I have believed in this issue since the beginning. This issue has both judicial and cultural aspects. Now, it has already started. Radio and television are producing some and the committee has also taken steps, of course, with the cooperation of the brother magistrates. But this is still too little and is not sufficient. Of course, it must be expedited. They are producing it and various groups are working in this area--the judicial group, law enforcement and radio and television.

Question, IRNA: After conferring the work to follow up the Imam's eight-point decree to a headquarters under the supervision of the Supreme Judicial Council, please tell us what steps this headquarters has taken thus far to implement the instructions of the Imam.

Answer: Here, I can actually tell the dear brothers the good news that since 1983, the Imam's decree has been quite successful in its highlights, even if I do not say 100 percent, it has been 95 percent successful. Concerning the affairs that the Imam identified, those things either no longer occur or, if they do, they are so few that one cannot point them out.

Now, the judicial system is engaged in cases involving what had occurred in 1979, 1980, and 1981, because the follow-up headquarters' work has now reached ordinary offenses, which are

of no concern to this headquarters, or concern the selections and admissions. There is no other work at all. The headquarters has been very successful. Of course, it is due to the blessed command of the Imam that it has been so successful. For instance, he said: No one is permitted to confiscate someone's belongings without any reason. Such a thing does not exist at all now. No one has the right to enter someone's house without permission. All those things which were mentioned in the decree do not occur in the society at all.

In this vast country, one or two cases might occur, but there is no reliable evidence.

Question, SOBH-E AZADEGAN, NPG Television of Japan, Japanese newspaper: What happened to the punishment of the leaders of the treacherous Tudeh Party; what is the reason for the frequent delays in their trial; and has a specific time been set for their trial?

Answer: You know that the Tudeh organization in Iran began some forty years ago. Some work had been done on this organization, but it was not dealt with seriously even in the previous regime. Although they quite opposed them and had clashes, they were not successful.

This time, the Islamic Republic dealt with them decisively and burned them at their roots. We arrested their entire organization and now we do not have a problem called the "outlawed Tudeh Party."

But, if we want to deal with this issue thoroughly, with a 40- or 50-year-old organization which had been worked on so much, we cannot do so in haste. It must be followed up in such a way that it would not cause us worry and trouble again tomorrow. This time that it was announced, it was thought that the investigations had reached a stage at which we do not need anything further. So the time of the trial was announced. In that space of time, some documents were discussed, certain threads were found, it became obvious that the issue had to be followed up, and the trial was delayed.

In any case, they are now being interrogated and the judicial branch is working on them. First, it had reached the conclusion that the interrogation was finished, but when the threads were found, again they went to follow up to see where it would lead.

Question, (ASAHI) from Japan: Recently, cases of bureaucratic corruption, particularly bribery, have been reported. Please explain the number of cases and how many persons have been tried and jailed so far? Have these statistics increased or decreased compared to the previous regime?

Answer: These statistics show a decrease compared to the previous regime, a significant decrease. Now the issue is being pursued seriously. The organizations themselves also cooperate with us. For example, a minister sometimes appoints a detective as his deputy. A deputy minister does the work of a policeman. Of course, they do this as far as it is their duty and we have asked them to do so. They have also volunteered to investigate their own organizations.

Those who are convicted will be announced in the newspapers. Some of them have already been announced and some are being investigated. The executive branch has made a request of us and we have also made a request of the executive branch to cooperate with us, so that if it is observed somewhere, it would be investigated. Of course, it requires in-depth investigations in order to examine the issue carefully.

Question, ETTELA'AT: After several years, no decision has been made by the Majlis about the agricultural lands in some of the seven-member committees and other organizations which have been transferred to farmers. On the other hand, one hears that in some villages the feudal landlords have returned and bother the farmers, while the Supreme Judicial Council has issued a letter to the courts not to investigate issues pertaining to land at the present time, until the Majlis makes a decision. What is your opinion in this regard?

Answer: Our opinion is the same as we stated in the circular letter, and we believe the circular letter remains valid and must be implemented. Sometimes it is reported to us, but of course it is rare, that in some places, the landlords have come and dismissed the farmers who have worked there for five or six years. Occasionally, it is heard that some of the courts have ruled on behalf of the landowner. As soon as we hear about them, we stop them and do not allow them to continue. We believe the same circular letter must be implemented. Recently, the Ministry of Agriculture has written a very good document and sent it to us for our opinion. We gave our opinion in two cases.

We gave two small opinions, otherwise, it was very good. It was sent to the Majlis and, God willing, we hope it will not take long for the Majlis to ratify it and then we will be rid of this indecision, because our circular letter is like a pain-killer, which is not the law. The Imam instructed us and we issued a circular letter. We are waiting for the land law to be ratified as soon as possible, God willing, in the Majlis.

Question: What decisions has the Supreme Judicial Council made in regards to the implementation procedures of Article 49 of the Constitution and when will these decisions be implemented?

Answer: The law has been ratified by the Majlis and this law is very complicated. If there is, God forbid, any negligence later on, the implementation of this law might cause problems. Therefore, an opportunity was provided to study the matter, which in our opinion is too short. Now, in the Supreme Judicial Council, the committees and advisors are engaged in consultation to find a way to establish the courts, which I do not know precisely. Of course, the Majlis has said, within three months, but it is too short, and it must be extended.

Question, SOBH-E AZADEGAN: Why has the fight against price hiking and price control not been followed up seriously?

Answer: In our opinion, it is being followed up seriously. The reason is that now we have a special guild-related court, which is working very hard and is sometimes complained about. They say that the problem is very serious. Now, in the case of Qanbari, you heard all the noise about why he was fined 20 or 30 million rials and given a 5-year suspended sentence. They said: Revise your opinion. The reasons are very serious and nothing else.

Question, JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI: In your Friday prayer sermons, you said that a series of trucks carrying iron disappeared between Bandar 'Abbas and Tehran. On the other hand, we heard that those responsible were arrested. Please explain.

Answer: This was a report from the public prosecutor's office of Tehran. They had reported it to me. If you want to know all the details, they are available in the public prosecutor's office of Tehran.

Question, KEYHAN: Considering the warnings of various national officials to the hoarders and economic terrorists, what are the practical policies in fighting hoarding and hoarders and why are the important persons not indentified to the people?

Answer: First of all, we do not have a particular policy. The judicial system cannot have an independent policy.

The judicial system must act in accordance with the Constitution.

Those individuals who are brought in are interrogated and sent to the court, which will announce them. As for the rest, there are no sufficient documents. They come and say that such and such a person has stolen so much and another so much. But they provide no documents. The judicial system cannot arrest anyone on rumors alone, without documentation. Those for whom documents are provided are announced. I see them being announced in the newspapers.

Question, KEYHAN: What issues are included in the international seminar on familiarity with the Islamic judicial system and when will it be held?

Answer: The seminar headquarters has now been established. There are four issues. First is the issue of Islamic as opposed to American human rights. Second is the political system; third the judicial system and, finally, the Islamic view on international treaties and agreements. At present, four headquarters are working on them, which will be written and translated. I think in late spring, the seminar will be held.

Question, KEYHAN: What is your opinion concerning the recent oil price setting of two Western countries and also, what is the OPEC policy towards this conspiracy?

Answer: Those who have power in the world always engage in conspiracies. They engage in conspiracies against the weak and the oppressed. It has both a political side and an economic side. They would not allow them to raise their heads. The recent OPEC event is also the same. We do not consider the recent OPEC event merely an economic one. We believe that it is political. Of course, it is also economic.

They want to weaken OPEC. They want to control it. And they have weakened it sufficiently, too; however, they are not satisfied yet. They still want to advance to the death of OPEC, so that these countries would not think of complaining or crying out. But in our opinion, the OPEC position must be much stronger. OPEC is acting weakly. You cannot fight OPEC. The issue is energy and oil.

They should refuse to sell the oil or let the other side refuse to buy it or put up some resistance and see who will be defeated. They say that they have a 60-day reserve. In OPEC, in their preliminary discussions, 13 countries took a common position to have an international agreement to control the price. As soon as they saw the number was 13, it was reported that the price of crude oil had increased somewhat. They had some preliminary discussions. They should be serious about it and say that at the present time, we are closing the session, close down oil production, and have a session another day. But they should really stop production for 20 days. They say that they have 60 days of reserves. Let us see how many days it takes for their 60-day reserve to finish and whether or not the situation of the market will change. This is due to our own weakness.

The enemy is engaged in a conspiracy and we are submitting to it. Well, when the enemy sees that you agree to \$25, he lowers the price.

If the enemy realizes that it does not have the ability to resist for 20 days, why say 60? Only 15 days will be enough for a remedy. That is all.

Now OPEC is putting up resistance, but it is acting weakly. It should act strongly. I am certain that if OPEC stops production, in 20 days, we can gather here to see to what extent England can take the market with its price, or Norway. This is a political and economic conspiracy and is condemned.

Question, SOBH-E AZADEGAN: What is your opinion in regards to the recent meeting of the Islamic conference organization in San'a and also the ratification of this meeting?

Answer: As far as the ratification or the resolution Iran offered is concerned, obviously we think positively of it. Several other resolutions were also offered, about which our view is obviously negative. But on the whole, I must say that while the horns of the superpowers are seen in these meetings, they are seen there themselves. Obviously, it is not only they who are here. There is someone else who is running it. There is someone else who gives opinions. These will not get anywhere. Why was it that such an important issue as "Camp David" was gradually forgotten? Why is it that such an important issue as southern Lebanon is quietly passed by? If the Islamic conference does not want to solve the important problems of the Islamic world and then comes and politely discusses whether or not Egypt must be returned and the like, how much value can be placed on it? We are sorry that these conferences, in contrast to their names, which are very interesting, are of little substance. Their substance is not something that a person can set his hopes on.

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IRAN

CHIEF PROSECUTOR URGES FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION, BRIBERY

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 5 Jan 85 p 26

[Text] Qom, KEYHAN correspondent. On the anniversary of the bloody epic of 9 January, the day of the uprising of the ever-alert clerics and the committed Muslim people of Qom, the unifying and enemy-defeating political-worship prayers of this week in the city of blood and uprising of Qom, as in other cities in the Islamic homeland, were held magnificently with the large participation of the martyr-nurturing Hezbollah nation; a group of scholars, learned people and students of theology; a group of the great families of martyrs, war prisoners, self-sacrificers and missing persons; a group of military and law enforcement personnel; and a large number of pilgrims to the sacred shrine of Ma'sumeh, with the temporary prayer leadership of Ayatollah Sane'i in the grand mosque and the adjoining prayer halls and the shrine square.

Before the sermons, Mohseni, the governor of Qom, made a speech. Praising the exalted position of the martyrs and emphasizing the continuation of the war to final victory, he enumerated some of the urban problems of Qom.

Then Ayatollah Sane'i, the temporary Friday imam of Qom, delivered the first sermon. In the first sermon, he called on the people to observe piety, and continuing the discussion of the previous weeks concerning instruction to do good and prohibition from doing evil as two principles which guarantee justice in practice, he said: The best way to call a society to what is good and prevent it from doing evil is for the actions of human beings to be a model for others, in particular, those who have social status. The more social status a person has, the more he must engage in self-building to construct the society.

A human being's avoidance of injustice, tyranny, bribery and the violations of other people's rights is not only necessary for that person but to build the society. He added: One of the mistakes that some of the people with deviant ideas have is that they should build themselves without caring about what goes on in

the world. This is a mistake on the part of those who seek comfort. This perception is contrary to the verses on such topics as prohibition from doing evil, instruction to do good, war, and holy war. Our great religious scholars, such as the late Tabarsi in his "Majma' al-Bayan" and 'Allameh Tabataba'i, and other eminent scholars, such as the late Feyz-Kashani, have rejected this false idea of the comfort seekers.

The imams also instructed the people on self-construction in the moral, practical and other dimensions through their own actions.

Ayatollah Sane'i devoted the second prayer sermon to discussing the political issues of the day. First, he referred to the magnificent uprising of the people of the city of blood and uprising of Qom on 9 January 1977, offered his congratulations and condolences on this magnificent day to the imam of the nation and the martyr-nurturing nation and said: At that time, when the newspapers of the day insulted the great leader and the source of emulation of the Shi'ites in the world, the clerics and the people of Qom rose up and the society of instructors guided and led them. On the 7th day of that month, the honorable society of instructors, which had recently been established, held a session surrounded by SAVAK agents. On 9 January, in Qom's martyr square, the blood of clerics and workers flowed on the ground, mingled and boiled to make the world understand that our movement is a divine movement, and steps were taken towards obtaining the rights of the oppressed.

The temporary Friday imam of Qom then referred to the issue of taxes being discussed by the representatives of the Majlis and said: Let me address one of the dimensions of taxes which is being discussed in the Majlis. We continuously ask for the continuation of the discussion on taxes in the Majlis. The great revered scholars also speak on the subject. From the standpoint of religious jurisprudence and law, competent individuals discuss this issue, hence, I requested of some of the officials that they not make this discussion a headline in the newspapers in order to prevent it from being taken advantage of improperly. These discussions build the future of the Islamic Republic and the people want to study them. If the issue is raised and discussed in this manner, problems will be fewer in implementation. In the judicial dimension, we find that due to the particular conditions of the time which the Majlis faced, the general points of our laws were ratified on the basis of Islamic standards in the Majlis and the Council of Guardians and offered to the officials for implementation, but because the details were not discussed, we have certain problems. And although the Judicial Council holds sessions every week and we sit with legal experts and clerics at a religious juridical level and solve the problems, still there are many problems left. Our religious scholars and clerics must note that our general points are rich. The rest of

the world does not have the author of "Javaher" and Sheykh Ansari. And there is not another person in the world like the imam of the nation. Today in the Islamic Republic, the statements of the author of "Javaher" are implemented line by line. Again, I request that the issue of taxes be raised as a scholarly discussion and if there are any errors, they should be resolved in a friendly manner. I wish all issues were discussed in this way. The prosecutor general then referred to the important decisions of the leaders of the OPEC member countries in the recent meeting and added: For a long time, seven large U.S. and British oil companies engaged in vast efforts in order for the price [as published]. Had they succeeded in this effort, they would have plundered \$72 million of the God-given wealth of the Third World every day. The same subjugating rich people who killed more than 2,500 people in India and deformed many children without anyone asking them why, the same seven companies hold the power of the world's oil. But despite the overall efforts of the 13 OPEC member countries, because of the major efforts of Iran, benefitting from the blood of the martyrs and the presence of our people on the scene in the Friday and congregational prayers, our government spoke with all its power and our oil minister defended the position of our country very well, and, finally, the price of oil was stabilized in its present form.

We thank God that we were able to prevent that plundering of the people's rights.

Ayatollah Sane'i added: Another issue that I wanted to point out concerns charity, of which we have a great deal in this country. Those whose financial situation permits should attend to this affair before they pass away. Those who have land and whose land cannot be taken away in accordance with the law must be generous and place it at the disposal of the officials in order to eliminate the difficulties, and buy and build houses for these students. Now that your student children are living under difficult conditions in Tehran in guest houses and your student daughters are living in dungeons, it would be proper for those who are in a good financial position to pay attention to this issue. Another issue is, as you know, that martyr Qoddusi and martyr Beheshti trained some of the clerics who are now serving in the courts and prosecutors' offices. For this purpose, a location has been assigned under the supervision of Ayatollahs Jannati and Meshkini for which those who are able should provide building aid.

Then, addressing the courts and prosecutors' offices as well as the law enforcement agents, he said: As a legal duty, I would like to say to all the military and non-military revolution prosecutors' offices and all agents for whom I am legally responsible, the agents must investigate, gather information and discover and eliminate the centers and sources of corruption,

prostitution and bribery. Of course, regular deviations are dealt with in the prosecutors' offices. But if certain individuals corrupt the boys and girls in schools, do those who are in the bribery gangs and who forge signatures and seals not commit corruption? I declare that those who come from me with recommendations, first of all, act according to the law. Secondly, report these offenders to me in order that they may be prosecuted.

He emphasized: The committees, Guards Corps and Police Department must prosecute the sources of corruption and bribery, regardless of their position and status, as the corrupt of the earth. Investigating this issue is within the authority of the Revolution Prosecutor's Office. Those who want to discredit the regime through any calculated action must be arrested and punished. The Muslim society cannot see its children being dragged into corruption or that there is corruption in a ministry. Your courts in the beginning of the revolution preserved the revolution. Our magistrate goes on pilgrimage and sleeps on the street because he cannot afford anything else. This is a source of pride for us. Referring to selection, Ayatollah Sane'i said: The issue of selection is managed on the instructions of the imam of the nation and by competent people; we hope it will improve in the future.

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IRAN

WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX ANNOUNCED FOR OCT-NOV 84

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 25 Dec 84 p 12

[Text] The wholesale price index for goods in Iran during the period 23 October-21 November 1984, at a figure of 378, increased by 2 percent over the previous month. This index, compared with the figure for the same period last year, shows a 7.8 percent increase. The wholesale price index figure, after the omission of seasonal fluctuations, was 0.8 percent higher than the index figure for the period 23 September-22 October 1984.

In the course of the first eight months of this year, the average price index for wholesale goods in Iran increased by 7.5 percent compared to a similar period last year.

The increase in the wholesale price index for goods this month was mostly due to the increase in the price of fruits, vegetables, and rice. And the price of dairy products, eggs, red meat, livestock, cotton seeds, unginced cotton, leaf tobacco, water pipe tobacco (due to the increase in the government purchasing price), certain construction materials, cotton and silk fabrics, air pressure pumps and gases increased, while the price of wheat and legumes decreased.

Major Groups of the Index

1. Goods Produced and Consumed in the Country

In this month, the price index for goods produced and consumed in the country, at a figure of 422.6, increased by 2.4 percent compared to the previous month.

The increase in the price index for goods produced and consumed in the country was mostly due to the increase in the price of fruits, vegetables, and rice. In this group, the price of dairy products, eggs, red meat, livestock, cotton seeds, unginced cotton, leaf tobacco, water pipe tobacco, certain construction materials, cotton and silk fabrics, and clothing also increased, while the price of wheat and legumes decreased.

The index for the above-mentioned group, after the omission of seasonal fluctuations, shows an increase of 1 percent compared to the previous month.

The index for goods produced and consumed in the country increased by 10.3 percent compared to a similar month last year.

2. Imported Goods

The price index for imported goods during the October-November 1984 period increased by 0.4 percent. The small increase in imported goods in this month was due to the increase in the price of printing machines, nuts and bolts, air pressure pumps and gases.

The index for this group after the omission of seasonal fluctuations shows an increase of 0.4 percent compared to the previous month.

The price index for imported goods increased by 3 percent compared to a similar month last year.

3. Exported Goods

The price index for exported goods in this month rose by 0.1 percent. The small increase in the price index for exported goods was due to the fluctuations in the price of (salambur).

The index of the above-mentioned group decreased by 1.4 percent compared to last month, after the omission of seasonal fluctuations.

The index for exported goods increased by 6.2 percent compared to a similar month last year.

Main Groups of the Index

Foodstuff and Livestock

The increase in the price of fruits and vegetables, at 9.7 percent, and grains and their products, at 2 percent (particularly rice, which increased by 4.6 percent), had the greatest share in the 3.5 percent increase in the price index for foodstuff and livestock this month. In this group, the price of dairy products and eggs increased by 0.8 percent; meat, chicken, fish and their products by 0.3 percent; spices, tea, coffee and cocoa by 0.4 percent; and livestock by 1 percent, but the price of legumes decreased by 3.3 percent.

The index for this group, after the omission of seasonal fluctuations, increased by 1.4 percent compared to the previous month.

The price index for foodstuff and livestock is 14.1 percent higher than the index figure for a similar month last year.

Textile Products and Clothing

The increase in the price of various kinds of thread at 0.3 percent, cotton and silk fabrics at 0.4 percent, carpet at 0.3 percent, and clothing at 2.4 percent caused an increase of 0.3 percent of the index for textile products and clothing.

In this group, the price of wool and cotton decreased by 0.4 percent and woolen fabrics by 2 percent.

The index for textile products and clothing, after the omission of seasonal fluctuations, decreased by 0.2 percent compared to the previous month.

The index for the above-mentioned group shows an increase of 0.1 percent compared to a similar month last year.

Exclusive Groups

The price index for agricultural and animal husbandry products increased by 4.5 percent this month, due to the increase in the index for the farming group by 5.2 percent and animal husbandry and fishing by 1 percent.

After the omission of seasonal fluctuations, the index for this group increased by 1.8 percent compared to the previous month.

The index for the agricultural and animal husbandry group is 20.8 percent higher than the index figure for a similar month last year.

Construction Materials

In the month reported, the index for construction materials increased by 1.1 percent, due to the increase in the price of metal construction materials by 8 percent and non-metal construction materials by 1.2 percent.

The index for construction materials, after omitting seasonal fluctuations, did not change in comparison to the previous month.

The index for this group shows an increase of 7.6 percent compared to a similar month last year.

Published by the economic statistics office of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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IRAN

DR NURBAKHSH DISCUSSES MONETARY POLICIES

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 23 Dec 84 p 16

[Interview with Central Bank Director General Dr Mohammad Nurbakhsh;
date and place not specified]

[Text] The rate of inflation in the course of the first 7 months of this year amounted to 12.8 percent, which decreased by 7.3 percent over a comparable period last year. The Central Bank will issue gold coins by the end of this year.

Dr Mohammad Nurbakhsh, the director general of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, announced the above statement in an exclusive interview with IRNA and explained the situation vis-a-vis cash in circulation (inflation), the Islamic banking operation, and the currency situation vis-a-vis exports as well as other monetary and financial matters concerning the country. Regarding the situation of the cash in circulation and the steps taken towards stabilizing it, the director general of the Central Bank said: Fortunately, with the steps that have been taken in the area of reducing the volume of cash in circulation, the level of cash in circulation in the course of the first six months of this year has approximately stabilized. If we look at the period 20 February-23 August 1983, we see that in the course of these six months, the volume of cash in circulation reached 6,788 billion rials from 6,430 billion rials, an increase of about 5 percent, whereas, from 20 March 1984, when the cash in circulation was 7,514 billion rials, to 22 September 1984, when it reached 7,519, the level of cash in circulation remained approximately the same.

Nurbakhsh announced that the main factor in the stabilization of the volume of cash in circulation was the monetary policies of the government in controlling government expenditures. He also considered the payment of banking credits and their control with consideration for the implementation of the new banking system, in which credits are put at the disposal of customers on the basis of particular transactions, preventing the passage of

credit through several hands, to be effective in stabilizing the amount of cash in circulation. Then, referring to the level of inflation in the first 7 months of this year, he said: With the system of distribution in place, the new plans of the Ministry of Commerce and other factors which were mentioned, the level of inflation in the first 7 months of this year reached 12.8 percent, whereas this level during a similar period last year was 20.1 percent.

He added: The rate of inflation in the food group last year was 21.3 percent, which this year reached 8.4 percent; housing was 19.2 percent, which reached 14.8 percent; clothing reached from 31 percent to 14.4 percent; and household furnishings reached from 21 to 6.4 percent. He expressed hope that if the three factors of controlling government expenditures, the new banking credit system, and the distribution system continue to move as harmoniously as before, by 20 March 1985, the Central Bank will have succeeded in controlling cash in circulation and inflation.

He added: Recently, about 300 billion rials was deposited in the banking system as the registration fees of the pilgrims to Mecca, of which about two-thirds, that is, 200 billion rials, was transferred within the banking system and about 100 billion rials has come to the banking system from outside, the positive role of which, in connection with the cash in circulation, we certainly cannot deny.

In connection with interest-free banking operations, the director general of the Central Bank said: According to the 7-month statistics through 22 October 1984, the investment deposits, including short- and long-term, were more than 1,200 billion rials and interest-free loans about 300 billion rials. In connection with transactions, the balance of transactions on the basis of Islamic contracts was about 400 billion rials.

He added: Thus far, about 54 billion rials have been put at the disposal of the people in interest-free loans. In regards to non-petroleum exports, Dr Nurbakhsh said:

The statistics on national exports in the first six months of this year show the positive growth that the Islamic Republic has enjoyed in this area. In the above-mentioned period, about 107,000 tons of non-petroleum products, at a value of \$165 million, were exported, which in terms of weight was an increase of about 17 percent and in value 26 percent over a comparable period last year. Concerning the new decisions about currency obtained from exports and also the opening of currency accounts, Dr Nurbakhsh said: Based on the ratification of the Cabinet, an exporter will be able to choose one of two options. He may either place the currency obtained from his exports at the disposal of the bank and, in exchange, in addition to the rials

from the sale of currency, receive a prize of the difference between the export and the preferred rate, this difference being due to the difference between the price of goods in the country and abroad, or this exporter may import goods which are announced vis-a-vis the export of goods and the currency that is deposited and distribute them in the country.

He added: The exporter may also transfer his currency to an importer who wants to import an item. Concerning the permit for opening a currency account, the director general of the Central Bank said: After the decision to control currency, there were people who had undeclared currency and, for this reason, they could not send their currency abroad. Recently, with the decision that was made, this group may go to the branches of the banks and open currency accounts, thereby changing their currency to declared currency and having it recorded in their passports.

Concerning the issuance of gold coins, he said: Considering the reception by the people to the distribution of gold coins by the bank, we intend to distribute coins among the applicants through the banks by the end of this year. In this manner, both the price of coins will be controlled in the free market and also it is anticipated that with the coin distribution, [the price] will significantly decline in the domestic market.

Concerning the currency situation of the country, the director of the Central Bank said: The policy of the Central Bank in regards to the currency situation is to act on the basis of controlling expenditures and conforming them with the revenues in such a way that every year the balance of our currency payments will be positive and we will not have a decrease in our currency reserves, which has a strategic aspect.

Concerning the national budget for the period 21 March 1985-20 March 1986 and the level of borrowings from the Central Bank, Dr Nurbakhsh said: The figure of borrowings of the government from the Central Bank in the 1985-86 budget is less than that ratified for the previous year. What is intended by the banking system is to increasingly reduce the reliance of the government on the banking system. This can be an important factor in controlling the flow of cash and inflation in the society. In this connection, a study of revenues and revenue estimation on the basis of facts and expenditure estimates will be an effective help.

For a sound and healthy budget, he said in conclusion, by the end of this year, the first bank notes to be printed in Iran will be available. He also said: In the future, 2,000-rial bank notes will also be printed and distributed.

IRAN

HOUSING PROJECTS FOR EMPLOYEES, WORKERS ANNOUNCED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 10 Jan 85 p 26

[Text] In a conference with the media, the minister of housing and urban development, accompanied by the general director of the urban lands organization and the deputy minister for parliamentary affairs of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, explained the new government policies on the housing of employees and workers, the transfer of government buildings to the people, the transfer and building of 10-50 housing projects to individuals and companies, the pre-sale of 6,500 apartments in Ekbatan Township, the transfer of land to people throughout the country, the use of the benefits of the new projects of the Ministry of Housing, creating rental buildings, and so on.

Concerning the recent plan of the Ministry which was ratified by the Economic Council, Engineer Kazeruni, the minister of housing and urban development, said: In this plan, which involves Article 67 of the bylaws on urban land, the partnership of the people has been examined and will be implemented from 21 March 1985.

This plan is not only restricted to the registered construction companies but a local builder, a construction expert or even an ordinary person may participate in this project.

In carrying out this plan, individuals up to 10 housing units, companies with the partnership of banks up to 50 housing units, and banks or public benefit organizations such as interest-free funds over 50 units can engage in building houses in partnership with the Ministry of Housing.

The minister of housing and urban development also said: Engineering groups in the form of individuals, construction

consultants and even government employees may participate in this project.

Then, concerning the transfer of land throughout the country, Isari, the director general of the urban land organization said: In 150-170 cities in the country, we have selected families of up to 3 persons and are prepared to transfer land to them.

He added: The problem of land transfer has been resolved in 100 cities and we will even transfer land to single people who meet the marriage requirements.

He referred to the statistics on the transferred lands and said: Thus far, 145,229 pieces of land, 4,231,692 square meters, have been allotted to housing throughout the country and also 1,056,000 square meters of land, 2,605 pieces, has been distributed for non-housing usage.

Shortage and High Prices of Housing

Concerning the housing shortage and the fluctuation in land prices, the minister of housing and urban development said: Since 3 or 4 years ago, the price of housing has decreased by 20-45 percent in the cities. One of the reasons for the high price of housing is its shortage, of which a major part concerns the whole of the economic sector which exists in Iran. However, in connection with the housing shortage, the recent plan that I mentioned, will be implemented with the participation of the people and the banks.

The Ministry of Housing said: One of the essential policies and one of the needs in housing, especially in large cities, is rentals, which account for 60 percent of the housing in the large cities in the world.

Concerning the building of rental housing units by the private sector, the minister of housing said: We intend to change the situation of housing from the lottery and incidental forms and make it more permanent and certain. Therefore, with a plan which was ratified by the economic council, the issue of housing and land with the loans granted by banks will be on a secure course. In other words, everyone should know that if, for example, they deposit 10,000 rials in this account, after 5 years they will certainly own a home.

Fortunately, in the bylaws on urban lands, some changes were made, which were also ratified by the Cabinet. One of the mechanisms which was suggested was that we should expand and develop rental housing. In this connection, we have provided some facilities for the private sector in order to invest in rental housing.

The minister of housing mentioned the rental period to be eight years and added: After this period, residential units will be placed at the disposal of its builder.

The Problem of Transferred Lands

Concerning the problems of lands transferred by the Islamic revolution housing foundation and other organizations early in the revolution, the minister of housing and urban development said: Recently, in numerous sessions that we had with the officials of the housing foundation and the urban land organization, this issue was resolved and the deeds of the lands, about 180,000 pieces, will be gradually transferred to individuals.

He referred to the policies and recent plans of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development and said: It is decided that all barren and uncultivated lands will from here on be placed at the disposal of service organizations, such as education, treatment centers, city halls, and so on, in order to eliminate the shortages.

Also, in order to encourage the exports to go to the deprived areas, land will be put by the urban land organization at the disposal of governors general to be distributed among these individuals.

Also, a plan called the land preparation plan for producing land has been prepared, which we hope will be ratified by the Economic Council. This plan can solve the housing and land problem.

Also, during this period, we had a ratification to solve the housing problem of the war refugees. We made exceptions for our fellow patriots in those provinces in order for them to become homeowners. Arrangements are also made for land distribution in the Provinces of Khuzestan, Ilam, Bakhtaran, Kohkiluyeh, Boyer Ahmad, Hormozgan, Bushehr and Fars.

Sale of Government Housing

According to the above-mentioned report, also in this interview, Mo'infar, the deputy minister of housing and urban development for parliamentary affairs, said:

The government policy is that housing projects whose upkeep is primarily not feasible for the government be distributed or sold as priorities.

In this connection, by the end of this year, about 2,000 project homes will be for sale.

He added: According to Note 39 of the budget law, low-cost housing built with developmental funds must be made available for sale, either completed or incomplete. There are also bylaws for this plan which have been ratified by the Cabinet.

He added: Recently, because the government policy is to provide increased aid to employees who are on fixed incomes and who must be helped in other respects, in our preference categorization for selling low-cost housing, we ratified an amendment on the basis of which the preference to government employees is raised from 20 to 50, so that the government employees will be able to benefit from these resources as much as possible. Secondly, the workers' housing cooperative companies are also given priority.

Concerning the housing of government employees and workers, the minister of housing and urban development said: In the plan that has been offered, government employees and workers are also taken into consideration. In short, the plan (to sell government housing) is that they can receive land from the government in the form of cooperatives or as individuals provided they meet the requirements, such as five years of work experience, credit in the bank as the housing share and payment of the loan through the bank, and to build houses or to make use of the existing government buildings or buildings which are built by the private sector on the basis of Note 67. In this connection, in the course of the next few days the form for the sale of 6,500 residential units in the township of Ekbatan will be published in the newspapers.

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IRAN

BRIEFS

PROGRAMS FOR IRAQI CLERICAL REFUGEES--Qom. Hojjat ol-Eslams Mahfuzi, Gharavi and Soltani, the representatives of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri in the Universities of Tehran and Tabriz and the technical engineering complex of Tehran, as well as the Friday imams of Bushehr, Kharg, Taleqan and Dorcheh and some of the combative Kurdish clerics of Iraq met and spoke separately with Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. In these meetings, 2 million rials were offered to him from the honorable people of Bushehr and its suburbs by Hojjat ol-Eslam Madani, the representative of the imam and Friday imam of the province, and more than 1 million rials from the self-sacrificing people of Kharg by Hojjat ol-Eslam Salehi, the Friday imam of that island, to aid the fronts of the imposed war. Based on this report, Hojjat ol-Eslam Musavi, the representative of the imam in Kurdistan, also met with Grand Ayatollah Montazeri and reported on the situation in Kurdistan and the necessity for establishing an office of related organizations under supervision of the Imam's representative in the area for the purpose of planning for the Iraqi Kurdish clerics who seek asylum in the Islamic Republic. In this meeting, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri expressed his appreciation and said: Under these circumstances in which the various strata, including the committed and combative clerics of Iraq, seek asylum in the Islamic Republic from the tyranny of the regime of Saddam, it would be appropriate to establish an office in the border areas of Kurdistan made up of the offices of governors general and other concerned organizations under the supervision of the Imam's representative in that area in order to make appropriate planning for such clerics. God willing, their presence will be effective for Kurdistan and the advancement of the revolution. [Text] [Tehran KEYHAN 9 Jan 85 p 3] 10,000

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